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Abstract 
Keywords: E-banking, operational risk assessment, soft computing tools, fuzzy 
logic, Bayesian networks, Naïve Bayes classifier, factor analysis, risk matrices, 
Nigeria banks. 
This study investigates E-banking Operational Risk Assessment (ORA) to enable the 
development of a new ORA framework and methodology. The general view is that E-
banking systems have modified some of the traditional banking risks, particularly 
Operational Risk (OR) as suggested by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
in 2003. In addition, recent E-banking financial losses together with risk management 
principles and standards raise the need for an effective ORA methodology and 
framework in the context of E-banking. Moreover, evaluation tools and / or methods 
for ORA are highly subjective, are still in their infant stages, and have not yet reached 
a consensus. Therefore, it is essential to develop valid and reliable methods for 
effective ORA and evaluations. 
The main contribution of this thesis is to apply Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) and Tree 
Augmented Naïve Bayes (TAN) classifier as standard tools for identifying OR, and 
measuring OR exposure level. In addition, a new ORA methodology is proposed 
which consists of four major steps:  a risk model, assessment approach, analysis 
approach and a risk assessment process. Further, a new ORA framework and 
measurement metrics are proposed with six factors: frequency of triggering event, 
effectiveness of avoidance barriers, frequency of undesirable operational state, 
effectiveness of recovery barriers before the risk outcome, approximate cost for 
Undesirable Operational State (UOS) occurrence, and severity of the risk outcome.  
The study results were reported based on surveys conducted with Nigerian senior 
banking officers and banking customers. The study revealed that the framework and 
assessment tools gave good predictions for risk learning and inference in such 
systems. Thus, results obtained can be considered promising and useful for both E-
banking system adopters and future researchers in this area.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Motivation 
 
 
1.1  Introduction 
E-banking channels provide customers and banks with the opportunity of cost 
reduction, anytime, anywhere, and easy banking activities. These environments 
undoubtedly facilitate the effective delivery of banking transactions, through the use 
of software, hardware, and applications which are accessible directly in the 
customers’ home, office, and public access points. This inevitable change is due to 
the intensive development of Internet technology and the evolution in 
telecommunication systems. 
However, E-banking has increased and modified some of the traditional banking 
risks such as operational, legal and reputational risk (Imala, 2002; Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision, 2003a; Bank of the Netherlands Antilles, 2007; Trenca et 
al, 2010). E-banking has also increased the technical complexity of many operational 
and security issues, in which users must be authenticated and authorized, in order to 
guarantee a successful and legitimate transaction process (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2003a). As a result E-banking systems risk assessment has 
become increasingly important and in particular that of operational risk. 
Risk assessment is the overall process of identifying, analysing, and evaluating risk 
(Standards Association of Australia, 1999; National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2011a; International Organization for Standardization, 2005, 2011). 
This process often require banks to assess the processes underlying their operations 
against potential threats, vulnerabilities, and their potential impact, which helps in 
revealing the risk exposure level, and the residual risk in the context domain 
(Tanampasidis, 2008; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011). In 
conducting risk assessment, causal relationships between risk factors and other 
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attributes are often analysed from noisy and ambiguous data. This however requires 
using challenging statistical measurement approaches. 
There are a number of risk assessment methodologies and frameworks which are 
often developed to identify risks, measure risk exposure levels and determine the 
residual risks (Tanampasidis, 2008). However, many risk assessment methodologies 
and frameworks have been using the classical risk formula i.e. severity x likelihood to 
create a two dimensional matrix that guides the risk tolerability judgement. These 
methodologies and frameworks often use control effectiveness values obtained 
during Risk and Control Self-Assessment (RCSA) as the overall severity rating scale 
for a given potential vulnerability (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011b). The assumption is that control effectiveness value is equal to the severity 
level of potential vulnerabilities, which is rather vague. 
In addition, the common emerging standards, principles and guidelines either 
focused on introductory basics or on a list of tools. The actual evaluation tools and / 
or methods for risk learning and inference in such systems are highly subjective, and 
are still in their infant stages, and have not yet reached a consensus (Adusei-Poku, 
2005).  
This motivates the investigation of processes, frameworks and tools for effective E-
banking operational risk assessment as addressed in the rest of the thesis. 
1.2 Motivation and Problem Description 
The E-banking system has progressed from the simple informational delivery 
channel to a more detailed transactional delivery channel. E-banking systems provide 
customers and banks with the opportunity for creating new products, services and 
market opportunities worldwide, thus breaching geographical, industrial and 
regulatory barriers (Liao & Cheung, 2002; Daniela et al., 2010). Traditional banking 
channels restrict customers to certain assessing methods, at a specific time and place; 
whereas E-banking services provide customers and banks with the opportunity of 
anytime, anywhere and easy banking activities. 
However, E-banking has increased and modified some of the traditional banking 
risks as mentioned earlier. In particular, operational risk is certainly heightened by 
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the technological complexity of E-banking activities (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2003a; Bank of the Netherlands Antilles, 2007; Trenca et al., 2010).  
Operational risks like most types of risks is often measured using classical risk 
assessment techniques. Many of the frameworks, models, and methodologies 
developed for calculating OR use the classical risk formula (severity x likelihood) to 
create a two dimensional matrix (see Standards Association of Australia, 1999; 
British Standards Institution, 2009, 2010; International Organization for 
Standardization, 2011; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b) that 
guides the risk tolerability judgement as mentioned earlier.  
This classical measurement approach tries to give value to severity and likelihood, by 
requiring the analyst to answer questions such as “severity of what?” and the 
“likelihood of what?”. These questions are answered differently by analysts, some 
refer to the severity of an actual event and its actual outcome, and others refer to the 
severity of potential outcome, an imaginary but realistic outcome, the most probable 
type of accident outcome, or the worst case scenario. Consequently, the likelihood of 
re-occurrence question is subjective as analysts assesses the likelihood of something 
similar happening again, which is rather unclear (ARMS Working Group, 2010) as 
this relies heavily on the intuition of risk analysts in assessing the likelihood and 
exposure of occurrences of adverse events.  
A main drawback of the classical measurement approach is that it requires a 
relatively long time span of historical data and analysts try to assess the likelihood of 
a similar risk event taking place in the future, rather than trying to assess the risk 
present in the event as it unfolded. Although a historical event contains no risk now, 
that does not mean it did not carry risk as it occurred, it is just that the risk was not 
necessarily realised (ARMS Working Group, 2010). Therefore, calculating risk 
based on similar event occurring in future is rather vague and highly subjective. 
Moreover, risk as defined by Hubbard (2010) is a state of uncertainty with the 
possibility of a risk impact. 
Further, the role of infrequent but very huge financial losses and the unpredictable 
nature of risk event occurrences make historical loss data somewhat irrelevant. In 
addition, the majority of the existing approaches do not take into consideration the 
existing or potential risk controls in the assessment process in the proper manner. 
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Analysts are often required to compute the likelihood of re-occurrence by 
multiplying the threat source motivation with the control effectiveness value 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b).   
To solve this problem, a comprehensive and specific assessment methodology and 
framework are needed to identify triggering events and frequency of occurrences 
(which include threats, vulnerabilities and other attributes), the effectiveness of both 
preventive and detective controls, as well as the impact of risk that the event carries 
as it occurs. This is to help recognize the risk exposure level these events 
demonstrate within the E-banking operation.  
It therefore seems logical to take advantage of Fuzzy Logic (FL) / fuzzy set
1
 theory 
and Bayesian Network (BN) approaches that could scan the risk database / dataset, 
incorporate internal and external data, scenario analysis, and Business Environment 
and Internal Control Factors (BEICFs), to automate the detection of certain patterns 
to be raised as potential risks. Such an approach could incorporate expert qualitative 
judgement to define variables and their relationships in order to give a quantitative 
output, and could be used for inference and predictions of various causes of action 
and intervention.    
1.3 Research Objectives  
The research mainly focuses on proposing a new risk assessment methodology and 
framework for evaluating operational risk in the context of E-banking systems. Risks 
inherent in such systems are identified from E-banking customers’ risk experiences 
and further assessed from the bank’s view point, to determine the risk exposure level 
and what action (risk treatment) if any is required.  
The research identifies soft computing tools, specifically FIS and TAN classifier as 
tools for automating the evaluation and analysis process. The major issue in the risk 
assessment process is identifying risks, risk factors, effectiveness of control 
mechanisms and the risk outcome. Moreover, because qualitative data and high data 
quantity analysis is a complex concept, its measurement is neither a simple task nor a 
straightforward task thus it is expected to be multidimensional in nature.   
                                                   
1
 Fuzzy set is a concept that was proposed by Zadeh (1965), which acts as a new approach 
to analysing objective uncertainty and vagueness within complex systems. 
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Once the main risk assessment tools and dimension of the framework were clearly 
defined – which set the standard for the E-banking ORA process, then a set of 
metrics to quantify the risk events and risk exposure level were defined.  
1.4 Research Questions  
As previously stated, this research focuses on assessing OR to E-banking systems; it 
will identify the main variable dependencies on E-banking OR and develop a TAN 
classifier to identify risks. Further, it proposes a conceptual framework and a FIS for 
measuring E-banking OR risk exposure level.  
Accordingly, the focus of this thesis is on the following six main research questions:  
Research Question 1:  
How can E-banking operational risk be assessed?  
Research Question 2: 
How can soft computing tools be utilized for E-banking operational risk assessment? 
Research Question 3:  
How can usable operational risk assessment methodology be defined for E-banking 
systems? That would better help the banking industries develop a risk management 
strategy 
Research Question 4:  
How can usable and measurable operational risk assessment framework be defined 
for E-Banking systems? 
Research Question 5:  
How can a set of usable and measurable metrics be specified for E-Banking systems 
risk analysis and evaluation? 
Research Question 6:  
What is the current state of risk to the Nigerian E-banking system? 
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These main research questions lead to the following detailed research questions that 
are to be answered: 
 How can E-banking risk exposure level be determined from identified 
potential risks, triggering events, effectiveness of control mechanisms and 
magnitude of risk impact, in order to ascertain the security level of the E-
banking system?  
 How can a specified set of variables be identified from both banks’ and 
customers’ perspective, to determine the parameters and structure of the E-
banking operational risk, in such a way they will enable the evaluation and 
analysis of risks exposure level in such systems?  
 How can the TAN classifier and the FIS be positively utilised for evaluating 
the E-banking OR data and also for determining the risk exposure levels?  
 What are the risks and risk exposure level within the Nigerian E-banking 
system? 
1.5 Research Approach and Methodology 
In order to achieve the research objectives, the research was structured in the 
following three phases: 
Phase 1: A review of the literature and the development of new operational risk 
assessment methodology and framework, and definition of suitable risk 
assessment tools and techniques  
The literature that addresses E-banking system and risks including related concepts 
such as adoption, risk assessment process, and tools and techniques was reviewed. 
The review commences with an attempt to define ‘E-banking’ and identify 
specifically factors for Internet banking adoption within countries.  This process led 
to the review of classical operational risk assessment methodologies, frameworks, 
and tools and techniques, as well as in the context of E-banking.  
The second aspect in this phase involved developing a new risk assessment 
methodology and framework, which is represented in three different context areas: 
risk identification, dataset analysis and risk evaluation. The risk identification stage 
is about collecting and listing of all potential risks, risk scenarios, and other domain 
 7 
 
knowledge related to the context area. This process provides the input for the 
assessment process. The second context area of the framework is the dataset analysis 
process. It involves identifying the triggering events (risk factors), the control 
mechanisms in place, and the UOS, which will lead to identification of the risk 
exposure level inherent in the system. The third context area is a process which 
requires detailed analysis of the factors in the second context area, using the 
measurement metrics and values previously defined, in deriving the risk exposure 
level and making risk treatment recommendation.  
Previously proposed methodologies and frameworks from available literature were 
used, specifically the Aviation Risk Management Solutions (ARMS) safety issues 
framework (ARMS Working Group, 2010), the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (2011) risk assessment methodology, and Gledhill & Álvarez (2010, 
2011a, 2011b) RCSA metric. The development of the conceptual risk framework is 
designed to provide comprehensive guidance on what is being risk assessed, which 
helped to reduce subjectivity in the assessment. Further, the effectiveness of risk 
controls and the cost of UOS are integrated in the assessment process.   
The third aspect in this phase involved defining clearly the risk assessment tools and 
techniques, which in this case are TAN, FIS, factor analysis and Bow Tie analysis 
techniques. 
Phase 2: Collecting data from secondary data and surveys 
In this study a triangulated approach is adopted. Data was collected in three phases. 
Firstly, secondary data were collected from the World Bank report on the global 
overview of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) trends and Policies 
in developing countries (Qiang et al., 2006), and the 2006 World Factbook (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2007). In addition, public literature on six countries 
representing a cross-regional perspective (United Kingdom, United State of America, 
Italy, Romania, Hong Kong and Nigeria) was used. These data were then used for the 
development of a FIS to identify the Internet banking adoption rate and to provide a 
clear definition and establishment of the specific type of E-banking risk considered 
in this thesis.  
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Secondly, a survey was collected using a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. 
Respondents were E-banking and non E-banking customers. Finally, an electronic 
questionnaire survey was conducted, based on the experimental findings on the 
customer-based-questionnaire and our proposed operational risk assessment 
framework. The electronic questionnaire was conducted with senior banking officers 
involved with E-banking system operation and risk management. Respondents for 
both surveys were selected from two commercial banks in Nigeria. Data were 
collected between January 2011 and June 2011 and between January 2012 and 
March 2012 respectively.  
Phase 3: Data analysis, validation and testing of the ORA tools, methodology, 
framework and defined measurement metrics through a case study. 
Once the data were collected, analysis was undertaken. The data collected from the 
banking customers, were analysed using two statistical packages: SPSS V.19 
software and WEKA (Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis) development 
toolbox. The aim was to determine customers’ E-banking risk experiences and 
factors for non E-banking adoption. The collected data were analysed using Factor 
Analysis and a TAN classifier to identify the risks inherent in the Nigeria E-banking 
system. 
Finally, the data collected from the banking officers, were analysed using MATLAB 
Fuzzy Logic toolbox. The aim was to validate our proposed operational risk 
assessment framework and methodology, and to determine the operational risk 
exposure level inherent in the Nigerian E-banking system. However, it is important 
to state here that some of these phases were conducted in parallel and not 
independently of each other.  
1.6 Original Contributions 
The study proposes a new ORA methodology and framework for E-banking systems 
risk assessment. A set of risk analysis metrics, which helped to facilitate evaluation 
and analysis of state-of-the-art risk assessment processes and frameworks, is also 
defined and applied to the ORA framework.  
The study investigates also the possibility of deploying soft computing tools 
specifically the Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes classifier (a Bayesian Network 
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approach), to model the causal relationships between risk factors, key risk indicators 
and other attributes in the context of E-banking systems. The performance of the 
TAN classifier is then compared with three other soft computing tools (C4.5 
Decision Tree, Naïve Bayes (NB) and Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)).  
The study also developed a Fuzzy Inference System which uses a fuzzy set theory 
and Fuzzy Logic approach, to measure Internet banking adoption rate and 
operational risk exposures inherent in the E-banking system.  
The study argued that soft computing tools such as Fuzzy Inference Systems and 
Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes classifiers combine a natural mechanism for 
expressing what-if-analysis with efficient algorithms for inference and learning. 
1.7 Outline of the Thesis 
This thesis comprises seven chapters: 
 Chapter 1: provides the background to the research and introduces the research 
questions and a brief overview of the research approach and methodology. The 
layout and content of the chapters are also described.  
 Chapter 2: reviews the E-banking system in general, the operational risks in such 
a system and the factors for Internet banking adoption, the risk assessment 
processes, tools and techniques. 
 Chapter 3: reviews related work on existing risk assessment methodologies and 
frameworks, and related work on E-banking operational risk assessment. 
 Chapter 4: focuses on our contributions towards identifying the key dimensions 
for developing a new operational risk assessment methodology and framework, 
for measuring identified risks / factors in an E-banking system. Further, it 
presents our contributions towards defining the risk metrics and measurement 
procedure for the proposed ORA framework. 
 Chapter 5: defines clearly the research methodology followed in this thesis. 
 Chapter 6: discusses the case study and experimental results. It focuses on our 
contributions towards identifying the major factors for Internet banking adoption. 
It presents a methodology for identifying these factors, using FIS. It also presents 
soft computing approaches for identifying risk attributes dependencies, 
parameters, and the network structure. It discusses the case study and the 
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automated approaches using Factor Analysis and TAN classifier as a feasibility 
test for data cleaning and risks identification. Finally, an automated approach is 
applied using FIS, as a feasibility test for the proposed risk assessment 
framework and methodology. Further, the system is evaluated based on the 
operational risk exposure level. 
 Chapter 7: presents the overall research contributions and findings as well as any 
research limitations, along with suggestions for future research.  
1.8 Summary  
This chapter lays the foundation for the research by providing background 
information and by introducing motivations and the research aims and objectives. 
The research questions, approach and methodology for achieving the research 
questions were then presented. Finally, an outline of the thesis was provided.  
The next chapter will present a general background on E-banking systems and risk 
assessment. The overview of factors for E-banking adoption and operational risks 
inherent in such systems, specifically within the context of Nigeria will be presented 
in the next chapter. Further, the review of risk assessment methodologies and 
frameworks is presented. Finally, an overview of risk assessment tools and 
techniques is presented. 
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Chapter 2 
Background of E-banking, Operational 
Risk Assessment, Tools and Techniques 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
E-banking is not a new concept; banks have recognized the significant advances in 
and functionality of Information Communication Technology (ICT) adoption. During 
the last decade, the amount of literature published in the field of E-banking has 
grown noticeably. However, literature in this large research area examines E-banking 
in varying ways.  
The general background presented here with regards to E-banking includes its 
definition, benefits, challenges and factors for Internet banking adoption. Operational 
risks in E-banking and specifically in the context of the Nigeria E-banking system 
are also presented. This chapter particularly focuses on operational risk assessment. 
Different types of operational risk assessment tools and techniques are discussed 
with highlighting on their advantages and disadvantages. This chapter particularly 
focuses on those subtopics of these large research areas which are directly applicable 
to this research. Each section includes a number of subsections to address the details 
relevant to this research.  
2.2 E-banking Definition 
During recent decades, E-banking has been defined in several different ways, 
partially because it refers to several types of services and is conducted via a variety 
of platforms such as the Internet, Automatic Teller Machine (ATM), Personal 
Computer (PC), telephone and mobile phone, through which customers can request 
information and carry out various forms of banking transactions (Nsouli & 
Schaechter, 2002; Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2003; Basel 
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Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003a; Anguelov et al., 2004; The Federal 
Trade Commission, 2006; Kondabagil, 2007; Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, 
2010; Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 2011). E-banking unlike traditional 
banking channels which restrict the customer to certain assessing methods, and at a 
specific time and place, provide customers and banks with the opportunity of 
anytime, anywhere, and easy banking activities. 
The position adopted in this research is that which the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia (2011) use, “a range of banking technologies that uses electronic 
equipment such as PC, Telephone,  Internet, ATM, and mobile phones for quick, easy 
and efficient delivery of banking services and products to satisfy customers’ needs” 
(Commonwealth Bank of Australia, 2011, p.1).  
2.2.1 Benefits to E-banking  
As with all forecasts and estimates, different authors provide different accounts of 
the magnitude of savings in E-banking against the traditional banking system. These 
savings come through the combined effects of better utilization of the workforce and 
equipment, more economic usage of space, and operational savings. Using Internet 
or mobile phone technologies for banking reduces further the cost of banking 
transactions, by enabling different products and services to be targeted at different 
consumers in different demographic regions and hard to reach areas (e.g. rural areas) 
(Jayawardhena & Foley, 2000), thus increasing the effectiveness of market coverage, 
reducing transaction cost and providing customer acquisition at the same time 
(Jayawardhena & Foley, 2000; Luštšik, 2003; Kumar et al., 2010).  
E-banking has also facilitated the expansion of services and paved the way for 
innovation in different banking products for customers such as insurance, loans, 
stock brokerage and so on (Gurău, 2005). Consequently, better management will 
occur as a result of the ability of customers to download their transaction history, as 
they can do a “what-if” analysis on their own PC before effecting any transaction on 
the web (Jeremy, 1988; Comptroller of the Currency Administrator of National 
Banks, 1999; Gurău, 2002; Luštšik, 2003; Banstola, 2007).  
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Globally, individuals are becoming more and more aware of the environment and the 
need to protect it. E-banking systems can contribute to this by reducing landfill as a 
result of the paperless transaction process it offers.   
2.2.2 Challenges to E-banking  
E-banking systems have presented additional but not new type of risks and security 
problems, influencing and heightening the complexity of banking institutions’ 
activities (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003a). The mode of risk 
occurrences, magnitude, and consequences takes on new dimension (Monetary 
Authority of Singapore, 2002, 2008). Subjectivity involved in determining severity 
of impact when a risk is released and lack of adequate quantitative information on 
probability of risks occurring may be new to some banks (Monetary Authority of 
Singapore, 2002, 2008). There may also be differences in the degree to which a 
particular risk is applicable and experienced across different banks, regions, 
countries and even customers (Owojori et al., 2011).   
Moreover, the system has yet to see a general consensus on global regulations, as 
many differences exist in international banking policies and regulations. Poor policy 
and regulation enforcement procedures still exist in some countries (Gurău, 2002, 
2005; Ezeoha, 2005, 2006). Determining when an E-banking service triggers the 
need for a license can be very difficult (Financial Fraud Action UK, 2011).  
In addition, identifying and monitoring money laundering cases is also a major issue 
of concern, due to the anonymity E-banking affords, which is why account opening 
fraud has continued to rise (Financial Fraud Action UK, 2011). However many 
countries have issued specific guidelines on identifying customers, but it is not clear 
whose regulatory authorities will investigate and pursue money laundering 
violations. The answer lies in coordinating legislation and regulation internationally.  
2.2.3 E-banking Adoption 
The importance of E-banking systems is growing worldwide (Gupta et al., 2000; 
Delgado et al., 2007; Kondabagil, 2007; Arnaboldi & Claeys, 2009) and in particular, 
the Internet as a channel for financial service delivery is fundamentally seeing an 
increase in adoption rate (Shah & Siddiqui, 2006; Garter cited in (Finextra Research, 
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2008); Arnaboldi & Claeys, 2009). Internet banking adoption is mainly driven by 
factors external to the banking industry, such as the percentage of households with 
access to Personal Computer ownership and access to the Internet at home, and 
higher broadband penetration rate (Anaboldi & Claeys, 2008). Specific factors 
related to the banking sector, such as security, low trust in banking institutions and 
actors, privacy concerns, and low development and effective use of financial 
services, are a major effect to E-banking systems adoption (Delgado et al., 2007; 
Centeno, 2005).  
Although Internet banking is seeing fundamental increase in adoption, it has however 
not led to a decline in the use of branch-based services but resulted in higher take-up 
of other channels such as ATMs and telephone banking (Garter cited in (Finextra 
Research, 2008)). Recent studies have shown that customers are still using their 
physical branch network for detailed financial transactions. Customers prefer a mix 
of delivery channels rather than an exclusive reliance upon any single channel 
(Delgado et al., 2007; Caliser & Gumussoy, 2008; Ojeka & Ikpefan, 2011).  
Whilst there are significant amount of studies on Internet banking adoption related 
with customers attitudes and perceptions, and country related issues (see Anaboldi & 
Claeys, 2008; Caliser & Gumussoy, 2008; Delgado et al., 2007; Durkin, 2007; 
Eriksson & Nilsson, 2007; Yiu et al., 2007; Chimeke et al., 2006; Cheng et al., 2006; 
Corrocher, 2006; Garau, 2005 & 2006; Centeno, 2005; Erdener & Talha, 2005; 
White & Nteli, 2004; Wang et al., 2003 & 2004; Gopalakrishnan et al., 2003; 
Maurino et al., 2003; Liao & Cheung, 2002; Howcrofth et al., 2002; Polatoglu & 
Ekin, 2001; Tan & Teo, 2000; Sathye, 1999; Yan & Paradi, 1998), generally, there is 
a broad concern about the security of the new technology.  
However, the fragmentation of research into E-banking (specifically Internet 
banking) adoption across countries, to include not only the advanced countries, but 
also developing countries from Africa and Asia, has inhibited scholars from 
achieving more integrated factors for Internet banking adoption and rate of adoption. 
Moreover, Ezeoha (2005), Chimeke et al. (2006), Corrocher (2006), and Garau 
(2006) report that many countries have not taken full advantage of this technological 
development, and the adoption rate differs among countries and among banks within 
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the same country. Thus, it is not known whether the same challenges facing Internet 
banking in one country are the same as in another.  
To address this gap, this study investigated public reports on six different countries 
(United Kingdom, Italy, Romania, Hong Kong, United States of America, and 
Nigeria) and implemented a FIS to determine the adoption rate for Internet banking 
adoption from both customers’ and banks’ perceptions. The next section presents the 
review of these six countries. 
2.2.4 Factors for Internet Banking Adoption  
Based on the survey conducted on 2,040 adults in the U.S., about 49% of active 
online users conduct most of, if not all, of their banking via the Internet, with an 
increase of nearly 23% from early 2007 (Finextra Research, 2009a). In addition, 
Forrester Research finds that U.S. consumers are using the Internet banking channel 
more frequently to access their accounts during the current global financial crisis 
(Hesse et al., 2008). 
However, engagement at many of the top banking sites first saw a decrease in the 
industry from the Q2 of 2007 to the Q3 of 2008 (Finextra Research, 2008; comScore 
Inc., 2009). Further, U.S. banking customers are affected by factors such as increased 
joblessness, less cash, credit crisis, and the overall poor health of the U.S. economy 
(comScore Inc., 2009). As a result, consumers are reducing their Internet banking 
activities. Thus, bankers who have relied on engaged visits from customers to build 
loyalty and to cross-sell additional products and services are facing significant 
marketing challenges in attracting consumers’ time and attention, at a time when 
consumers’ confidence in their banks is being tested. While this is a challenge to 
some of the players, it is however an opportunity for other competitors to address 
customers with the choice of new technology adoption (comScore Inc., 2009; 
Finextra Research, 2009b). 
Over the past decade the penetration of Internet banking in the U.K. has gradually 
grown by 49.5% (comScore Inc., 2008a & 2008b). However, a study released by 
Forrester Research finds that the growth of Internet banking in the U.K. is beginning 
to slow down in the last two years after a steady take-up of the service between 2000 
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and 2005 (Hesse et al., 2008). Phishing attacks
2
 are on the rise by 42%, even though 
Internet banking fraud losses fell by 67% in 2007 (The U.K. Payments Association, 
2008). This however, reaffirmed previous researches which claimed that the major 
influencing factors to Internet banking adoption in the U.K. are the perceived 
security of the bank’s websites, responsiveness of service delivery, ease of use of the 
bank’s website, credibility of the Internet banking provider (White & Nteli, 2004), 
literacy level and Internet accessibility (Howcrofth et al., 2002). 
In Italy the acceptance and use of the Internet influences Internet banking adoption 
(Hesse et al., 2008).  However, not many people use the Internet and as result the 
adoption of Internet banking is relatively low with about 15% of adults banking 
regularly on the Internet. The slow and negative effect is also due to the well-
established traditional banks, which operate in well-defined geographical areas, and 
as a result customers have little or no interest in adopting Internet banking 
(Corrocher, 2006; Hesse et al., 2008). Despite these drawbacks, some of the large 
banks in Italy are currently promoting online banking and are offering financial 
incentives to encourage customers to use it (Hesse et al., 2008). 
Romania with a population of well over 22million, is portrayed as a poor country 
(Garău, 2005). However, it has experienced consistently high rates of growth in both 
IT and telecommunication industries over the last five years (Garău, 2005). The first 
Internet banking service was introduced in Romania in 1999 (Garău, 2002). Since 
then, Internet Banking has become increasingly popular, but not achieved the 
expected level of usage, and the necessary legislative environment is still in their 
infant stages. A major factor to Internet banking adoption is that most customers 
perceive Internet banking as expensive, slow and risky (Garău, 2005). The level of 
knowledge / computer literacy of the population are also influencing directly the 
success of Internet banking adoption in the country. As a result traditional branch 
networks are still the classical channel of banking services in Romania (Garău, 
2005). 
Internet banking in Hong Kong was first introduced in 1997 (Datamonitor, 2008). 
Since then Hong Kong market has strongly recognized the importance of Internet 
                                                   
2
 Phishing attacks occurs when criminals set up a fake website version of a genuine bank, 
and then send out thousands or millions of spam emails asking people to click on a link that 
will send them to that fake website, and thereby steal the victim’s account details, and money 
from the account 
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banking, and it is one of the most advanced Internet banking systems in the world 
(Datamonitor, 2008). However, the number of Internet banking users is relatively 
low compared with the number of Internet users. Internet adoption rate is about 83% 
while Internet banking is about 32%. The major inhibitors to Internet banking by 
non-adopters are risk, the ease of use, the convenience of using ATM, phone 
banking, branch banking, and perceived usefulness of the technology. In addition, 
security of the innovation continues to be a main concern for adopters and non-
adopters (Lai & Li 2005; Yiu et al., 2007; Datamonitor, 2008).  
The Nigerian banking institutions started to embrace and realize the importance of 
technological adoption for delivery banking products and services after they 
underwent a major banking reform in 2004 (Ezeoha 2005, 2006; Central Bank of 
Nigeria, 2007). In addition, the reformation / deregulation of the telecommunication 
sector have also made the adoption of E-banking system more promising in the 
country, specifically the Global Service for Mobile (GSM) (Ezeoha, 2005 & 2006; 
Ayo et al., 2008). 
However, Internet banking adoption by customers is about 16.7% (Agboola & 
Salawu, 2008). Several reasons account for low Internet banking adoption in Nigeria 
and include adequate operational infrastructures, acquisition of software that can 
handle effectively the Internet banking system, perceived cost, fraudulent activities, 
inability of customers to acquire devices that will enable them to carry out banking 
transactions, high capital investment for banks to operate the full and secure E-
banking system, low level of economic development, ineffective telecommunication 
service providers, and intermittent power supply. Literacy level and unwillingness to 
change banking style are also seen as major factors inhibiting Internet banking 
system adoption in Nigeria (Ezeoha, 2005 & 2006; Agboola, 2006; Chimeke et al., 
2006; The Central Intelligence Agency; 2007; Adeyemi, 2008; Ayo et al., 2008; 
Agboola & Salawu, 2008).  
Across these six countries investigated, bank-specific factors also categorized as 
operational risks are largely the main drivers for Internet banking adoption vis-à-vis 
E-banking systems. As a result, these factors lead to the exploration of E-banking 
operational risk assessment in general and specifically in the context of the Nigerian 
banking industry.  
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2.3 Operational Risk in E-banking 
Commonly, “risk” refers to chance or the likelihood of a given threat-source’s 
exercising a particular potential vulnerability which will have resulting adverse or 
negative impact upon the organization’s objectives (Carroll, 1996; Standards 
Association of Australia, 1999; Nosworthy, 2000; Pfleeger, 2000; National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, 2011a and 2011b). However, Hubbard (2010) and the 
International Organization for Standardization (2011) identifies the basic concept 
necessary for understanding the term risk. The key element of the definition hinges 
upon the state of uncertainty and not the degree of probability. They referred to risk 
as “a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, 
or other undesirable outcome” (Hubbard, 2010; International Organization for 
Standardization, 2011). 
Building upon Hubbard (2010), the International Organization for Standardization 
(2011) and the commonly adopted definition by researchers, the position adopted in 
this research is that “risk is a state of uncertainty when a given threat source exploits 
one or several vulnerabilities, resulting in an adverse or non-adversarial impact, 
where some of the possibilities involve a loss or other undesirable outcome”. The 
key concept of this definition is that it looks upon risk as a state of uncertainty and 
the resulting impact it will have on the organization’s objectives. 
Operational risk is redefined by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in 
2011 as “risk of losses which may be as a result of inadequate or failed internal 
processes, people, systems, or external events”. The definition includes legal risk but 
excludes strategic and reputational risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2011).  
Any compromise to an E-banking system can result in loss of time, decrease in 
productivity, significant loss of money or staff hours, loss of credibility or market 
opportunity, and loss of customers’ trust and confidence (Pennathur, 2001). 
Moreover, recent financial reports reveal that substantial financial losses on E-
banking systems are as a result of Information Systems (IS) malfunctions such as: 
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SQL injections
3
 (Barnett, 2009), viruses, fraud, and phishing attacks, among other 
factors (Bonsón et al., 2008; UK Payments Administration, 2011). For example, the 
number of phishing attacks targeting UK banks and building societies continued to 
rise, from 1,700 reported in 2005 to 61,873 in 2010 (Financial Fraud Action UK, 
2011). Phone banking fraud also went up by 5% (£12.7 million) in 2010 compared 
with 2009, the first ever centrally collated figure (Financial Fraud Action UK, 2011). 
These financial losses have been categorized as operational risk, as a result, the area 
of E-banking operational risk assessment and management is becoming extremely 
attractive for researchers.  
2.3.1 Operational Risk in Nigeria E-banking 
Nigeria is ranked third among the top ten sources for cybercrime in the world (The 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (cited by Wada & Odulaja, 2012). 
Fraud and forgery are one of the highest manifestations of operational risk in the 
Nigerian banking industry (Owojori et al., 2011). This fraud and forgery is highly 
prevalent in ATM and Internet banking (Adepoju & Mohammed, 2010; Wada & 
Odulaja, 2012). Security threats are often carried out through ATM card theft, 
Personal Identity Number (PIN) theft, card reader techniques, PIN pad techniques, 
forced withdrawal and so on (Adepoju & Mohammed, 2010; Wada & Odulaja, 
2012).  
In addition, there are no specific laws for cybercrime and card-related crimes in 
Nigeria. Hackers see this as an opportunity to make fake cards and use customers’ 
stolen identity for transactions (Wada & Odulaja, 2012). Majority of these frauds are 
often carried out by insider attacks (Olasanmi, 2010). These attackers are usually 
successful in executing fraudulent attacks, because of weak internal controls and risk 
management know-how, retention of staff with a high propensity for fraudulent 
practices (Owojori et al., 2011), lack of regular staff training, knowledge / adequate 
investment in computer security and up-to-date technological equipment. Customers’ 
attitude towards safeguarding their account, ATM cards and personal details also 
give these attackers more opportunity for successful fraud and forgeries.  
                                                   
3
 Structured Query Language (SQL) injection is an attack in which malicious code is inserted 
into strings that are later passed to an instance of SQL Server for parsing and execution 
(http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ms161953(v=sql.105).aspx) 
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Further, the lack of an adequate and effective legal and institutional framework, to 
facilitate consolidation and risk management in the country is also a major issue for 
concern. As a result it is common practice for bankers in Nigeria to overlook certain 
risks and even ignore regulatory guidelines meant for risk management (Owojori et 
al., 2011).  
However, there are general laws which are not specific to cybercrime but are being 
enforced to deal with crimes, such as the Nigeria Criminal Code Act 1990, the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act 2004, and the Advance 
Fee Fraud and other Related Offences Act 2006 (Ewelukwa, 2011). 
The general view of these researchers is that despite the level of fraud and forgeries 
in E-banking systems, banks are not keeping up to date with technological changes 
and as a result are putting little effort into minimizing such risks. 
2.4 Operational Risk Assessment  
Risk assessment is the first process and the core element of risk management 
methodologies and thus the heart of risk management (British Standards Institute, 
2010). It involves the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis, and risk 
evaluation according to ISO / IEC 27001 (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2005) and also to (Standards Association of Australia, 1999; 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011a; International Organization 
for Standardization, 2011). Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show the general risk assessment 
contribution to risk management process and a detailed risk assessment process 
respectively.  
According to the ISO / IEC 27001 (International Organization for Standardization, 
2005), risk management is a coordinated activity to direct and control an 
organization with regard to risk. Risk management typically includes risk 
assessment, risk treatment, risk acceptance and risk communication (British 
Standards Institution, 2005). The process of managing risk requires systematic 
application of management policies, procedures and practices to the activities of 
communicating, consulting, establishing the context, identifying, analysing, 
evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risks (British Standards Institution, 
2010). 
 21 
 
Risk assessment
Preparing for risk 
management
 
Establishing the context
 
Risk identification
 
Communication and Consultation
 
Risk analysis
 
Risk evaluation
 
Risk treatment
 
Monitoring and review
 
 Figure 2.1 General risk assessment contributions to risk management process 
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Figure 2.2 A detailed risk assessment process  
The general consensus is that traditional banking risk assessment and management 
principles, tools and techniques are applicable to E-banking activities (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2003a). In this study the general risk assessment 
process is presented for E-banking operational risk assessment. 
Operational risk assessment and management is usually conducted to identify 
operational risk profiles, their causal relationships and measure the risk exposure 
levels, based on their severity of occurrences or to measure and allocate sufficient 
amount of risk based capital for the Value at Risk (VaR) (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2011; Tker, 2005). Effective management of operational risk is 
a fundamental element of any bank’s risk management programme, as operational 
risk is inherent in all banking products, activities, processes and systems (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).  
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As a result, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has continued to focus on 
the practical challenges associated with the development, implementation and 
maintenance of operational risk management and measurement. In 2006, the 
committee developed the Basel II accord to improve the measurement of both credit 
and operational risks (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) while in 
2009 they enhanced the measurement of risks related to securitisation and trading 
book exposures (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009). Further, Basel III 
was then developed in 2011, to strengthen the global capital requirements on bank 
liquidity and leverage, with the aim of raising both the quality and quantity of the 
regulatory capital base and enhancing the risk coverage of the capital framework 
(Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).  For instance, Basel III will 
require banks to hold 4.5% of common equity (up from 2% in Basel II) and 6% of 
Tier I capital (up from 4% in Basel II) of risk-weighted assets (RWA) (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006, 2011).  
Further, the Payment Card Industry - Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS), requires all 
organizations involved in payment card processing – including banks, which store, 
process or transmit cardholder data, to annually conduct formal risk assessment in 
order to identify threats and vulnerabilities (Payment Card Industry - Data Security 
Standard, 2010). The PCI-DSS suggested in section 12.2.2, that OCTAVE, ISO 
27005 and NIST SP 800-30 risk assessment methodologies could be used to carry 
out the risk assessment process, however it is not limited to these methodologies 
(Payment Card Industry - Data Security Standard, 2010). 
2.4.1 Risk Identification  
Risk identification refers to the process of identifying the sources of risk, areas of 
impact, events and their causes, which could lead to a potential negative impact upon 
objectives (British Standards Institution, 2010). Risks are identified by assessing the 
underlying operations against potential threats, vulnerabilities, existing controls, and 
their potential impact upon objectives or assets
4
 as described in ISO / IEC 27001 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2005) and ISO / IEC 27005 
(International Organization for Standardization, 2011). There are several methods for 
                                                   
4
 Assets are anything that requires protection and has value to the organization. Assets may 
have assigned values for both their financial cost and / or the business consequences if 
damaged or compromised (ISO/IEC 27005:2011, Clause 8.2.2, 8.2.6).   
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identifying risk, including systematic team approach, the evidenced based approach 
and so on. The evidenced based approach requires a comprehensive use of check-
lists or historical data on risk events, reported either in the database or literature 
(British Standards Institution, 2010). The systematic team approach on the other 
hand, uses structured set of prompt questions, such as Interviews or questionnaires, 
from a prompting sheet to identify risks from a different perspective (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2010; Institute of Operational Risk, 2010). The 
systematic team approach encourages imagination, which helps in identifying new 
risks and novel solutions unlike the evidenced based approach (British Standards 
Institution, 2010; ARMS Working Group, 2010).  
However, risk identification methods are clearly defined by organizations depending 
on the criticality, sensitivity, business functions and the organization’s core mission. 
2.4.2 Risk Analysis  
Risk analysis refers to a systematic description of the frequency and physical 
evaluation of risk, which involves identifying undesirable risk events, their triggering 
events and consequences of these undesirable risk events, taking into consideration 
the effectiveness of existing or planned controls (Ricci et al., 1998; British Standards 
Institution, 2009). The resulting consequences and their probabilities are then 
calculated to determine the risk exposure levels.  
According to the ISO / IEC 27001 and ISO / IEC 27005, risk analysis can therefore 
be defined as a process to systematically understand the nature of risk and to estimate 
the level of risk in order to assist management in defining where time and money 
should be spent and improvement should be made on the overall business or 
operations (International Organization for Standardization, 2005, 2011).  
2.4.3 Risk Evaluation 
Risk evaluation is the process used to determine the significance of risk by 
comparing the estimated levels of risk against predetermined standards, target risk 
levels or criteria according to ISO / IEC 27001 (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2005) and ISO / IEC 27005 (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2011). In determining risk, management priorities on identified 
 24 
 
types of risk and significance, ethical, legal, financial and other considerations are 
included as inputs to decision making (British Standards Institution, 2010). These 
decisions may include the need to treat, monitor or review risk (Standards 
Association of Australia, 1999; British Standards Institution, 2010). The decisions 
also depend on the cost and benefits of accepting the risk and the costs and benefits 
of implementing improved controls (British Standards Institution, 2010). 
The final stage in the assessment process is report generation and documentation. 
Risks and other findings should be expressed in clear and understandable terms, in 
order to help the team or top executives to monitor the risk assessment process and 
control effectiveness justification (British Standards Institution, 2010).   
2.5 Operational Risk Assessment Tools and 
Techniques  
Over the past decades, several tools and techniques have been developed for 
operational risk assessment and include Key Risk Indicators (KRIs), Monte Carlo 
simulations, soft computing tools (e.g. decision trees, BN, FIS, and ANN), and so on. 
These tools and techniques are considered outstanding modelling tools for 
operational risk assessment and management (Adusei-Poku, 2005). Banking 
institutions can use these tools either to establish a cause-effect relationship, or track 
occurrences of operational risk events for prompt actions, in order to minimise the 
effects of operational risk factors (Adusei-Poku, 2005, Teker, 2005). They can also 
use these tools and techniques for quantifying and allocating capital, thus providing 
banks with a complete set of tools for overall operational risk management (Adusei-
Poku, 2005, Teker, 2005). 
However, a number of factors influence the selection of risk assessment tools and 
techniques (British Standards Institution, 2010). These include but not exhaustively 
availability of resources and the information available, the nature and degree of 
uncertainty in the data, and complexity of the application (British Standards 
Institution, 2010). Further, the Basel II accord also allows some degree of flexibility 
in computing the economic capital requirements, especially within the Advanced 
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Measurement Approach
5
 (AMA) (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006) 
for OR measurement. As a result the development of tools and techniques for 
conducting operational risk assessment is very dynamic.  
In this study, the focus is to determine the potential operational risk factors 
underlying banking operations, which will help in revealing the operational risk 
exposures inherent in an E-banking context. As a result capital allocation 
measurement is outside the scope of this study, and the literature presented here 
mainly focuses on causal modelling tools.   
2.6 Key Risk Indicators 
Key risk indicators are self-assessment approaches that can be used for various types 
of risk and at any level within the organization (Adusei-Poku, 2005; Pinedo, 2009). 
The selection of KRIs is usually conducted by interviewing executives and using 
measurable metrics or indicators to track exposures or losses (Adusei-Poku, 2005) 
inherent in the organization. Measurements are often based on data and are selected 
to track near-real-time objective data on bank operations, and also to provide a 
forward or backward-looking measure of risks that are tied to management (ISACA, 
2009; Beasley et al., 2010).  
Measurement thresholds could be set using colour codes: green, yellow and red, with 
each threshold associated with some measurable quantity. For example green could 
indicate risks are properly controlled, yellow that risks are approaching unacceptable 
levels, and red that risks have exceeded the acceptable level (Adusei-Poku, 2005). 
What this means is that KRIs can be used to serve as early warning systems 
(“preventive” and “detective”) by signalling when risk controls are needed (Adusei-
Poku, 2005; ISACA, 2009). Key Risk Indicators are important tools within 
operational risk management, as they able to facilitate monitoring of risk events and 
control effectiveness (Institute of Operational Risk, 2010).  
                                                   
5
 It is based on the quantitative self-assessment of the frequency and loss severity of 
operational risk events. It represents the most flexible regulatory approach, subject to several 
qualitative and quantitative criteria and soundness standards. The current regulatory 
framework allows banks to use their own internal risk measurement models under the 
standards of Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA) as a capital measure that is 
explicitly and systematically more amenable to the different risk profiles of individual banks in 
support of more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements (Jobst, 2007). 
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However, a metric may be considered a risk indicator when it can be used to measure 
the quantum (amount) of exposure to a given risk or set of risks, the effectiveness of 
any controls that have been implemented to reduce or mitigate a given risk exposure, 
and how well the organization is managing their risk exposure (Institute of 
Operational Risk, 2010).  
Despite the usefulness of KRIs, selecting the most relevant statistics to construct the 
KRIs, and the need to periodically maintain their relevance are the main challenges 
with KRI approaches, as some of the indicators may become obsolete due to changes 
in operational risk events (Adusei-Poku, 2005; Institute of Operational Risk, 2010). 
Further, KRIs are often incomplete or inaccurate in specification, there is no 
alignment between risk, KRI description and KRI metrics (ISACA, 2009). In 
addition, results cannot be aggregated or compared with other similar surveys or 
even previous surveys in the same organization, as they cannot take into account 
process changes and system upgrades (Tanampasidis, 2008; ISACA, 2009).  
2.7 Monte Carlo Simulation and Value at Risk  
Monte Carlo simulation was first introduced by Metropolis and Ulam in 1949, as a 
technique that can be used to evaluate the values for uncertain variables in 
mathematical models (Metropolis and Ulam, 1949). However, Monte Carlo 
simulations are commonly used for evaluating the possible outcomes and relative 
frequency of values in that range for quantitative measures of a model such as cost, 
duration, throughput, demand and similar measure (British Standards Institution, 
2010). In addition, Monte Carlo simulations can also be used to combine stochastic 
data and stochastic models, to estimate the effects of individual terms on the model 
outcome (Nash and Hannah, 2011).  
Value at Risk, on the other hand, was first used by major financial firms to measure 
the risks of their trading portfolios in the late 1980s (Linsmeier and Pearson, 2000). 
Since then VaR has been explored and used by other financial and non-financial 
institutions to statistically summarise the measure of possible portfolio losses 
resulting from normal market movements (Linsmeier and Pearson, 2000). For 
example the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) requests banks to 
calculate their capital requirements for operational risk using their VaR models.   
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The Monte Carlo simulation engine can be used in estimating the economic capital 
requirements within the AMA under the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) (Samad-
Khan, 2006; Teker, 2005).  The aim of this model is to calculate the operational 
Expected Loss (EL) and the VaR, also known as the Unexpected Loss (UL), for a 
given confidence interval through the estimated cumulative loss distributions for 
each business line / risk factor cell in the operational risk matrix (Samad-Khan, 2006; 
Teker, 2005). The capital requirement is the simple aggregation of each operational 
VaR in the matrix (Teker, 2005). Figure 2.3 shows a graphical representation of a 
simple cumulative loss distribution. 
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
Mean 
           VaR or UL
99.9% confidence level
Annual Aggregate Loss
Cumulative Loss Distribution
 
Figure 2.3 A simple cumulative loss distribution 
In Monte Carlo simulation, a model or algorithm is usually defined to represent as 
closely as possible the behaviour of the system under study. The model is run 
multiple times with random numbers to produce the model outputs. However, where 
the application is to model the effects of uncertainty, then it uses statistical sampling 
techniques in obtaining probabilistic approximation to the solution in the form of a 
mathematical equation providing the relationship between input parameters and an 
output (British Standards Institution, 2010; Nash and Hannah, 2011). In either case 
the model is run multiple times with different inputs and produces multiple 
outcomes.  
The selected input values are taken from appropriate probability distributions such as 
uniform, triangular, normal, or log normal distributions, that represent the nature of 
the uncertainty in these parameters (British Standards Institutions, 2010). The output 
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could be a single value, a result expressed as the probability or frequency 
distribution, or it could be the identification of the main functions within the model 
having the greatest impact on the output.  
Models are relatively simple to develop and easily extended as the need arises. Any 
influences or relationships arising in reality can be represented as conditional 
dependencies. Strong and weak influences can be identified using sensitivity 
analysis. The relationship between inputs and outputs are transparent and as a result 
are easily understood. It also provides the measure of the accuracy of the result 
(British Standards Institution, 2010).   
However, accuracy of the results will depend on the number of simulations that can 
be performed. This limitation is also dependent on the speed of the processor; as 
more and more high speed computers become available the less important the 
number of simulations will become. A Monte Carlo simulation is also negatively 
affected, as it relies on being able to represent uncertainties in parameters by a valid 
distribution. In addition, the complexity of the models may be challenging to the 
modellers and as a result become difficult for stakeholders to engage with the 
process. Further, Monte Carlo simulations may not adequately weight high-
consequence / low probability events; as a result an organization’s risk appetite 
cannot be reflected in the analysis (British Standards Institution, 2010).        
2.8 Soft Computing Tools  
Soft computing tools are considered outstanding tools for reasoning under conditions 
of uncertainty and vagueness, and are capable of modelling cause-effect relationships 
at multiple levels (Zadeh, 1992; Jang et al., 1997; Li et al., 1998; Negnevitsky, 2002; 
Mogharrenban, 2006; Adusei-Poku, 2005; Venugopal et al., 2009; Chakraborty, 
2010). They are also capable of predicting future occurrences and possible 
intervention, which makes them attractive tools for OR assessment and management.  
Further, soft computing tools deal with soft values or fuzzy sets and consist of 
several computing fields such as fuzzy computing, neural network computing, 
evolutionary computing and probabilistic computing (Negnevitsky, 2002). The 
combination of these techniques form the core of soft computing, an emerging 
approach to building hybrid intelligent systems.  
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The potential of soft computing was first realized by Lofti Zadeh, who defined soft 
computing as “an emerging approach to computing which parallels the remarkable 
ability of the human mind to reason and learn in an environment of uncertainty and 
impression” (Zadeh, 1992).  
However, the concept of soft systems thinking is not new; the significant advances in 
and functionality of soft systems has been recognized by Peter Checkland; he defined 
soft systems thinking as “an organized learning system, developed to cope with 
complex situations in human affairs, how they perceive and interpret the world in 
their own ways and make judgements about it, using standards and values which 
may not be shared by others to as to bring about improvement” (Checkland and 
Scholes, 1990).   
During the recent decades, several attempts have been made to further define soft 
computing. It is important that the specific definition used in this part of the thesis 
matches that of the majority of readers and is effective in the context in which it is 
applied. In general, most of the definitions of the term soft computing are extended 
based on Zadeh’s definition, such as the use of intelligent systems to exploit the 
tolerance for approximation, uncertainty, imprecision, and partial truth (Jang et al., 
1997; Li et al., 1998; Negnevitsky, 2002; Mogharrenban, 2006; Venugopal et al., 
2009).   
The position adopted in this research is that soft computing is the practical process of 
combining modern artificial intelligent systems that are capable of handling 
uncertainty, tolerance for approximation, partial truth, and imprecision calculations 
at one or more levels, for addressing problems in its domain, in the same way as 
humans deal with them, i.e. on the basis of intelligence, common sense, 
consideration of analogies, and approaches.  
However, each of these intelligent systems has its strengths and limitations (Jang et 
el., 1997; Negnevitsky, 2002; Negoita et al., 2005). Moreover, soft computing is still 
growing and developing; as a result a boundary between modern artificial 
intelligence and soft computing is still vague and elusive. A clear consensus on what 
comprises soft computing has not yet been reached (Negnevitsky, 2002; 
Chakraborty, 2010). 
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2.8.1 Bayesian Network Classifiers 
Bayesian Network was first introduced by Pearls in 1988, as one of the most 
plausible inference classifier that is capable of representing conditional 
independencies (Adusei-Poku, 2005). Bayesian networks are capable of estimating 
missing information / data, and in conjunction with other BN statistical techniques or 
models, are able to combine domain knowledge and data to compute more quickly 
and effectively causal relationships between risk attributes, while effectively 
avoiding the problems of data over fitting (Heckerman, 1996; Adusei-Poku, 2005).  
Definition of BN is given by Heckerman (1996) as a set of random variables X
 1,..., nX X which consists of a network structure S and a connected network of 
nodes corresponding to the random variables in X, and a set of P of local probability 
distributions associated with each variable. Together, these components define the 
joint probability distribution function (PDF) for X. The network structure S must be 
a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) and the nodes in S are in one-to-one 
correspondence with the variables.  
If we let iX  denote both variable and its corresponding node, and let iPa  denote the 
parents of node iX  in S as well as the variables corresponding to those parents, then 
given structure S, the joint PDF for X can be calculated as:  
       1| ,..., |i i i i ip x x x p x                                             (2.1) 
The local probability distributions P are the distributions corresponding to the terms 
in the product of equation 2.1. Consequently, the pair (S, P) encodes the joint 
distribution p(x).  
Taroni et al., (2006) further defined BN as a DAG with no cycles
6
 and a set of 
conditional probabilities for each node given its parents. The nodes, links, and 
                                                   
6
 A cycle within a graph is a path that starts and ends at the same node. A path is a 
sequence of arrows connecting two nodes X and Y, independent of the direction of the 
arrows. A parent-child relationship is present when there is an arrow pointing from node X to 
node Y, it is said that X is a parent of Y and Y is a child of X. The parent child relationship is 
also extended to an ancestor-descendent relationship i.e. X is the ancestor of Y and Z. A 
node with no parents is called a root node (Taroni et al. 2006) 
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probability assignments represent random variables and direct correlations between 
variables as shown in Figure 2.4.  
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Figure 2.4 An example of a directed acyclic graph  
Each node in a BN is associated with a set of probability tables. The links in a BN 
specify the independence assumptions that must hold between the random variables; 
for each variable X with parents Y1, Y2,…, Yn, there is associated a conditional 
probability table Pr (X | Y1, Y2,…, Yn, I), where I denotes background knowledge, 
which is all the relevant knowledge that does not explicitly appear under the form of 
nodes in the graph. If X is a root node then its table reduces to probabilities Pr (X | I), 
unconditional on the other nodes in the graph (Taroni et al., 2006).  
Bayesian Network classifiers (e.g. TAN, Boosted Naïve Bayes and so on) can be 
constructed into a "multi-level" model, which can show several levels of dependency 
among several risk factors (e.g. frequency of outsider fraud attacks as a result of 
successful Trojan attacks on a customer computer, which is also enhanced by the 
weaknesses of the bank IT systems, such as the cryptographic techniques). When 
extended into a decision network, Bayesian Network classifiers can provide cost-
benefit analysis of risk controls, where the optimal control is determined within a 
scenario analysis framework (Adusei-Poku, 2005).  
Bayesian Network classifiers inputs are similar to Monte Carlo model inputs, in that 
they can define system variables, causal relationships between variables, add 
evidence to network and outcome variables are described by deterministic equations 
(British Standards Institution, 2010). Equations and Monte Carlo type techniques 
(such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo) techniques can be used to develop the 
conditional probability tables that underlie Bayesian Networks. However, Bayesian 
Networks have the additional benefits of not requiring recording prior to 
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investigation of different scenarios, representing graphically the relationships 
between parameters and making the assumptions underlying the model explicit 
(Nash and Hannah, 2011).   
2.8.2 Fuzzy Inference Systems  
Fuzzy Inference System also known as fuzzy-rule-based system, fuzzy expert 
system, fuzzy model, fuzzy associative memory, fuzzy logic controller, and simply 
but ambiguous, fuzzy system (Negoita et al., 2005), is a computing framework that 
provides a robust approach to deal with uncertainty and vagueness and it is based on 
the concepts of fuzzy set theory, fuzzy reasoning, and fuzzy rules (Jang et al., 1997). 
It uses the mathematical theory of fuzzy sets in simulating the process of normal 
human reasoning and represent fuzzy truth membership in vaguely defined sets, such 
as the likelihood of some event or condition (Jang et al., 1997). FIS are capable of 
providing high degree of flexibility in classifying data and are able to incorporate 
expert domain knowledge to define variables and their relationships.  
In most real-world classification problems, fuzzy logic rule-based induction is often 
used to handle inconsistent and missing data, by aggregating the hypothesis of all the 
rules (Dunham, 2003; Negoita et al., 2005; Vargas, 2009; Venugopal et al., 2009). 
Several fuzzy rules may be used simultaneously to produce outputs, and the outputs 
are usually represented by fuzzy sets (Vargas, 2009). It is important to note that the 
basic FIS can take either fuzzy or crisp inputs (known as singletons), but the output 
is almost always fuzzy sets. However, it is sometimes necessary in most of the FIS to 
obtain single output; therefore, an aggregation process is usually applied to integrate 
all the output fuzzy sets into a crisp output sets (Jang et al., 1997; Vargas, 2009). 
This process uses defuzzification methods in obtaining a crisp value that best 
represents the fuzzy sets. 
The reasoning behind this approach is that decision making is not always a classical 
logic; it often involves unstructured and vague variables. Further, in data mining the 
extraction and processing of qualitative attributes can become very complex and 
difficult by applying conventional rule induction techniques (Venugopal et al., 2009).  
Fuzzy rules and fuzzy reasoning are the backbone of FIS, and it is the most important 
modelling tool based on fuzzy set theory (Jang et al., 1997).  
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· Fuzzy set theory - provides a systematic calculus to deal with imprecise and 
incomplete human like reasoning. In contrast to a classical set theory, which 
is governed by a logic that uses crisp values: true or false, yes or no, 0 or 1, 
fuzzy set theory uses the basic concept that an element belongs to a fuzzy set 
with a degree of membership and uses linguistic labels characterized by 
membership functions for performing numerical computation (Jang et al., 
1997; Negnevitsky, 2002; Vargas, 2009).  
· Fuzzy reasoning - also known as approximate reasoning is an inference 
procedure that derives conclusions from a set of fuzzy-if-then rules and 
known facts (Jang et al., 1997; Vargas, 2009). What this means is that in 
fuzzy reasoning the rule antecedent (the IF part of the rule) is evaluated first 
and thereafter the implication or application of the result to the consequent 
(the THEN part of the rule) is evaluated. Fuzzy reasoning works in a more 
complex environment when vague concepts in the antecedents and multiple 
values of truth are introduced (Vargas, 2009).   
· Fuzzy rules – is a concept that was introduced by Zadeh (1973), as a new 
complex systems analysis approach, in which human knowledge is captured 
in fuzzy rules. This process requires the definition of the rules as a 
conditional statement, such that if the antecedent is true then the consequence 
is true.  
FIS have been applied to wide range of areas such as automatic control, expert 
systems, pattern recognition, time series prediction, and data classification (Jang et 
al., 1997). 
2.8.3 Decision Trees 
Decision trees are predictive divide-and-conquer techniques used in clustering and 
classification tasks. Decision tree classifiers are one of the most popular and widely 
used classifiers for inductive inference. When a decision tree is deployed for 
classification purposes, the tree divides the search space into rectangular regions and 
a tuple is classified based on the region into which it falls. A major advantage of 
decision trees is their ability to break down complex decision making processes into 
a collection of simpler decisions and results that are easy to interpret (Vaidya, 2004). 
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They are also able to learn disjunctive expressions, and are robust for noisy data 
(Ratanamahatana & Gunopulos, 2002).  
However, decision trees, like any other type of machine learning schemes, inherit the 
issue of how to deal with missing data in a real life situation. Several reasons could 
be responsible for the occurrence of missing data such as malfunctioning 
measurement equipment, changes in experimental design during data collection, 
collation of several but not identical datasets, the fact that respondents in a survey 
may refuse to answer certain questions. Data could also be missing as a result of 
unreported events, irrelevant values, lost or corrupted data, security and privacy 
policy issues (Witten & Frank., 2005). A clear understanding of why data is missing 
in the problem domain is of great significance. 
Quinlan (1993) developed the C4.5 decision tree algorithm as an extension of the 
basic ID3 algorithm he earlier proposed. He developed the C4.5 to address the 
problem of over fitting the data, trying to find a small decision tree, how to deploy 
reduced error pruning, rule post-pruning, handling sensibly continuous attributes and 
missing values, choosing an appropriate selection measure, and handling 
computational efficiency. C4.5 algorithm uses Shannon’s entropy-based measure 
known as “information gain” as a criterion for selecting the most significant features 
(Yang, 2010) and defined as: 
Entropy (S) = 2
1
( ).log ( )
c
i i
i
p p

                                                 (2.2) 
 where ip is the proportion of the examples that belong to the i
th
 class. 
At each decision node, available attributes are computed using the information gain, 
the attribute with the highest information gain will be chosen as the most significant 
attribute to split the given set of training data. This process is repeated until the data 
cannot be split any further. The main advantages of C4.5 algorithm as a classification 
tool is that decision trees are self-explanatory and comprehensible, which makes it 
even more suitable for a novice to understand and use (Witten & Frank, 2005; Yang, 
2010). They are capable of handling both discrete and continuous variables. They 
also have the capability of dealing with noisy data as well as missing values. The 
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complexity of building a decision tree algorithm is quite straightforward to analyse 
(Yang, 2010).  
However, the estimated complexity of the C4.5 algorithm increases drastically when 
there are many attributes and the number of numeric values present for each attribute 
in the training dataset (Witten & Frank, 2005). In addition, C4.5 as a classification 
tool tend to perform less when there are many complex interactions in the training 
data, but they however perform well when there are few and highly relevant 
attributes in the dataset.  Further, there is a tendency of oversimplifying the situation 
in order to be able to represent it as a tree-like graph (Ratanamahatana & Gunopulos, 
2002; Dunham, 2003; Yang, 2010; Patil et al., 2010).  
2.8.4 Artificial Neural Networks 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) are reasoning models that are based on the way 
the human brain processes information. They consist of a graph representing the 
processing system as well as various algorithms that access the graph (Jang et al., 
1997; Dunham, 2003; Yang, 2010; Venugopal et al., 2010).  
Artificial Neural Networks are structured as a directed graph with many nodes and 
arcs between them. The nodes in the graph are connected by individual numerical 
weighted links. These weights are the basic means of long-term memory in ANNs. 
They express the strength or the importance of each neuron input. A neural network 
on the other hand learns through repeated adjustments of these weights (Dunham, 
2003; Negoita et al., 2005). Figure 2.5 represent a simple ANN structure. 
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Figure 2.5 A simple ANN with three layers  
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ANN approaches, like decision trees, require that a graphical structure be built to 
represent the model and the structure be applied to the data. In a data mining task, 
each input corresponds to a single attribute. For example, if the problem is to 
ascertain the risk exposure level to E-banking systems, some attributes could be 
customer’s age, gender, income level, literacy level, fraud awareness, and phishing 
attacks severity. The numeric value of an attribute is the input to the network. 
However, several types of data such as text, pictures and voice can also be used as 
inputs. Further, ANNs can have more than one input node for each attribute value to 
be examined unlike decision trees, which has only one input node, (Turban & 
Aronson, 1998).  
In addition, the ANN may be changed after a tuple is processed to improve future 
performance. The output node is the solution to the problem and it determines what 
the prediction is. The purpose of the network is to learn and compute the values of 
the output. The ability to learn the network is determined by its architecture and by 
the algorithmic method chosen for training. Artificial Neural Networks have the 
advantages of adapting to unknown situations; they are robust with fault tolerance 
due to network redundancy and are capable of autonomous learning and 
generalization (Dunham, 2003; Negoita et al., 2005).  
However, a major drawback to ANN is that it is considered to be a black box due to 
the problem of low comprehensibility inherent in the system. If the input data 
increases, then the computational complexity of the structure increases dramatically 
(Dunham, 2003; Negoita et al., 2005). Another drawback to ANN applications is the 
fact that they are difficult to explain to end users (Negnevitsky, 2002; Dunham, 
2003; Negoita et al., 2005), unlike a decision tree which is very easy to understand. 
Moreover, in real time classification or predictions, large computational complexity 
usually hinders the processing speed both in training and testing.    
2.9 Bow Tie Analysis 
The British Standards Institution (2010) defined Bow tie analysis as a simple 
diagrammatic framework for integrating and analysing the pathways of a risk from 
cause to consequences. It is used for displaying a risk showing a range of triggering 
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events and consequences of risk outcome, while taking into consideration the 
controls or barriers put in place (British Standards Institution, 2010; ARMS Working 
Group, 2010). The focus of Bow tie analysis is on the preventive barriers, which lie 
between the causes and the risk, and the recovery barriers, which lie between the risk 
and the risk consequences (McConnell & Davies, 2006; British Standards Institution, 
2010; ARMS Working Group 2010; Mokhtari et al., 2011). Figure 2.6 represent a 
general Bow tie diagram. 
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Figure 2.6 A typical Bow tie diagram  
Although, Bow tie analysis has proven valuable for describing risk assessment 
process, it may oversimplify complex problems where quantification is attempted. It 
is also not capable of revealing in the diagram where multiple causes occur 
simultaneously to cause the consequences, and therefore an earlier risk identification 
process is required. The quality of the analysis will also depend solely on the quality 
of the analysis process, and the analysts or domain experts. In addition, analysis may 
be influenced by staff members or experts with a differing agenda to that of the 
organization, as a result additional supporting information may be required either 
from external data or other relevant documents.  
2.10 Consequence / Probability Matrix 
The consequence / probability matrix is described as a way of mapping qualitative or 
semi-quantitative ratings of consequence and probability to produce a level of risk or 
risk rating (British Standards Institution, 2010). The consequence / probability matrix 
can be used to rank risks and sources of risk, or treat risks based on the level of risk. 
Extremely severe 
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The consequence / probability matrix format and definitions are dependent on the 
context in which it used. However, it is often used to determine the necessary actions 
required for a given risk, that is if a risk is considered acceptable, or not. It may also 
be used as a screening tool when many risks have been identified such as risks that 
require further analysis or that need immediate treatment (British Standards 
Institution, 2010). The consequence / probability matrix may also be used to 
communicate a common understanding for qualitative levels of risks across the 
organization.  
This technique takes in as input customized scales for consequence and probability 
and a matrix which combines the two variables. Consequence scales usually cover 
the range of financial, safety, environment or other parameters, which maps from the 
highest credible consequence to the lowest consequence. The probability or 
frequency scale may also have any number of points. Just like the consequence scale, 
the probability scale needs to cover ranges relevant to the problem or situations under 
study and also maps from the highest credible probability to the lowest probability 
(British Standards Institution, 2010). The scales may have a number of points, 
although 3, 4, or 5 point scales are most widely used, and the consequence scale is 
drawn on one axis, with the probability on the other (British Standards Institution, 
2010; Institute of Operational Risks, 2010; Alvarez & Gledhill, 2010).   
The level of risk identifed may be linked to a decision rule such as using the results 
of the risk classification, against the costs and benefits of taking or implementing 
improved controls. The deliverable output of this technique is a rating for each risk 
or ranked risks with significant levels (British Standards Institution, 2009). The 
major advantages of this technique are that rapid ranking of risks into different 
significant levels is provided and it is relatively easy to use.  
However, a major drawback to this approach is that risks cannot be aggregated (i.e a 
particular risk assign to one category say low risk cannot belong to another say 
medium risks); it is difficult to combine or compare the level of risk for different 
categories of consequences. Finally, the use of the consequence / probability matrix 
is very subjective, and thus varies among experts.   
 39 
 
2.11 Cost / Benefit Analysis  
Cost / benefit analysis (CBA) is often used during risk evaluation process where total 
expected costs are weighted against the total expected benefits in order to make 
decisions on risk treatment (Mishan & Quah, 2007; British Standards Institution, 
2009). This can be qualitative or quantitative or a combination of both. Inputs for this 
technique include information on costs and benefits to relevant stakeholders and on 
uncertainties in those costs and benefits (British Standards Institutions, 2010). Costs 
include resources expended and negative outcomes, while benefits include positive 
outcomes, negative outcomes avoided and resources saved. When there is 
uncertainty about the level of costs or benefits, then weighting can be accorded to 
either or both terms. The output of this technique is information about the relative 
costs and benefits of different options or actions, which may be expressed 
quantitatively or qualitatively.  
The cost / benefits analysis allows for comparison using a single metric (money); it is 
transparent in decision making and requires the collection of detailed information on 
all possible aspects of the decision. However, cost / benefit analysis suffers from 
different derivation of quantitative CBA numbers depending on the methods used to 
assigning values. It is also difficult to determine a valid discounting rate for future 
costs and benefits (Mishan & Quah, 2007; British Standards Institution, 2010).  
2.12 Summary 
The chapter provided a general overview to the subject of E-banking, including the 
definitions, benefits, challenges, factors for Internet banking adoption and risks 
associated with E-banking systems. The concept of operational risk within E-banking 
systems and its occurrence in the Nigerian banking industry have been presented. 
The chapter has discussed briefly the operational risk assessment process and tools 
and techniques, which will provide a good basis for this research to measure the 
operational risk exposure level in E-banking systems along the dimensions of these 
tools and techniques. In the next chapter, related work on E-banking operational risk 
assessment, risk assessment methodologies and frameworks will be presented.  
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Chapter 3 
Related Work on Risk Assessment 
Methodologies and Frameworks, and E-
banking Operational Risk Assessment  
  
3.1 Introduction 
As mentioned earlier in section 2.4, the general consensus is that traditional banking 
risk assessment and management principles, tools and techniques are applicable to E-
banking activities. In this part of the literature review, a brief discussion of some of 
the classical risk assessment methodologies and frameworks are presented. 
Thereafter related works on E-banking operational risk assessment is presented.    
It is important to examine the literature relating to classical risk assessment 
methodologies / frameworks, in order to test the possibility of extending these 
methodologies and frameworks to assessing operational risk inherent in an E-
banking system. The risk assessment methodologies, frameworks, and related works 
on E-banking operational risk assessment presented here are referred to by the 
author’s name.  
3.2 Risk Assessment Methodologies and 
Frameworks 
Summers’s Methodology (Summers, 1977): Summers suggests an asset-oriented 
approach for conducting risk analysis. The method includes four major steps: 
1. Identify assets and assign monetary values 
2. Identify threats and vulnerabilities 
a. Estimate likelihood of occurrence for each threat 
b. Estimate impact of each threat 
3. Calculate exposure of each asset to each threat 
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4. Identify potential safeguards and their costs 
The analyst is first required to identify assets of the system and make a subjective but 
simplistic assignment of monetary values to each of the asset identified. The values 
can be assigned based on the values recorded in the asset register of the organization 
(known as standard accounting) or based on the replacement cost of the asset. 
However, the standard accounting approach is ideal for tangible assets, while the 
replacement cost approach is most suited for intangible assets (Vidalis, 2004). In 
calculating the output for this step, the values of security attributes (confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability) are also included.  
Next is the identification of possible threats and vulnerabilities. Probabilities are used 
for estimating the likelihood of each threat. The goal is to try to predict the 
importance / severity of each threat towards the system. The impact of each threat is 
calculated from the financial aspect using the following formula: 
         F I f A f In f C f L                          
  Where I = threat impact, A = availability, In = integrity, C = confidentiality and L = 
likelihood. The threats and vulnerabilities are linked by calculating the exposure of 
each asset to each threat. Finally the potential safeguards are identified. No metrics is 
however given to objectively identify these parameters and probabilities are being 
used for estimating the likelihood of each threat. There may be other non-financial 
but important long-term impacts organizations may be concerned about. Threat 
agents may defy probabilistic rules and equations; as humans are proven to be 
unpredictable and difficult to understand (Vidalis, 2004).  
Carroll’s Methodology (Carroll, 1996): she identifies four main steps for 
conducting risk assessment and includes   
1. Threat assessment 
a. Likelihood estimation 
b. Severity prediction 
2. Asset evaluation (importance, exposure, attractiveness) 
a. Vulnerability assessment 
3. Impact assessment 
a. Threat and asset interaction 
4. Safeguard evaluation 
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The methodology uses historical data for threat assessment and shows in the 
assessment process the methods used for identifying threat, threat agents and 
safeguards. The methodology assumes that an attacker must have the capability to 
perform the attack, the motivation and the opportunity to do so in order to manifest a 
threat. As a result she makes a distinction between deliberate threats and accidental 
threats. Each threat is assessed based on two properties: likelihood and severity. 
Likelihood is evaluated as the number of occurrences of the threat per year, while 
severity refers to the consequences of the realisation of the threat.  
Next is asset evaluation, which is dependent on three factors: how important the asset 
is to the organization, its exposure, and its attractiveness. Lastly controls (safeguards) 
implemented or planned are evaluated.  
Pfleeger’s Methodology (Pfleeger, 1997): suggests an asset-oriented approach. The 
methodology uses five distinct information sources for calculating the risk such as; 
(a) probability estimate from observed data of the general population, (b) probability 
estimate from observed data for a specific system, (c) estimates of the number of 
occurrences in a given time period, (d) estimates of the likelihood from a table, and 
(e) the use of DELPHI approach. His methodology comprises of six major steps and 
includes:  
1. Identify assets,  
2. Determine vulnerabilities,  
3. Estimate likelihood,  
4. Compute expected annual loss,  
5. Survey applicable controls and their costs 
6. Project annual savings of controls.  
It uses a subjective table in calculating the likelihood based on the frequency of the 
threat occurrence. The assumption is that when vulnerabilities are exploited, certain 
loss will be seen, and as a result annual loss expectancy is calculated by multiplying 
the loss due to vulnerability exploitation with the number of occurrences of the 
incident (Pfleeger, 1997).  
The method is likelihood estimation sensitive. However, Pfleeger’s methodology is 
time consuming, which may render the results unusable. Data from other systems is 
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not usable; as the methodology is based on the frequency of threat occurrences to a 
specific system.  
ISACA Framework (ISACA, 2009): They developed an IT Risk framework to 
enable organizations integrate IT risk management into their overall Enterprise Risk 
Management (ERM). The IT Risk framework addresses risk governance, risk 
evaluation, and risk response. Each of these domains is assigned a process detail, 
goals and metrics. The goal of the framework is to help organizations make well-
informed decisions about the extent of their risk, risk appetite and risk tolerance, and 
to understand how to respond to the risk. In the context of risk evaluation (i.e. risk 
assessment) the typical aspect of their framework includes 
1. Data collection 
a. Establish and maintain a model for data collection 
b. Collect data on the operating environment 
c. Collect data on risk events 
d. Identify risk factors  
2. Risk analysis 
a. Define IT risk analysis scope 
b. Estimate IT risk 
c. Identify risk response options 
d. Perform a peer review of IT risk analysis 
3. Risk profile maintenance  
a. Map IT resources to business processes 
b. Determine business criticality of IT resources 
c. Understand IT capabilities 
d. Update IT risk scenario components 
e. Maintain the IT register and IT risk Map 
f. Develop IT risk indicators 
The risk evaluation domain first requires the analyst to identify relevant data from 
various sources to enable risk identification, analysis and reporting. The resulting 
output of this stage is an established data collection model, data collected on the 
operating environment and the risk events, and the identified risk factors. The 
identified risks events are then analysed to estimate the frequency and the magnitude 
of the risk scenarios, taking into account the risk factors (which include all known 
operational controls). The residual risk exposure levels is then estimated and 
compared with the acceptance risk tolerance that was initially defined to identify risk 
exposures which may require a risk response. The range of risk response options, 
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such as avoid, reduce / mitigate, transfer / share, and accept, taking into consideration 
the cost / benefits and responsibility for project execution are also examined.  
Further, a peer review is carried out on the risk analysis result and risk analysis scope 
and thereafter the resulting output from this review is sent for management approval 
and use in decision making process. Thus the resulting output of the risk analysis 
stage is the risk analysis scope, the scenario analysis results, the risk analysis results 
and the peer-review recommendations. Values for these factors are measured in 
percentage, such as the percentage of risks for which the probable frequency of 
occurrence and the probable magnitude of business impact are measured within the 
scope. 
The final stage of the risk evaluation domain requires the maintenance of an up-to-
date and complete inventory of known risks and attributes such as expected 
frequency, potential impact, IT resources, capabilities and controls in the context of 
business products, services and processes. They believe that Risk IT framework fills 
the gap between generic risk management frameworks, standards and principles such 
as COSO
7
, AS / NZS 4360, ISO 31000, the UK – based risk management standard 
and domain specific frameworks. 
Caralli et al. Methodology (Caralli et al., 2010): They proposed an Operationally 
Critical Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) methodology to 
optimise the process of assessing information security risks. The goal is to allow 
broad assessment of an organization’s operational risk environment by producing 
more robust results without the need for extensive risk assessment knowledge. The 
methodology comprises of eight steps that are organized into four different phases: 
establish drivers, profile asset, identify threats, and identify and mitigate risks. The 
steps include  
1. Establish risk measurement criteria 
2. Develop information asset profile 
3. Identify information asset containers  
4. Identify areas of concern 
5. Identify threat scenarios 
                                                   
7 Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) was developed in 
2004, as a generic risk management framework for applying enterprise risk management principles. 
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6. Identify risks 
7. Analyse risks 
8. Select mitigation approach 
Set of qualitative risk measurement criteria are first developed and captured, to 
reflect the organizational drivers. These drivers will be used to evaluate the effect of 
a risk to the organization mission and business objectives. The risk measurement 
criteria form the foundation of the information asset risk assessment process. The 
resulting output of this step is the evaluation of the extent of an impact in a specific 
area and the impact areas that are most significant to its mission and business 
objectives. Next, a complete profile of the information assets is created. The most 
significant information assets are then identified, taking into consideration the 
containers in which the information assets live and the custodians of those 
containers. All of the points at which the information assets might be vulnerable to 
disclosure, modification, loss / destruction, or interruption are also identified. This 
process forms the basis for threats and risks identification.  
Next, a brainstorming and characterization of the areas of concern are carried out to 
capture quickly those situations or conditions that could threaten the organizations’ 
information asset. These areas of concern are then expanded into threat scenarios to 
further detail the properties of a threat. However, this process does not provide all the 
possible threats to the organization’s information asset. As a result, they suggest that 
a robust range of possible threats be obtained by including other threat scenarios that 
were not identified while capturing the areas of concern. This process is carried out 
by using a threat tree structure that takes into consideration the asset, access / means, 
the various actors, motives, and outcomes inherent in the area of concern.  
Finally, risks are identified by considering the consequences possible threats will 
have on the organization if a threat scenario is realized. The goal is to try to predict 
the importance / severity of each threat towards the information asset. To identify the 
risks an organization is exposed to, a risk equation is used: 
   Threat Impactcondition consequence Risk 
    . . Steps 4 and 5 Step 6i e Risk   
Probabilities are used for measuring the likelihood of threat scenario and the impact 
of each threat. Further, an impact value is derived from the risk measurement criteria 
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to measure the extent of a threat impact on the organization, by computing a risk 
score for each risk to each information asset. The relative risk score for each risk is 
determined by considering the severity of a risk outcome on the organization 
compared to the relative importance of the various impact areas. To compute the 
score for each impact area the impact area rank (using numerical ranking values) is 
multiplied by the impact value (qualitative values) and recorded in a score column. 
The total score for each column is equal to the total relative risk score. The relative 
risk score is computed in order to analyse identified risks and to help the 
organization determine an appropriate risk strategy.  
To select a risk mitigation approach, risks are prioritized (say from highest to lowest) 
based on their relative risk score. Risk with the highest score maybe considered first 
and categorized as mitigate or lowest as accept. A relative risk matrix which uses 
probability may be considered appropriate based on the organization needs. 
However, mitigation strategies are often decided by considering other factors such as 
the value of the asset and its security requirements, the containers in which it lives, 
and the organization’s operating environment, cost, and benefits of mitigation 
strategy. 
ARMS Working Group Methodology and Framework (ARMS Working Group, 
2010): The ARMS working group proposed an operational risk assessment 
methodology and framework for flight safety risk assessment. The methodology 
comprises three different phases and includes 
1. Event risk classification (ERC)  
a. Risks assess all incoming events to be risk assessed (from safety reports, 
flight data events, safety survey results, audits etc.)  
b. Conduct preliminary database screening 
c. Store events in a safety event database 
2. Data analysis 
a. Hazard identification from database  
b. Identify safety issues  
c. Assess identified safety issues 
i. Use Safety Issue Risk Assessment (SIRA) technique  
ii. Define and scope the safety issue before assessing risk 
iii. Calculate risk using prevention, avoidance, recovery and minimisation 
of losses factors 
iv. Determine the level of risk 
3. Periodic safety assessments on new or revised operational activity 
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The Event Risk Classification phase is a process which requires a preliminary 
screening of the database within a very short period of time; say one or two days in 
order to identify any event occurrences and safety hazards requiring immediate 
action. This process is based on the concept of assessing the risk associated with one 
event and not the risk associated with all similar events. The output of the ERC 
process is both a risk class, which indicate the necessary actions needed for the risk 
inherent in the event, and a numerical value of risk, which can be used for 
quantification during the risk analysis phase. The findings of the ERC process are 
usually stored in a safety event database for further risk assessment, at a later 
specified time period.  
In order to identify a number of safety issues affecting the organization, the output of 
the ERC process is further analysed along other data collected from other sources 
such as safety reports, questionnaire / surveys, external information and so on. Once 
the safety issues are identified, scenarios are created to identify the highest risk, 
which becomes the safety issue risk value. This safety issue is then calculated as the 
product of four factors: frequency / probability of triggering event, effectiveness of 
avoidance barriers, effectiveness of recovery barriers, and severity of the most 
probable accident outcome.  
These four factors expand upon the classical risk assessment formula (severity x 
likelihood) discussed earlier in chapter 1 and together determines the risk exposure 
level. Frequency here refers to frequency of the triggering event, while severity 
refers to the severity of the potential accident outcome and not the severity of some 
intermediate outcome. In effect, the frequency of triggering event, the effectiveness 
of avoidance barriers, and the effectiveness of recovery barriers are assigned 
estimated numerical values or classes. These values or classes commonly defines the 
mean frequency of the accident due to safety issue, while the severity of the most 
probable accident outcome indicates the estimated severity of the potential accident 
to determine the risk. A factor of 10 of difference is used between the barriers 
effectiveness classes (e.g. the barrier will fail “once in 100 times”, or “once in 10 
times”). However, the frequency of triggering event is an estimate of the exposure of 
this event. The concept here is that the meaning of frequency and severity becomes 
clear when compared with the classical risk formula and that effectiveness of both 
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avoidance and recovery barriers will allow the integration of the impact of controls in 
the risk assessment process. These four factors form the major part of their risk 
assessment framework known as the Safety Issue Risk Assessment (SIRA) 
framework.  A detailed discussion of this framework will be presented in the later 
part of this section.  
Finally, the third phase involves a periodic assessment of a specific part of the 
operation. They refer to this phase as the safety assessments process. The goal is to 
assess whether that part of the operation is safe enough, i.e. whether the risk level is 
acceptable. This process is focused on a new or changing part of the operation and 
the purpose is to ensure that planned operation will be safe. In conducting the safety 
assessment, the analyst is required to identify and analyse the associated hazards. 
The SIRA technique is then used to assess the risks related to the identified hazards. 
Although, they indicated that it may be impossible to use the SIRA framework when 
there are not enough factual and quantifiable elements to produce the SIRA, it can 
however be solved by using qualitative assessment that is based on domain expert 
judgements. 
The SIRA Framework: is a process which requires first a clear definition and scope 
of the safety issue and the typical aspects of this stage include 
1. Safety issue title 
2. Description of hazards 
3. Description of related accident scenarios 
4. A/C types considered 
5. Locations considered 
6. Time period understudy 
7. Departments whose involvement in the assessment is necessary 
8. Other 
Next is to quantify the assessment using a formula where risk has four factors: 
1. Frequency / probability of the so-called triggering event 
2. Effectiveness of the avoidance barriers (controls) 
3. Effectiveness of the recovery barriers (controls) 
4. Severity of the most probable accident outcome  
The values for these factors can be qualitative classes or numerical values as 
mentioned earlier. However, the first three factors define the mean frequency of the 
 49 
 
accident, while the fourth factor defines the most probable severity of the outcome. 
The resulting output of the SIRA process is a risk value for each safety issue. This 
output gives the profile of the residual risk inherent in the system. Finally, the result 
of the operational risk is produced on a scale of five levels of risk (Stop, Improve, 
Secure, Monitor, and Accept) to identify exposures which may require a risk 
response. The stop and improve scales are classified as unacceptable levels of risk, 
while the secure, monitor and accept scales are classified as tolerable levels of risk.  
They showed their framework works well by developing an Excel-based application 
tool to illustrate how the SIRA process should be conducted. The tool goes through 
the SIRA process step-by-step. A numerical estimation for the first three factors 
(frequency of the occurrences of triggering events (i.e. vulnerabilities, threats and 
other domain knowledge), effectiveness barriers to avoid the UOS
8
 occurrence, and 
effectiveness barriers to recover from the UOS before the accident outcome) is made 
and the severity of the potential accident outcome is estimated using a four scale 
rating (e.g. from catastrophic to no accident scale) similar to the ERC discussed 
earlier. A factor of 10 of difference is used between the barriers effectiveness classes. 
NIST SP 800-30 Methodology (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011b): They proposed a general risk assessment methodology which encompasses 
nine steps:   
1. System characterization  
2. Threat identification  
3. Vulnerability identification 
4. Control analysis 
5. Likelihood determination 
6. Impact analysis 
7. Risk determination 
8. Control recommendation and  
9. Results documentation.  
The risk assessment process starts with the system characterization by defining 
clearly the scope of the effort, boundaries, available resources and the information 
contained in the system. Steps 2, 3, 4 and 6 can be conducted in parallel after step 1 
                                                   
8
 UOS is defined as the “stage in an accident scenario where the scenario has escalated so far that 
excluding providence the accident can be avoided only through successful recovery measures” (ARMS 
Working Group, 2010, p.44). 
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is completed. Two distinct parameters: impact (also referred to as severity) and 
likelihood are used. Impact is described in terms of types of harm such as the harm to 
operations, assets, individuals, other organizations and the harm to the nation. To 
determine the overall likelihood rating for the probability that a potential threat 
source may exploit a given potential vulnerability, the analyst must make a 
subjective assignment of values based on the threat source motivation and capability, 
the nature of vulnerability, and the effectiveness of existing controls.  
In order to determine the adverse impact assuming a successful threat exercises or 
will exercise a given vulnerability, a risk scale and a risk-level matrix must be 
developed for measuring the risk level. The risk level scale can be a 3 x 3 matrix, 4 x 
4 matrixes, or a 5 x 5 matrix. The probability assigned to threats with overall ratings 
between 100 and 50 (exclusive) are classified as high risk, between 50 and 10 
(exclusive) are classified as medium risk, and between 10 and 1 are classified as low 
risk. The risk is then derived by multiplying the assigned ratings of the threat 
likelihood and the threat impact. These parameters can be qualitatively (categories) 
or quantitatively (numbers) rated based on the information or data availability, and 
the exact formula is: 
  Risk impact likelihood    
The goal is to determine the level of risk. In determining the risk, they assume that at 
certainty (i.e. 100% probability), the risk level equals the impact level. Each risk 
corresponds to a specific threat event with a level of impact if that event occurs. 
Thus, the general idea is that the risk level is typically not higher than the impact 
level, and the likelihood can serve to reduce the risk below the impact level. 
However, the upper bound on the risk analysis being equal to impact level at 
certainty may not hold for organizations with wide risk management issues, due to 
the potential for aggregation of risk. Further, even when each of the risk is at the 
moderate risk level, the aggregation of those moderate risk levels could aggregate to 
a higher risk level when multiple risks materialises. To solve these problems, they 
suggest that organizations could define a threat event as multiple occurrences of 
harm and an impact level associated with the cumulative degree of harm.    
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3.3 E-banking Operational Risk Assessment  
Aburrous et al. (2008): They proposed a model for assessing and evaluating E-
banking security website (i.e. an asset driven risk) based on fuzzy logic approach. 
The model consists of four stages: fuzzification of input variables, rule evaluation, 
aggregation of the rule outputs, and defuzzification. Their model addresses E-
banking website by classifying all Internet banking risks, threats, and vulnerabilities 
according to an important weight.  The goal is to identify the risk with large impact 
on the E-banking website security and performance.  
They assessed the website security using four main risk attack criteria: direct internal 
attack, communication tampering attack, code programming attack and denial of 
service attack. These four criteria are classified into a hierarchical ring layer structure 
and prioritized according to their importance using the weights concluded from their 
bank IT auditors’ survey. The least important criteria is assigned a weight equal to 
0.2 and placed in ring layer 1 and their union produces rule base 2 (known as phase 2 
evaluation). The criteria with the highest importance is assigned a weight equal to 0.4 
and placed in ring layer 2 and produces rule base 1 (known as phase 1 evaluation).  
The combination of rule base 2 and rule base 1 produces rule base 3 (known as phase 
3 evaluation) and represents the final security rating. Each criterion also has several 
components which explain the relationships between criteria and components. Once 
the criteria, components and ring layers have been defined, membership values of the 
inputs (low risk, moderate risk and high risk) and output (annoying, harmful, 
destructive, safe and catastrophic) fuzzy sets are produced, using fuzzification to the 
integer crisp values of the components of each criterion.  
Next, the rule base for the input and output parameters are defined using IF-THEN 
rules. The rule base for phase 1 is developed using the four input parameters (i.e. 
phishing attack, social engineering attack, insider attack and brute force attack) and 
one output which is the highest important criteria (direct internal attack). For each 
entry of the rule base, each component is assumed to be one of three input values and 
each criterion has one of five output value and produces the direct internal attack rule 
base 1. In phase 2, the system structure is a combination of the least important risk 
attack criteria (i.e. communication tampering attack, code programming attack and 
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denial of service attack) and one output parameter (security rating), which produces 
the rule base 2. These three risk attack criteria forms the inputs parameters. The third 
and final phase of the rule base is the combination of phase 1 and phase 2, which in 
turn produces the rule base 3 and final security rating. 
Finally, defuzzification is carried out on the aggregated output fuzzy set. They used 
clipping method in aggregating the consequences and defuzzified the aggregated 
surface of the rule evaluation, using Mamdani method to find the Center of Gravity 
(COG). Their model deployed the centroid defuzzification technique shown in the 
equation below, to find the point where a vertical line would slice the aggregate set 
into two equal masses:  
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   Where x  is the defuzzified output,  i x is the aggregated membership function, 
and x  is the output variable. Their proposed E-banking website security evaluation 
system was implemented in MATLAB 6.5 and they showed that direct internal attack 
is more important than all other risks attacks.   
Tanampasidis (2008): He proposed a methodology for assessing E-banking 
operational risk, which uses a Key Risk Indicator, self-assessment and expert opinion 
approach. The overall goal is to identify the level of risk exposures, the residual risk 
for further investigation, assess areas where risk is eliminated or insignificant, and 
the areas where risk is relatively high or sensitive. The assessment process is carried 
out based on six major steps and includes  
1. Strategy analysis and evaluation  
2. Risk identification 
3. Identification of points of risk mitigation and control 
4. Risk evaluation 
5. Risk measurement 
a. Business unit activity 
b. Application / subsystem functionality and constraints 
c. Identification of key risk factors 
d. Self-assessment 
e. Data processing 
6. Reports.  
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The bank’s strategic goals in the context of E-banking must first be described and 
documented by the auditor. Key bank executives are then interviewed by the auditor 
to determine the goal, corporate governance and policies. All operational risks 
associated with the key functions / services of the bank’s E-banking system, without 
taking into consideration controls and points of mitigation, which may have been 
applied to reduce risk exposures (inherent risk), and all business units involved in the 
daily conduct of the E-banking process must be listed. He suggests the use of 
Strength Weakness Opportunity Threats (SWOT) analysis technique for identifying 
the level of operational risk to which the bank is exposed.  
Next, risk mitigation and controls applied by the banks are reviewed by the auditor to 
assess the quality of the allocated resources and costs. Previously identified risks are 
evaluated to determine the level of residual risk, after all controls are in place and 
their effectiveness level determined. The resulting output is a list of all the key risks 
to which the bank is exposed, the major control mechanisms / point of risk mitigation 
that was applied for risk exposure reduction. Thereafter, the risk related to the 
technical infrastructure is measured using Technical Infrastructure Risk Assessment 
Form (TIRAF). The average rate per Key Risk Factors (KRF) and per application / 
subsystem is calculated by the business units and the total. The resulting output is the 
measurement of risk related to the technical infrastructure.  Finally, the auditor 
quantifies the average risk per KRF, average risk per function and the average risk 
per piece of technical infrastructure. Eventually the various outputs are summarized 
and documented for monitoring after the risks is analysed and evaluated. 
Several forms are used as tools for the information gathering process such as 
Business unit activity form and application description form which are used for 
identifying KRF and the major business processes Risk Assessment Form
9
 (RAF), 
which is used for self-assessing the level of risk exposures. The overall risk 
assessment process is based on expert opinion.  
This E-banking operational risk assessment process requires an external auditor to 
identify key risk areas, while the business users assess the level of risk exposure for 
                                                   
9
 The RAF is a double-entry matrix developed in an Excel spread-sheet. Scales are rated 
from zero to three, where zero is the minimum level of risk exposure and three the maximum 
level of risk exposure. The assigned colour for each rate is 0 = white, 1 = yellow, 2 = orange 
and 3 = red. 
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each area / risk factor. The idea is that business users may conceal some of the 
information or risk relevant for the evaluation from the analyst or auditor. Thus, 
reliability of the results depends on the degree to which both the risk analyst and 
business users actively participate in the assessment process. In addition, different 
analysts may provide different set of KRFs, thus results are not comparable to other 
similar surveys or even previous surveys in the same organization. KRIs mentioned 
earlier in section 2.6, cannot take into account process changes and system upgrades. 
Nevertheless, it has been shown that auditors with average experience will provide 
similar sets of KRFs. 
3.4 E-banking Operational Risk Assessment in 
Nigeria  
Wada & Odulaja (2012): deployed a social theory
10
 approach for assessing 
cybercrime and its impact on Nigerian banking institutions. Their findings revealed 
that absence of a law specifically for dealing with card-related crimes in Nigeria may 
be giving hackers more opportunity to make fake cards and use customers’ stolen 
identity for transactions.  They suggested that online banking has enhanced 
cybercriminals’ activities. Moreover, there are presently no specific law for 
cybercrime in Nigeria.  
Owojori et al. (2011): employed a trend analysis of variables in providing an 
overview of risk management practices in insured banks in Nigeria. Their findings 
revealed that volume of fraud and forgeries is one of the highest manifestations of 
operational risk in Nigeria. They claim that fraud and forgery were more pronounced 
in the post-consolidation era. In addition, they note that it is common practice for 
bankers in Nigeria to overlook certain risks and even ignore regulatory guidelines 
meant for risk management. Further, lack of an adequate and effective legal and 
institutional framework, to facilitate consolidation and risk management in the 
country is a major issue for concern. The occurrences of these risk events arise from 
                                                   
10
 A social theory is the process of using historical debate over the most valid and reliable 
methodologies in abstracted empirical evidence used to study and interpret social 
phenomena. These abstractions are described as scientific, descriptive or objective (Zinn 
2008). 
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weak internal controls and retention of staff with a high propensity for fraudulent 
practices. 
Adepoju & Mohammed (2010): conducted an empirical research on the challenges 
to ATM usage and fraud occurrences in Nigeria. They used a frequency table as the 
analysis method.  They suggest that although the adoption of ATM transactions is 
growing and the convenience of using ATM is starting to be recognised, it is 
however increasing security threats in the system. These threats are perpetuated 
through; ATM card theft, PIN theft, card reader techniques, PIN pad techniques, 
forced withdrawal and so on. 
Olasanmi (2010): empirically surveyed computer crimes and existing counter 
measures for such identified crime. The finding reveals that majority of fraud 
conducted in Nigerian banking institutes are from insider attacks. He argues that 
employees are usually successful in executing fraudulent attacks not just because of 
technical know-how, but also as a result of lack of regular staff training and lack of 
knowledge / adequate investment in computer security and technological equipment.  
In addition, customers’ attitude towards safe guarding their account, ATM cards and 
personal details are also major factors for insider attacks.  
The general view of these researchers is that despite the level of fraud and forgery in 
E-banking systems, banks are not keeping up-to-date with technological changes and 
as a result are putting little effort into minimizing operational risks. This agrees with 
the findings of Ochuko et al. (2009); as bank-specific factors are largely the main 
drivers for Internet banking adoption vis-à-vis E-banking systems.  
3.5 Research Validity   
Significantly missing in the literature is the use of soft computing tools, such as TAN 
and FIS, for assessing internally the operational risk exposure level inherent in an E-
banking system. In addition, many organizations are still using the classical risk 
formula (severity x likelihood) of a similar risk event taking place in the future, to 
create a two dimensional matrix that guides their risk tolerability judgement. Such an 
approach is failing nowadays as we move towards a more dynamic environment of 
knowledge, dependent on human driven information society. This present research 
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differs from earlier research in many aspects; as it will tackle the gap in E-banking 
operational risks assessment, tools, methodologies, and frameworks. This study will 
provide a practical application of soft computing tools and other statistical 
measurement approaches for E-banking OR assessment.  
The proposed E-banking OR assessment methodology and framework will be able to 
assist risk officers and E-banking system adopters, to identify variable dependencies 
as well as to understand drivers for E-banking OR. The methodology and framework 
will also able to help risk officers / senior executives, to review and make predictions 
on their banking risk profile. Further, technology adopters will also benefit from the 
OR assessment methodology and framework; as they will be able to assess the 
effects of possible interventions on their planned system adoption, as well as their 
overall risk management strategy and organizational goal.  
Although, the primary focus of this research is on E-banking OR, the model could 
however be applied to operational risks inherent onto the organization as a whole. It 
can also be tailored to a specific risk domain such as asset driven risk (e.g. Modem, 
FTP), vulnerability driven risk (e.g. two password authentication only), threat and 
threat agent driven risk or processes (e.g. loan application process, account opening 
processes, authentication and authorization processes), system adoption process, and 
so on. 
3.6 Summary 
The literature review presented existing risk assessment methodologies, frameworks 
and related works on E-banking ORA. Many of the classical methodologies and 
frameworks which are used to evaluating risk exposure levels and to make security 
predictions are highly subjective. They try to assess the likelihood of a similar risk 
event taking place in the future, rather than trying to assess the risk present in the 
event as it unfolds. In addition, many of these approaches do not take into 
consideration the existing or potential risk controls in the assessment process in the 
proper manner and often requires the use of relatively long time span of historical 
data for ORA process. The role of infrequent but very large loss event occurrences 
makes historical loss data somehow irrelevant.  
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This research aims to provide a forward-looking risk assessment methodology and 
framework needed to identify triggering events and frequency of occurrences, 
effectiveness of both preventive and detective controls, as well as the impact of risk 
that events carry as it occurs within the E-banking operation. Consequently, this 
research aims to take advantage of soft computing tools, to automate the detection of 
certain patterns to be raised as potential risk issues and to incorporate expert 
qualitative judgement to quantitatively define the output. It seems logical, therefore, 
that the available methods for risk assessment are now reviewed. 
The literature presented in this chapter, focused mainly on the sub-topics of the 
larger research areas that is directly applicable to this research. In the next chapter, a 
new risk assessment methodology and framework based on ARMS Working Group’s 
methods, that incorporate in the risk analysis stage the control effectiveness factor is 
proposed. The next chapter also developed a set of risk assessment metrics for the 
proposed framework. 
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Chapter 4 
An Operational Risk Assessment Methodology 
and Framework for E-banking Systems  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter focuses on the concepts of OR assessment methodology and 
framework, particularly on identifying the key steps and factors for ORA, in order to 
determine the operational risk exposure level inherent in an E-banking system.  It is 
essential to identify key steps to an operational risk assessment, because it is a main 
component of a risk management strategy which is developed by organizations 
during a risk framing step of a risk management process.  
In this research, the ORA methodology and framework of the ARMS working group 
(ARMS Working Group, 2010) is extended and used as a reference point, owing to 
how well it incorporate in the risk analysis control effectiveness factors, how well it 
fit our problem domain and most importantly how well it employs the ISO / IEC 
27001:2005 standard on Information Technology – Security techniques – 
Information security management systems Requirements and BS ISO / IEC 
31010:2010 standard on Risk Management – Risk assessment techniques.  
4.2 An Extended Operational Risk Assessment 
Methodology  
Although the ARMS working group ORA methodology provide a good base for 
measuring OR in E-banking systems, it was necessary to extend it to address new 
requirements and to include any undiscovered risk measurement attributes that may 
have risen in recently published research in the area of ORA.  
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After the ARMS working group ORA methodology was identified, diverse research 
efforts was spent on other existing risk assessment methodologies, frameworks and 
related work on E-banking operational risk assessment as discussed previously in 
Chapter 3 and referred to by the authors’ name. This process was necessary in order 
to identify new risk assessment processes and attributes. Seven risk assessment 
methodologies, two risk assessment frameworks and one E-banking security 
performance assessment model, within the recently published literature, covering the 
timeline between 1977 and 2011 were examined and presented in sections 3.2 and 
3.3. Interestingly, it was found that there was no consensus on the risk assessment 
process. In general, two common risk assessment attributes (likelihood of occurrence 
and severity of impact estimation) were used in reviewed methodologies and 
frameworks. The definition of what these attributes mean and how they are 
employed in the risk analysis process differs between researchers and organizations.  
4.3 Key Steps to Operational Risk Assessment 
Although it is appreciated that identifying clearly the risk assessment methodology is 
often the first step on how to assess risk associated with an organization operation, 
the following pseudocode however gives the key steps to ORA that will better help 
organizations in developing a risk management strategy. The three main parts are: 
defining the risk assessment methodology, identifying the risk assessment 
framework and measurement metrics, and identifying the data analysis tools and 
techniques. An algorithmic description of these steps is presented in sections 4.4 to 
4.7, and 5.10.1 to 5.10.5: 
Step 1: define clearly the risk assessment methodology11  
{ 
Define the risk model by defining 
the key terms used in the assessment,  
risk factors to be assessed, and  
the relationships between those factors (such as threat 
agents, threats, vulnerabilities and other risk factors)  
} 
{ 
Identify a preferred risk assessment approach; 
Choose qualitative, quantitative, semi-quantitative or a 
combination of approaches  
                                                   
11
 based on sections 4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.5, and 4.5.1 to 4.5.5. 
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}  
{ 
Identify the risk analysis approach with respect to the 
starting point of the risk assessment process and the level of 
details required;  
Choose the preferred risk analysis approach:  
Preliminary / database screening approach, 
Threat-oriented approach, 
Vulnerability-oriented approach, 
Asset / impact-oriented approach, 
Graph-based approach or 
Rigorous analysis approach 
}  
{ 
Identify and define clearly the risk assessment process 
System characterization / asset identification, 
Risk identification, 
Data analysis, 
Risk evaluation and 
Results documentation and recommendations 
} 
 
Step 2: define clearly the risk assessment framework12; 
Take in the operational risk data; 
Create a structured database (input data)13  
 
{ 
Enter  
      Operational risk issue title; 
} 
{  
Define the scope of the risk issue; 
 describe the risk(s); 
 describe the scenario; 
 list the E-banking system type; 
 define the location; 
 state the period understudy; 
other comments; 
} 
{ 
Describe controls in place and analyse the potential risk 
scenario; 
List the triggering events; 
List the existing controls to avoid Undesirable Operational 
State (UOS); 
Define the UOS; 
List controls to recover before the risk outcome; 
Define the risk outcome; 
}  
{ 
Analyse the risk based on fuzzy logic attribute representation 
for the following variables; 
Frequency of triggering events based on equation 4.2; 
                                                   
12
 based on sections 4.6.1, 4.7, 4.7.1 to 4.7.5 and Figure 4.2. 
13
 based on sections 5.10.1 to 5.10.3. 
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Controls to avoid UOS based on equation 4.3 and 4.4; 
Frequency of UOS occurrence; 
Controls to recover before the risk outcome based on equation 
4.3 and 4.4; 
Estimated cost of UOS; 
The severity of risk outcome; 
} 
{ 
Classify the risk exposure level based on fuzzy logic attribute 
representation; 
 Resulting risk class based on equation 4.5 and 4.6; 
} 
{ 
Evaluate risk based on fuzzy logic attribute representation; 
 Determine the security posture; 
 Make recommendations; 
Generate reports; 
} 
Step 3: define clearly the data analysis tools14  
{  
Perform the OR assessment computation using the following soft 
computing tools; 
 Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes classifiers based on equation 5.2 
to 5.12; 
 Fuzzy Inference systems based on equation 5.13 to 5.28; 
} 
Figure 4.1 Pseudocode for ORA key steps  
4.4 Proposed E-banking Operational Risk 
Assessment Methodology 
Risk assessment methodology is “a risk assessment process, together with a risk 
model, assessment approach, and analysis approach” (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology, 2011b, p.7). Any assessment of risk must include an 
explicit risk model, assessment approach and an analysis approach. Our proposed E-
banking ORA methodology is discussed by first defining in the following 
subsections, the risk model, the assessment approach and the analysis approach 
adopted here. 
4.4.1 Risk Model 
A risk model is the key terms used in risk assessments, the risk factors to be assessed 
and the relationships between those risk factors. That is the risk attributes such as 
                                                   
14
 based on sections 5.10.4 and 5.10.5. 
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threats, vulnerabilities, threat agents, other risk factors, and their relationships 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b). Defining clearly the risk 
model will help the organizations or the analysts, to understand significant 
dependencies and effectively determine the risk inherent their problem domain. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the operational risk model for adversarial events including key 
risk factors and their relationship.  
 
Threat Agent
 
Threat  
Vulnerability
 
Controls to 
prevent or detect
 
Exposure / 
security posture 
Give rise to
Exploits
Leads to
Can damage / cause
And causes an
Can be countered with
Other risk factors 
or predisposing 
conditions
Asset or UOS
Risk / Risk 
Issue
 
Figure 4.2 The E-banking OR model (modified from: OCTAVE, 2010 and NIST SP 
800-30, 2011b) 
A threat agent with the capability and intent could give rise to threat events by 
exploiting the system vulnerabilities, which could lead to a risk or risk issues with a 
likelihood of occurrence. These risks or risk issues could damage an asset or cause 
an undesirable operational state with an impact, and thus causing risk exposures on 
the system or the organization as a whole. However, risk exposure levels are 
determined by the effectiveness level of the controls in place to both prevent and 
recover the asset against threat agents. 
Threat agent: an actor (individual or group) or a method that can manifest a threat 
accidentally or with intent, by exploiting vulnerabilities or a situation in an E-
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banking system. Threat agents include hostile cyber / physical attacks, human errors 
of omission or commission, structural failures of organization-controlled resources 
(such as hardware, software, environmental controls and so on), natural and man-
made disasters, accidents, and failures beyond organization control. 
Threats: any event or circumstances with the potential to adversely have impact on 
the E-banking operations through an information system via unauthorized access, 
destruction, disclosure, modification, and / or denial of service.  
Vulnerabilities: an inherent weakness in the security procedures, internal controls or 
an asset (e.g. E-banking system) that could be exploited by a threat agent. 
Vulnerabilities can exist in any E-banking system as result of physical intruders 
break into computing facilities, natural disasters, hardware / software failures, stolen 
or damaged storage media, intercepted, possibly modified or misrouted 
communication and human intent.  
Other risk factors or predisposing conditions: conditions which exist within the 
E-banking system architecture and operation, which affects the likelihood that 
threats events, once initiated will result in adverse impacts on the E-banking system. 
For example gaps in contingency plans or weaknesses in the E-banking system 
backup, susceptibility of customers to attacks based on their E-banking culture, 
behaviour or personal profile.   
Asset and Undesirable Operational State: an asset is something of value to the 
organization (e.g. E-banking system, information asset, technology asset and so on). 
Assets are used by organizations to achieve goals, provide a return on investment, 
and to generate revenue. Undesirable Operational State is the stage in an accident 
scenario where the scenario has escalated so far that excluding providence the 
accident can be avoided only through successful recovery measures. An UOS 
occurrence may be as result of violation of security requirements (e.g. 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of an asset.   
Risk Exposures: risk exposure is the quantified potential for loss that might occur as 
a result of security violations or some activities. The level of risks associated with 
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identified risks, expressed in terms of the combination of consequences and their 
likelihood, represents the degree to which organizations are threatened by such risk 
issues. Thus, the security levels of the asset to the organization as a whole. 
Likelihood: the occurrence or percentage count of an UOS and a triggering risk 
event (e.g. threats, threats agent exploiting vulnerabilities, key risk indicators or 
other attributes).  
Impact or Severity: the process of determining the impact upon availability, 
integrity and confidentiality when a risk is successfully executed on the E-banking 
system. 
Control: means of managing E-banking operational risk occurrences, including 
policies, procedures, guidelines, practices or organizational structures, which can be 
of administrative, technical, management, or legal nature   
4.4.2 Risk Assessment Approach 
The consensus is that organizations may employ qualitative, quantitative, or semi-
quantitative risk assessment approaches based on risk criteria, risk appetite and 
organizational culture, availability of data / analysis expertise of the organizations 
and the decision-making needs of the organization (Sadiq et al., 2007; British 
Standards Institution, 2010; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b). 
Some of the approaches and degree of details may be prescribed by legislation. 
However, it is important the organizations or analysts understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of deploying their preferred approach. 
A qualitative approach uses a set of methods, principles, or rules based on non-
numerical categories or levels such as “very low”, “low”, “moderate”, “high”, and 
“very high” and the decision-making needs of the organization for assessing risk 
(Baker, 1997; Vidalis, 2004; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011b). Probability estimation is not required but only estimated potential loss value.  
However, it is subjective and highly dependent on expert experiences and risk 
perception, which may affect consistency and significantly assessment results. To 
solve this problems each value must be clearly defined or characterized by 
 65 
 
meaningful examples (e.g. the value is very high because of the following factors). 
Thus, an organization or an analyst may consider a qualitative approach when less 
uncertainty and expert knowledge / judgement is considered necessary, in order to 
support to a much higher degree, risk communication in conveying assessment 
results to decision makers.  
A quantitative approach may be employed when quantitative mathematical methods 
are considered necessary for measuring the risk variables or factors. Quantitative 
approaches provide numerical probabilities or frequencies of the consequences and 
likelihood of identified risks. It produces values for the level of risk in specific units 
defined when developing the context. The values used may be obtained from 
historical databases or estimated values by the domain experts. Notably, this type of 
assessment most effectively supports cost-benefit analysis of alternative risk 
responses or courses of action (British Standards Institution, 2010; International 
Organization for Standardization, 2011; National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, 2011b). However, quantitative approaches may be expensive and time 
consuming, because it requires the use of hard facts and figures, and as a result full 
quantitative analysis may not always be possible, thus still contains probability 
estimates and some degree of qualitative interpretation. In such circumstances, the 
analyst or the organization may consider using a semi-quantitative ranking of risks 
by experts knowledgeable in the problem domain and values obtained from historical 
databases.    
Semi-quantitative approaches use a set of methods, principles or rules that uses bins 
or numerical rating scales for representing consequences and probabilities, and 
produces the level of risk by combining these using a formula for assessing risk. 
Scales may be linear or logarithmic, or have some other relationship. These scales or 
bins translate easily into qualitative terms which help in supporting risk 
communications for decision makers. Formulae used in this approach may vary, and 
expert judgement in assigning values is more evident in the semi-quantitative 
approach than in a quantitative approach (British Standards Institution, 2010; 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b). However, rigour is 
significantly reduced when subjective determinations are contained within 
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assessments, or when significant uncertainties are present in the determination of 
values. When bin or scales rating are embedded in the assessment, care must be 
taken to ensure that they are not attributed a level of accuracy and precision 
inconsistent with the accuracy of the data and methods employed. Thus, clear 
meaningful examples of the bins or ranges of scale must be defined or characterised 
(British Standards Institution, 2010; National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011b).   
In this research, the semi-quantitative approach has been adopted and presented in 
chapter 6, for measuring E-banking OR, due to the difficulty of quantifying 
operational risk, the role of infrequent but very large loss events occurrences, which 
makes historical loss data somehow irrelevant. Moreover, the definition of risk 
presented in section 1.2 and 2.3 means that calculating risk on quantitative or 
qualitative data alone, may lead to highly subjective and unrealistic risk values, for 
example when historical data are scarce or when the variables are too biased towards 
experts level of knowledge.  
4.4.3 Risk Analysis Approach 
Risk analysis approaches are determine by the starting point of any risk assessment 
process, the level of details required in the assessment and how risks will be treated. 
Basically there are six risk analysis approaches: preliminary / database screening, 
threat-oriented, vulnerability-oriented, asset / impact-oriented, graph-based analysis, 
and rigorous analysis (ARMS Working Group, 2010; National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 2011b). However, an organization or an analyst may choose any of 
the approaches or a combination (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011b). These approaches will firstly be described to clarify the concept. The stance 
adopted in this research will then be established with reference to these approaches.  
1. Preliminary / database screening approach - screens historical dataset or 
databases to identify the most significant risks / security issues affecting the current 
operation. It uses screening techniques such as charts, graphs, filters in identifying 
trends and clusters of related risk events by different combination. One of the major 
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reasons for conducting a preliminary / databases analysis is that, results obtained 
from preliminary analysis may highlight risk issues which may require immediate 
action before a formal risk issue assessment is conducted. For example, if the 
database screening result indicates a very high level of Denial of Service (DoS) or a 
very high system delay to the E-banking system operation, then it will become 
obvious the need to urgently address the risk issues.  
This approach may also be employed to ensure that resources are focused on the 
most significant risks. However, care must be taken not to screen out low risk which 
occur frequently and as a result have a significant cumulative effect. Further, the 
potential impact (severity) of the risk events is not taken into account at this stage; 
therefore assessing risk based on the preliminary result alone may be misleading. To 
solve this drawback further detailed risk assessment must be conducted within 
reasonable period of time say annually.  
2. Threat-oriented approach - starts with the identification of threat sources 
and threat events. Carroll (1996), Caralli et al. (2007), and the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (2011b) discussed in section 3.2, suggest the use of a 
threat-oriented approach in their risk assessment methodologies. This approach 
however requires the creation of a list of all possible threats and vulnerabilities for 
each threat identified.  
3. Vulnerability-oriented approach - identifies and creates list of exploitable 
weaknesses / deficiencies or a set of predisposing conditions in organizational 
information systems or the environments, in which the systems operate (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b).  Both threat and vulnerability-
oriented approaches are very difficult to apply, as it is rather difficult to identify all 
threat sources, threats and vulnerabilities of the system under study especially, when 
the size is large. It is also time-consuming and as a result may render the results of 
the model out of date and unusable (Vidalis, 2004). It is even more difficult to 
employ, due to the dynamic nature of threats exploiting the ever new emerging 
vulnerabilities in information systems or processes.  
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4. Asset / impact-oriented approach - start by identifying high-value assets or 
highly adverse impacts (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b). 
This approach can be implemented by using Business Impact Analysis (BIA) risk 
assessment techniques, which are capable of identifying high-value assets and 
adverse impacts, with respect to loss of integrity, confidentiality or availability 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b). Pfleeger (1997) suggests 
the use of the asset / impact-oriented approach for carry out risk assessment.  
So far each of the orientation mentioned above can potentially fail to notice and 
hence determine risk (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b). To 
improve the rigor and the effectiveness of the analysis, risk could be identified from 
a second orientation by either using the graph-based or rigorous analysis approaches.  
5. Graph-based analysis - uses highly specific threat events to generate threat 
scenarios and account for situations where one event changes the likelihood of the 
occurrence of another event. Attack, Event and Fault Tree Analysis techniques are 
some specific risk assessment techniques that can be used to generate multiple threat 
scenarios that are nearly alike. When simulated or modelled automatically, the 
graph-based analysis can generate large number of threat scenarios such as 
functional dependency networks (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011b). Typical examples of graph-based analysis tools are the Bayesian Network 
classifiers and the Fuzzy Inference Systems. 
6. Rigorous analysis - provides an effective way to account for the many-to-
many relationships between threat agents and threat events; between threat events 
and vulnerabilities, and between threat events and assets / impacts. In addition, a 
rigorous analysis approach provide ways to account for whether, in the time frame 
for which risks are assessed, a specific adverse impact could occur or a specific asset 
could be harmed at most once, or perhaps repeatedly (National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, 2011b) depending on the organization control techniques and their 
effectiveness level. 
In the context of this research, the Preliminary / database screening and graph-based 
analysis approaches are proposed. The suggestion is that Fuzzy Inference System 
 69 
 
could aid the establishment of the context domain area (i.e. identify the type of E-
banking system to be considered for assessment). Preliminary / database screening 
approach should be adopted by using factor analysis technique for screening the 
dataset, in order to identify the most significant risk attributes on the E-banking 
system under study, thus ensuring resources are focused on the most important 
operational risks for further risk assessment. The graph-based analysis approach 
should then be adopted by using the Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes classifier, in 
identifying the triggering factors to operational risk and their causal relationships 
from this screened dataset. Finally, the Fuzzy Inference System should be used in 
determining the OR exposure levels inherent in the E-banking system under study. 
These approaches are considered appropriate because of how well they are able to 
incorporate internal / external data, scenarios, BEICFs approach, to modelling the 
causal relationships between risk factors, key risk indicators and other domain 
attributes in the risk analysis and determining the inherent risk exposures (see 
chapter 6 for application).  
4.5 Proposed Risk Assessment Process 
The E-banking OR assessment process is extended based upon the ARMS Working 
Group risk assessment methodology (ARMS Working Group, 2010) and the NIST 
Special Publication 800-30 revision 1 guide for conducting risk assessments 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2011b). Moreover, the ISO / IEC 
27001:2005 provides a sequencing of the core part of the risk assessment process 
into sub-processes for context identification, risk identification, risk analysis and risk 
evaluation (International Organization for Standardization, 2005). For each of these 
sub-processes, the E-banking OR assessment process gives detailed explanation with 
respect to which models or techniques may be applied and how they are expressed. 
Although, the sub-processes are sequenced the E-banking OR assessment process is 
iterative and allows feedback. The proposed OR assessment process consists of five 
major steps and includes 
1. System Characterization / Asset Identification 
2. Risk Identification 
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a. Threat identification 
b. Vulnerabilities identification 
c. Other background information identification 
d. Conduct preliminary screening of information in a, b, and c 
i. Identify risks that require urgent actions 
ii. Make recommendation for immediate risk mitigation  
iii. Store identified risks in the risk event database 
3. Data  analysis 
a. Identify risk issues from databases / datasets 
b. Use ORA framework  
i. Define and scope the risk issue before risk assessing 
ii. Identify triggering risk events 
iii. Identify avoidance and recovery barriers (controls) 
iv. Identify UOS 
v. Identify severity of the risk outcome 
c. Calculate risk using the ORA formula 
i. Frequency / probability of the so-called triggering events 
ii. Effectiveness of the avoidance barriers (controls) 
iii. Effectiveness of the recovery barriers (controls) 
iv. Cost of UOS occurrences 
v. Severity of the most probable risk outcome 
d. Determine the level of risk 
4. Evaluate risk 
a. Use estimated risk exposure level portfolio 
b. Identify risk criteria defined during context establishment 
c. Identify significance of the level and type of risks 
d. Identify risk scale values, definitions and required actions 
i. Make control recommendation on decisions to accept, treat, 
monitor or review risk. 
5. Results documentation and recommendations 
4.5.1 System Characterization / Asset Identification 
The first step in the risk assessment process is to prepare for the assessment, by 
establishing the context for the risk assessment. That is defining clearly the system 
or information asset that will be risk assessed. This context should be established and 
informed by the risk management strategy of the organization that was developed 
during the risk framing step of the risk management process. Thereafter the scope, 
purpose, boundaries of the E-banking system, along with the resources and 
information that constitute the system or asset must be identified. System 
characterization or asset identification is compulsory; as it helps to establish the 
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scope of the assessment effort, provide information essential to defining the risk and 
delineates the operational authorization boundaries.  
Several information gathering techniques such as questionnaire, interviews, 
document review, and automated scanning tools are available, and can be used for 
identifying the system of interest and its operational boundary. Any, or a 
combination of these techniques can be employed. 
4.5.2  Risk Identification 
Risks should be identified by first assessing the underlying E-banking operations 
against the potential threats, vulnerabilities, and other background information that 
may impact upon objectives as mentioned in section 2.4.1. The goal of this step is to 
identify and list the potential threat sources / agents, their motivations and threat 
events applicable to the E-banking system being evaluated. At this stage it is 
important to identify also vulnerabilities (weaknesses or flaws) that could be 
exploited by the potential threat agents. For example, a disgruntled employee with 
the intent of gaining unauthorized access to the E-banking system, in order to 
compromise the system by installing Trojan horse program, which in turn bypass the 
system security.  
Next, analysts should conduct a preliminary data screening of the information 
collected so far on threats, vulnerabilities and other background information that may 
impact upon the E-banking operation. This is to enable the identification of risks 
which requires immediate risk mitigation and to identify the most significant risks or 
to exclude less significant risk from further analysis at later specified date. 
Preliminary data analysis is necessary because it allows the organization to focus 
resources on the most significant risks.  
There are several methods for identifying risk, including the evidenced based 
method, which requires comprehensive use of check-lists or historical data on threats 
vulnerabilities, and threat events reported previously either in the database or 
literature. They can however be used at any stage of the risk assessment process (e.g. 
risk identification, control failures determination and so on). The outputs will 
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however depend on the stage of the risk assessment process to which they are 
applied. The OCTAVE threat profile or any suited technique can also be used as a 
guide to creating a comprehensive list of threats, threat agents, and actions associated 
with the E-banking system being evaluated. The system vulnerabilities could be 
identified by using vulnerability sources (e.g. NIST I-CAT vulnerability database), 
the performance of system security testing (e.g. automated vulnerability scanning 
tool), and the development of a security requirements checklist. 
A major benefit of using the check-list approach is that it can be used by non-
experts. It is allows for the combination of a well-designed range of expertise into an 
easy to use system and also able to ensure common problems are not forgotten. 
However, their limitations include but are not limited to the following: they 
encourage ‘tick the box’ type behaviour, tend to miss problems that are not readily 
seen due to their observational nature, and tend to inhibit imagination in the risk 
identification stage (British Standards Institution, 2010). 
Another method for risk identification is referred to as the systematic team approach. 
It uses a structured set of prompt questions such as interviews and survey 
questionnaires for identifying risk. Interviews and questionnaires are often used to 
identify risks or to assess control effectiveness as part of a risk analysis process 
(British Standards Institution, 2010; Institute of Operational Risk, 2010). They may 
however be applied at any stage of the assessment process or project. In conducting 
interviews (structured or semi-structured) and survey questionnaires, relevant set of 
questions and interview objectives must be clearly defined by the analysts. This is to 
guide the interviewer and to allow a degree of flexibility in providing opportunity of 
exploring areas into which the interviewee may wish to go, which will prove 
essential for effective risk analysis. In addition, a well-defined list of interviewees or 
survey respondents must be selected from relevant stakeholders (British Standards 
Institution, 2010) or groups of people.  
Some organizations have found benefits from using comprehensive and extensive 
standard questionnaires with questions allocated to respondents based upon the 
relevance of the activities (Institute of Operational Risk, 2010). However, it is time-
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consuming for the analysts to obtain multiple opinion or responses. It is biased 
tolerated and thus not removed from the discussion or responses, which may have 
significant impact on the risk analysis. The triggering of the imagination feature of 
the brainstorming
15
 technique may not be achieved (British Standards Institution, 
2010) with these approaches. However, the interview and survey questionnaire 
approaches are useful where brainstorming is proven difficult to apply in the 
problem domain.  
Finally, the initial assumptions and results of the risk analysis must be documented 
and stored in the organizations database, along with the identified E-banking risks, 
threats, threat agents and motivations, and vulnerabilities. It is important to develop 
databases, which can be used for data analysis and where individual risk events can 
be found easily.   
4.5.3 Data Analysis 
The main purpose of data analysis is to identify risk issues affecting the current E-
banking operation, their causal relationships, the effectiveness of controls 
implemented or planned, and to determine the inherent risk exposure level and the 
residual risk from existing data. It is important at this stage to carry out a preliminary 
database / dataset screening of risk previously classified, in order to identify also 
risks that require urgent actions. Automatic scanning tools and techniques such as 
the tools and techniques discussed in sections 2.6 to 2.10, SPSS which runs 
regression analysis, factor analysis and other statistical data analysis may be used. 
Charts, graphs and filters may be produced to sort the risk events by different 
combinations. Results can be presented as “number of events” or “rate of events” 
and / or their causal relationships. The resulting output of the preliminary analysis 
should be used as input to identifying the most significant risk issues affecting the E-
banking system under study and also to identifying the risks that highlight the need 
for immediate risk treatment.  
                                                   
15
 Brainstorming and Delphi methodology are examples of techniques that can be used to identify 
and improve the accuracy and completeness of the risk identification process (see British Standards 
Institution, 2010; ARMS Working Group, 2010). 
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Further, analysis should then be carried out on the most significant risk issues 
identified. These risk issues must be assessed using the ORA framework described in 
section 4.6.1 and Figure 4.3. At this point, the chosen risk issue for assessment must 
be clearly defined and scoped. Triggering risk events, and controls to avoid and 
recover before risk outcomes should also be described. Based on the data collected 
analyst should highlight contributing factors and their frequency of occurrence to 
risk events. That is determine the specific conditions which existed when risk events 
occurred and how these conditions may have influenced the frequency and severity 
of loss to risk events. Determine their causal relationships across multiple events.  
The analysis of controls effectiveness levels to both prevent and recover before risk 
outcome may be expressed qualitatively, semi-quantitatively or quantitatively. A 
formal review either by inspection or by statistical tests (that is sampling) could be 
performed and will inform the formal risk assessment process.  However, this 
decision may be based on the rigor, available data format, analyst expertise and the 
RCSA process.  Planned or implemented control analysis is necessary in determining 
risk, because control failures will tip the balance between inherent and residual risk, 
it will affect the severity of risk impact and thus may cause devastating financial and 
reputational effect on the E-banking system or the organization as a whole.  
Consequence or risk outcome analysis determines the type and nature of impact risk 
event occurrences will have on the E-banking system. Analysis may be a simple 
description of risk outcomes to detailed quantitative analysis.  
Severity of the risk outcome or the most probable outcome must also be described. 
Defining the factors will enable the risk assessment more factual, because analyst 
can then create and calculate the risks and determine the level of risks inherent in the 
E-banking system. The analysts or the organizations must also identify the 
undesirable operational events they are trying to avoid. The question asked here does 
not refer to the most probable outcome or the worst case scenario but undesirable 
operational events that could create UOS which could in turn result in an accident or 
risk with an impact on the E-banking operation. Organization can characterize 
magnitude of impacts and UOS by security objective (e.g. loss of confidentiality, 
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integrity, or availability). The approximate cost of UOS should be determined; as 
this will provide a good base for the valuation of assets and also help in identifying 
clearly the magnitude of risk impact.  
Once the key risk issues, triggering events, controls implemented, several potential 
risk outcomes have been precisely defined around one or more UOS, the information 
should then be entered into the ORA framework.  These factors should then be 
calculated using the ORA formula as explained in section 4.6.1 and illustrated in 
Figure 4.3. Next, estimate of the probable frequency / likelihood and the probable 
magnitude of impact associated with the E-banking risk scenarios; as influenced by 
applicable triggering events (risk factors) should be made. Finally, the analysts 
should determine the level of risk based on the most important risk scenarios and 
develop the effectiveness of identified controls (their capability to detect and to 
recover before risk outcome, and their effect on probable frequency and magnitude, 
and applicable risk factors).  
4.5.4 Risk Evaluation 
In this step, analysts should evaluate the risk based on the estimated risk exposure 
portfolio. At this stage the estimated levels of risk must be compared with the risk 
criteria defined during context establishment, in order to determine the significance 
of the level and type of risks. The meaning of each risk scale values, definitions and 
required actions must be clearly defined and agreed upon with top management or 
stakeholders of the organization. These decisions may include the need to treat, 
monitor or review risk. Decisions may also depend on the costs and benefits of 
taking the risk and the costs and benefits of implementing improved controls as 
discussed in section 2.4.3. Cost / benefit analysis are often used for evaluating risk as 
discussed in section 2.11. The estimated E-banking operational risks could be 
evaluated by dividing them into three bands (see British Standards Institution, 2010). 
These bands are:  
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1 An upper band where the level of risk is regarded as intolerable, where urgent 
risk treatment is required irrespective of the cost or the benefits the activity 
may bring.  
2 A middle band where costs and benefits are taken into account by balancing 
opportunities against potential consequences. 
3 A lower band where the level of risk is regarded as negligible, and as a result 
no risk treatment is necessary.  
4.5.5 Result Documentation and Recommendations  
The results of the risk assessment should be generated and documented based on; the 
information associated with the risk model, chosen risk assessment methodologies, 
analysis approaches, and the four stages of the ORA process proposed. Operational 
risks and other findings should be expressed in clear and understandable terms, in 
order to help the risk management team or top executives of the organization to 
monitor the risk assessment process and control effectiveness justification. However, 
the granularity of the report will depend on the objectives and scope of the 
assessment. It is important to include in the report, insights related to anticipated 
time frames associated with particular risks. Documentation can include also 
relevant parts of the system and their functions; assumptions and uncertainty 
analysis. Finally, conclusions and recommendations must be documented in 
accordance with the need of the risk management process. Periodic risk event and 
risk factor analysis, to identify new or emerging risk issues must be a carried out and 
updated on this on-going risk factors monitoring.   
4.6 An Extended Operational Risk Assessment 
Framework 
This section focuses on the development process for an operational risk issue 
assessment or simply ORA framework within an E-banking context. The ORA 
framework has six main steps namely: risk issue identification, development of the 
related potential risk scenarios, analysis of potential risk scenario, description of 
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barriers and cost estimation, risk assessment (computation) and the resulting risk 
class (risk exposure level and security level determination).  
The new framework was developed by adopting the ARMS Working Group 
framework and using it as a guideline; as it employs the principles of the BS ISO / 
IEC 31010:2010 and BS / ISO 31000:2009 standards. This framework was chosen 
owing to its ability of significantly shifting from classical risk assessment methods to 
a new risk assessment method which addresses the problems of the modern 
electronic era. Although, their safety issue assessment framework provides a good 
base for this research in measuring OR exposure levels in E-banking systems, due to 
the factors of the framework, it was necessary to extend it to include any 
undiscovered factor that may have arisen in recently published research in the area of 
risk assessment in general and in particular the E-banking OR assessment. Apart 
from identifying the ARMS Working Group safety issue framework, the ISACA 
Risk IT framework discussed in section 3.2 was also identified. Interestingly, it was 
found that there was no general agreement on used risk assessment factors. Two 
common risk assessment attributes (frequency of occurrence and severity of impact 
estimation) were used in the two frameworks reviewed. These two attributes were 
already used and extended within the ARMS Working Group framework, to allow 
for the integration of the “impact of barriers” in the risk assessment.  Four factors 
were identified in the ARMS framework and were used as a fundamental base to 
which a new factor was discovered for E-banking OR assessment, instead of the 
classical severity x likelihood formula.  
4.6.1 Proposed Operational Risk Assessment Framework 
In the ARMS Working Group framework, the adequacy of planned or existing 
security controls were taken into account and included at the level of risk 
determination. However, the ARMS Working Group framework failed to identify the 
importance of including in the risk assessment, the cost for the occurrence of UOS or 
the assets value (see ISO / IEC 27005:2011). It was noticeable that including the 
“approximate cost for UOS occurrence” would help in identifying more clearly the 
magnitude of impact and the risk exposure level as against the approximate cost for 
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each occurrence of the threat-source’s exercising the vulnerabilities, suggested in the 
NIST SP 800-30:2011 methodology. Considering the approximate cost for each 
occurrence of the threat-source’s exercising the vulnerabilities is rather vague and 
highly subjective, because the number of vulnerabilities tends to be large, as a result 
identifying the cost is complex and most likely impractical. As a result the proposal 
to update the ARMS framework comprised an additional ORA factor: an 
approximate cost for UOS occurrence.  
Therefore, the proposed framework consists of six ORA factors (triggering events, 
avoidance controls, recovery controls, UOS occurrence, cost of UOS, and severity of 
risk impact) as shown in Figure 4.3 (pages 80-82). The formula for the ORA adopted 
in this research is calculated as a product of the six factors indicated in the Bow tie 
analysis approach in Figure 2.5 and as shown in the Cartesian product: 
Risk Exposure Level (REL) =  
Triggering Events (TE) x Avoidance Barriers (AB) x Undesirable Operational State (UOS) 
x Cost of UOS x Recovery Barriers (RB) x Severity of Risk Outcome (SRO)                    (4.1) 
 Further, the proposed ORA framework includes the following stages:  
1. Identify clearly the various risks / risk factors in the E-banking system under 
study 
· Based on literature, dataset / databases analysis results (e.g. TAN 
model) and other statistical analysis results. 
2. Define the risks / risk factors precisely 
· Scope the selected issue in terms of identified risks, scenario 
description, locations, E-banking types or processes, and time period 
under study. 
3. Develop the related potential risk scenarios using Bow tie analysis 
· There may be several risk scenarios within one risk / risk factors.  
· Select the most critical scenarios (one or more) for the risk 
assessment, alternatively aggregate them if possible. 
4. Analyse each potential risk scenario using the ORA framework 
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· Identify what is considered the triggering event 
· List the avoidance barrier (controls) and review its robustness 
· Decide what is considered the Undesirable Operational State (UOS) 
· List the recovery barriers (controls) and review their robustness 
· Define the risk outcome of the scenario 
· Determine the estimated cost for UOS occurrence 
5. Run the ORA with values 
· Consider using FL approach for each risk attribute rating 
· Consider using Excel tool, FIS, or other matrix formulation tools 
· Select a known or an estimated value for each of the six ORA 
components 
6. Determine the risk exposure level  using a scale of three, five or more risk 
classes    
· Classify the resulting risk class and security level 
· Make recommendations 
· Generate reports   
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 E-BANKING OPERATIONAL RISK ASSESSMENT (ORA) FRAMEWORK 
1 Risk Title:  
2 Define / Scope the Risk Issue: 
2.1 Description of risks  
2.2 Description of scenario  
2.3 E-banking system type  
2.4 Locations   
2.5 Time period understudy   
2.6 Other   
3 Analysis of Potential Risk Scenario (also known as Bow tie analysis): 
3.1Triggering events  3.2 Undesirable Operational State (UOS) 3.3 Risk (accident) outcome 
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4 Describe the Barriers (also known as control assessment): 
 4.1 Barriers (existing 
controls) to avoid the UOS 
 4.2 Barriers (existing 
controls) to recover 
before the risk (accident)  
 
     
5 Risk Analysis ( also known as fuzzy logic analysis): 
5.1 The estimated 
frequency (likelihood  of 
triggering (threat) events 
(per specified users) 
5.2 The barriers will 
fail in avoiding the 
UOS (per specified 
attacks) 
5.3 The frequency 
(likelihood) of UOS 
occurrence (per 
specified attacks) 
5.4 The barriers will 
fail in recovering the 
situation before the 
accident 
5.5 The estimated cost 
of UOS (expert 
specified value range) 
5.6 The severity of risk 
(accident) would be 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cause 
Not at all severe 
 
Slightly severe 
 
Somewhat severe 
 
Moderately severe 
 
Extremely severe 
 
Cause 
Cause 
Cause 
UOS 
BOW TIE ANALYSIS 
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6 Risk Exposure Level Classification  
6.1 Resulting risk class:   7  Risk Evaluation (also known as consequence / probability matrix):  
7.1Security level / decision:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
8 Documentation:  
 
Figure 4.3 The diagrammatic framework for the E-banking ORA 
Fuzzy Logic based on attribute representation  
 Very frequent 
 Frequent 
 Occasional 
 Rare 
 Very rare 
  
 Practically always 
 Often  
 Sometimes  
 Rarely 
 Very rarely 
 
 Very frequent 
 Frequent   
 Occasional 
 Rarely 
 Very rare 
 Practically always 
 Often 
 Sometimes  
 Rarely 
 Very rarely 
 Very high 
 High 
 Average 
 Low 
 Very low 
 Extremely severe 
 Moderately severe 
 Somewhat severe 
 Slightly severe 
 Not at all severe 
ACCEPT IMPROVE 
 Very high 
 High  
 Moderate  
 Low   
 Very low 
   
Fuzzy Logic based 
on attribute 
representation   
MONITOR STOP SECURE 
 83 
 
4.7 Measurement and Metrics Definition  
This section focuses on the concept of metric definition to quantify the attributes of 
the ORA framework presented in section 4.6.1 and Figure 4.3.  Defining a suitable 
set of measurement metrics is considered one of the most important issues for any 
analysis process (Alkhattabi, 2010). It enables the quantitative evaluation of the risk 
exposure levels and the effectiveness of internal controls, which supports the 
foundation for decision making on risk mitigation. A Risk Control and Self-
Assessment metrics approach and a threat-oriented metrics approach were used (see 
British Standards Institution, 2010; Alvarez and Gledhill, 2010, 2011a, 2011b).  
In order to identify suitable risk analysis metrics for an E-banking system, metric 
proposals should address user’s needs in the domain context. To deal with this issue, 
the RCSA and the threat-oriented approaches were applied to solve the challenges 
brought by the subjective nature of risk assessments and represent the results in an 
informative and intuitive manner by addressing questions such as 
· What is the frequency (likelihood) of triggering events? 
· What is the frequency (likelihood) of UOS occurrence?  
· What are the existing controls for the identified risk issues? 
· Were those controls capable of adequately avoiding or recovering the risk 
events before the risk outcome? 
· In practice, did the controls operate in the manner intended and demonstrated 
effective when required?  
· What is the severity (impact) of risk outcome? 
These approaches were originally proposed to evaluate inherent risks (the risk before 
controls are considered) and not residual risks, the effectiveness of the internal 
control environment in preventing, detecting and responding to risk events that could 
cause financial losses, reputational damage and / or missed objectives, and residual 
risk (the risk exposures after controls are considered). The RCSA approach is based 
upon the assumption that, to transparently identify and assess the firm’s risk 
exposures and gauge the strength of the control activities in place, objective criteria 
to assess the risks and controls must be specified.  To achieve this, a rigorous RCSA 
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metrics and qualitative terms for describing the observed levels of risk exposure must 
be defined. The RCSA process is depicted in Figure 4.4. 
Risk Assessment Scale
Risk Rating 
scale
Control portfolio 
effectiveness
3 or 5-tier frequency 
and severity risk scale 
definition
Frequency risk 
scale definition
Severity risk scale 
definition
Control effectiveness 
scale
Frequency scale 
Frequency scale by 
occurrence
Frequency scale by 
percentage
Severity scale
Financial 
People 
Process 
Technology 
Relationship 
Regulatory 
Effectiveness 
category
Effectiveness 
criteria
Effectiveness range
Calculation value
Control weights 
3 or 5-tier 
Rating scale
Rating score 
A
Rating score 
B
 
Figure 4.4 The graphical structure for the RCSA process 
 The risk rating scale description: consistent risk rating scale should be 
defined for frequency and severity in this level. The risk analysts must first 
decide on the number of tiers to illustrate the riskiness - that is using either a 
3-tier (low, medium, and high) or a 5-tier (very low, low, medium, high and 
very high) to describe the range of risk.  
 The frequency and severity scale description: using a 3 or 5-tier scale, the 
risk analysts should define frequency and severity descriptors consistent with 
the needs of the organisation in this level. There are three perspectives to 
consider when evaluating the frequency and seven perspectives when 
evaluating severity of the risk as indicated in Figure 4.4.  
 Control effectiveness scale description: a scale of categories should be 
defined for assessing control activities from “least effective to most effective”. 
For logical consistency the number of categories in the control effectiveness 
scale should match the number of levels used for frequency and severity 
assessment scales. There are four perspectives to consider when evaluating 
the control effectiveness: control effectiveness category, control effectiveness 
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criteria, range and calculation value. However, organizations usually 
implements more than one control activity to manage a risk, thus a portfolio 
of controls should be used to determine the contributions made by the 
individual controls to the overall portfolio’s effectiveness (the control 
‘weights’). All controls in the portfolio should either be weighted equally or 
have specific weights.  
By using the RCSA approach, many current approaches can be combined to measure 
the E-banking OR exposure level; these include the ARMS working group and the 
NIST SP 800-30 revision 1 risk assessment approaches. In this research, an 
integration of these approaches is adopted.  
Next, is the detailed steps followed in applying the combination of RSCA, threat-
oriented and FL approaches to obtain the risk assessment metrics, measure the risk 
exposure level, and security level within an E-banking OR context. These 
measurements are based on the function of the six factors identified in the proposed 
framework in section 4.6.1.  The results obtained for measurement metrics of the six 
factors are presented in Tables 4.1 to 4.6 and described in the following sections. 
4.7.1 Frequency and Severity Scale Definition 
The starting point to creating the RCSA and the threat-oriented metrics is to identify 
both qualitative and semi-quantitative values for the frequency of triggering events, 
frequency of UOS occurrence and severity of the risk. Determining the frequency 
(likelihood) is fairly straightforward. It is the occurrence or percentage count of an 
UOS and a triggering event (e.g. threats, threats agent exploiting vulnerabilities, key 
risk indicators or other attributes). Severity of risk on the other hand is the process of 
determining the impact upon availability, integrity and confidentiality when a risk is 
successfully executed. This process helps the risk analysts to focus on not only the 
financial impact of the risk exposure, but also on other important dynamics that 
could impede the achievement of the business objectives such as an adverse 
regulatory action, a process disruption or incapacitation of a critical infrastructure.  
However, risk analysts often rely on common sense when conducting risk analyses 
for such complex systems. They often use vague and qualitative terms such as “very 
high”, “high”, “average”, “low” and “very low” (also known as linguistic values),  
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in dealing with uncertain factors within complex systems. Fuzzy logic can 
incorporate expert qualitative judgement to define those variables and their 
relationships. The example of a 3-tier frequency scale definitions, definitions for the 
risk categories used in evaluating the severity risk outcome and the severity scale is 
presented in Table 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 respectively for the E-banking ORA. At the end 
of this step, a set of fuzzy risk scales and scales description is provided.  
In Table 4.1, the frequency risk scale is defined; for example “occasionally” values 
are under the range of 21 – 79, which means that occurrence of UOS or triggering 
risk event (e.g. virus attacks) on the assessed E-banking system is 2 to 3 times within 
the calendar / fiscal year, with an occurrence percentage of the triggering event 
above 30%, but less than 50% of the organization E-banking transactions. 
The frequency of triggering events is quantitatively defined to assessing an 
individual triggering event. Usually various events can trigger a given risk event 
within a business process. The individual triggering event must be aggregated into a 
portfolio of triggering events. One simplified approach is treating the triggering 
events as one. Though this methods seems easy to use, the risk assessment 
granularity will however be sacrificed. Thus a more detail approach is to average the 
individual triggering events. The generalised expression for the aggregate triggering 
events is: 
 1 = 
i
n
te
i
RP
te
F
TE
N


                                                                                                 (4.2)  
where te = triggering events, Nte = Number of triggering events, and Ftei= frequency 
of triggering events. 
In Tables 4.2 and 4.3, the severity risk scale is defined; for example “not at all 
severe” values are under 0 -20, which means that total financial cost for the risk of 
loss that is readily quantifiable and has an accounting and economic impact on the 
firm is less than £5,000.00 with no negative effect on the firm based on employee’s 
performance, no disruption to the organization process, no performance interruption 
on technology in place, no impact is experienced by a third party and no regulatory 
impact as result of the risk event occurrences.  
 87 
 
Frequency risk scale definition 
Qualitative 
values 
Semi-quantitative 
values 
Trapezoidal Fuzzy 
numbers 
By number of occurrence By percentage 
Very frequent 80 - 100 10 [0.6, 0.9, 1, 1] Occurrence of a TE or UOS is one or more monthly  Occurrence of a TE or UOS is > 50%  of transactions 
Occasionally  21 - 79 5 [0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7] Occurrence of a TE or UOS is 2 to 3 times within the calendar/fiscal year Occurrence of a TE or UOS is > 30% and < 50% of transactions 
Very rarely  0 - 20 0 [0, 0, 0.2, 0.4] Occurrence of a TE or UOS is < once during a calendar/fiscal year  Occurrence of an event is < 10%  and < 30% of transactions 
Table 4.1 Frequency risk scale definition 
Definitions for risk categories used in evaluating severity component of risk 
Severity descriptors  Definitions  
Total Financial cost The risk of a loss (including the cost of UOS and other perspectives described in the risk scale definition) that is readily quantifiable and has an accounting and / or 
economic impact on the firm. It may be outsider or insider attacks 
People  The risk intentionally or unintentionally caused by an employee (through error or misdeed) or involving employees, such as in employment disputes. This covers internal 
organisational problems, people risks arise from the action or inaction of an individual or a small group of people within the firm.  
Process  The risks related to execution and maintenance of transactions, and the various aspects of running a business, including products and activities. Process risks are 
problems that are systematic in an institution or group, or inherent in a business process.  
Technology  The risk caused by privacy, theft, failure, breakdown or other disruption in technology, data or information; also includes technology that fails to meet business needs. 
Technology risks can occur in any department; not just those that manage the firm’s E-banking infrastructure. 
Relationship  The risk arising from the relationships or contact a firm has with its customers, shareholders, stakeholders or counterparties. Relationship risks include a human element 
but they are distinct from people risk incidents because they are based on the interaction between the firm and outside entities or, in some cases, the connection among 
groups within the firm. 
Regulatory  The risk associated with the firm not complying with regulations, law or supervisory guidance.  
Table 4.2 Definitions for risk categories used in evaluating severity component of risk 
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Severity risk scale definition 
Qualitative 
values 
Semi-
quantitative 
values 
Trapezoidal Fuzzy 
numbers 
Financial cost People  Process  Technology  Relationship  Regulatory  
Extremely 
severe 
80 - 100 10 [0.7, 0.9, 1, 1] 
[ >1m]  
Employee commits a 
legal and / or 
regulatory wrongful 
act 
 
Employee suffers an 
injury that results in 
health and / or 
personal safety issue 
Process does not 
execute 
 
Process needs to 
execute its business 
resiliency plan 
Complete failure in 
service 
 
Interruption resulting 
in big impact to 
business 
Third party 
experiences complete 
disruption to its 
business  
Regulator closes or 
takes over business 
 
Regulatory criticism 
fine, and curtailment of 
business 
Moderately 
severe 
21 - 79 5 [0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.9] 
[500k, 1m] 
Employee’s 
performance and / or 
behaviour requires 
management action 
up to and including 
dismissal 
 
Employee suffers 
discrimination and / or 
harassment issue  
Process is delayed 
due to disruption or 
re-work performed  
 
No business impact 
despite minimal 
disruption 
Performance 
interruption and 
impact to business 
(e.g. delay in process 
or re-work) 
 
Performance 
interruption but no 
impact to business 
Third party 
experiences minor 
disruption to its 
business  and 
inconvenience 
Regulatory criticism and 
fine 
Not at all 
severe  
0 - 20 0 [0, 0, 0.2, 0.4] 
< 500k 
Employee’s 
performance does not 
negatively affect the 
firm 
No disruption  
No performance 
interruption  
Third party 
experiences no impact  
No regulatory impact  
Table 4.3 Severity risk scale definition 
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4.7.2 Barriers / Control Failure Scale Definition 
In order to quantify the effectiveness of controls in the E-banking system, the scale 
for effectiveness of controls to avoid UOS and recover before risk outcome must be 
defined, from “practically always failing to very rarely failing” categories. When 
conducting the business or functional unit’s activities, the qualitative control failure 
criteria are defined. Each of these criteria is assigned a control failure range to 
complement the criteria and help the risk analysts in determining the appropriate 
category while looking at the control effectiveness. Control failure range is however 
the starting point for quantifying the subjective control failure assessment. Lastly the 
mid-point of the control failure range is the calculation value used.  
Table 4.4 list three control failure categories, qualitative control failure criteria for 
each, the control failure ranges, and the subsequent calculation values. In Table 4.4, 
the control failure scale is defined; for example controls in place to avoid UOS (e.g. 
virus attacks) on the E-banking system is “practically always” able to deny or delay 
unauthorised access to the E-banking system under the range of 70% – 100% of the 
time. However, as mentioned earlier risk analysts often use vague and qualitative 
terms when conducting risk analyses, as a result a Fuzzy Logic risk scale, which is 
able to incorporate effectively experts’ qualitative judgements to define those 
variables and their relationships is defined.  
Up to this point, the control effectiveness scale is quantitatively defined to assessing 
an individual control. Usually organizations implements more than one control 
activity to manage risk exposures. The individual control effectiveness must be 
aggregated into a portfolio of controls. To address the situation, risk analysts must 
resolve one unknown, determining the contributions made by the individual controls 
to the overall portfolio of control (the control ‘weights’). There are two general 
conditions to assigning weight: all of the controls in the portfolio are either equally 
weighted or they have specific weights. Equally weighted controls contribute equally 
to the portfolio of controls, whereas controls with specific weights contribute to the 
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portfolio by prescribed amounts. Regardless of the weight chosen, portfolio of 
controls  cp can be quantified as: 
   
1
n
cp i i
i
  

                                                                   (4.3) 
where i  are the individual control effectiveness values, and i  are the control 
weights. In this research the control weights must sum to 1 as shown below: 
   
1
1
n
i
i


               (4.4) 
Although, equation (4.3) and (4.4) are straightforward, risk analysts may find it 
difficult to assign individual weights for each control activity in the control portfolio. 
This can however be avoided by assigning qualitative categories such as ‘primary’, 
‘secondary’, and ‘tertiary’, or numerical ranking such as 1st, 2nd and 3rd to 
characterise control weights instead. Moreover the use of control weight categories 
will enable consistency across organization (Alvarez and Gledhill, 2010).  
4.7.3 Cost of UOS Definition 
In order to quantify the cost for UOS occurrence, the risk scenario must first be 
defined. Risk or threat scenario may be described in terms of loss of data or system 
integrity, loss of availability and loss of confidentiality as mentioned in section 4.4.3 
and 4.5.3. For example, an attacker (insider or outsider) pretended to be a legitimate 
mobile banking agent because he / she was able to gain unauthorized access to the 
mobile banking agent system and gained access to the agent login IDs. He then uses 
the stolen details to masquerade in order to steal customers’ money. For this reason, 
the UOS is loss of data integrity through account comprise, which must in turn be 
assigned an estimated cost for occurrence. Determining the approximate cost of UOS 
is fairly straightforward, it is the quantitative value for an UOS occurrence using the 
environment upon which the UOS is situated. This will help the risk analysts in 
identifying more clearly the magnitude of impact and the risk exposure levels. Table 
4.5 list the qualitative and quantitative values, the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers and the 
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definition.  Looking at Table 4.5 for instance, an approximate cost of UOS scale 
could be defined as the loss to data or system integrity, as a result of unauthorized 
changes on the E-banking system, leading to account compromise or theft is “very 
high” and is under the quantitative values greater than £1,000,000.00.  
4.7.4 Risk Exposure Level Scale Definition 
Assessing the E-banking OR is a combination of likelihood, impact and cost results. 
Likelihood, impact and cost are assessed on the system as it is operating at the time 
of the assessment. The level of risk associated with identified risk represent a 
determination of the degree to which organizations are threatened by such risk 
issues. Equation (4.5) reveals that risk exposure level is simply the product of the 
ORA factors once they are assessed.  
teRe  = Fix uos uos rr uos rol FA F F EC S                                                                (4.5) 
Where Rel = risk exposure level, Fte = frequency of triggering events, FAuos = 
failure to avoid UOS,  Fuos = frequency of UOS occurrence, Frr =failure to recover 
before risk outcome, ECuos = estimated cost of UOS, Sro = severity of risk outcome 
When determining risk at 100% probability of certainty, it is consistent that the risk 
level equals the impact level (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 
2011b). Each risk corresponds to a specific risk issue with a level of impact if those 
issues were exploited. In general, a risk level is typically not higher than the impact 
level. However, when addressing the portfolio of risk (such as in E-banking 
systems), this upper bound assumption may not hold, due to the potential 
aggregation of risk. To address the situation, risk analysts must resolve one 
unknown: determining the contributions made by the individual risk to the overall 
portfolio of risk (averaging the individual risk). The general expression for 
aggregation of risk is: 
te
1Re  = 
  
n
uos uos rr uos ro
i
RP
F FA F F EC S
l
Number of risks

    
                                          (4.6) 
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where Re
ix
l is the mean value for the collection of risk exposures. Hence equation 
(4.6) will yield the result for a portfolio of risk exposure level for the E-banking OR. 
Table 4.6 list both qualitative and quantitative values, the trapezoidal fuzzy numbers 
and definitions adopted in this research. In Table 4.6 the risk exposure level scale is 
defined; for example “very low risk” values are under the quantitative range of 10% 
-40%, as a result the organization will accept these levels of risk since it has small or 
negligible impact on the E-banking system. 
4.7.5 Risk Evaluation Scale Definition 
The next stage in the risk assessment process is to evaluate the risk based on the 
estimated risk exposure portfolio. At this stage the estimated levels of risk is 
compared with the risk criteria defined during context establishment, in order to 
determine the significance of the level and type of risks (British Standards 
Institution, 2010). The meaning of each risk scale values, definitions and required 
actions, must be clearly defined and agreed upon with top management or 
stakeholders. These decisions may include the need to treat, monitor or review risk 
(Standards Association of Australia 1999; British Standards Institution, 2010). These 
decisions may also depend on the costs and benefits of taking the risk, and the costs 
and benefits of implementing improved controls as discussed in section 2.11 (British 
Standards Institution, 2010). 
The final stage in the assessment process is report generation and documentation. 
Risks and other findings should be expressed in clear and understandable terms, in 
order to help the team or top executives to monitor the risk assessment process and 
controls effectiveness justification.  
The risk assessment process must also be documented for monitoring, review and 
further analysis at a later specified time period. It is important to note that granularity 
of risk assessment will depend on the organization’s risk objectives, appetite, culture, 
analyst experiences, and scope of assessment. Notably, the risk assessment 
methodology, framework and measurement metrics presented here should be 
customised to the specifics of the organization.    
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Control failure scale for (barriers to avoid UOS and recover before the risk outcome) 
Control Failure 
category  
Control Failure criteria Control Failure 
range 
Calculation 
value 
Trapezoid Fuzzy numbers 
Practically always  · Control objective is able to mitigate risk exposure(s) 
· Controls portfolio denies or delay unauthorized access to the E-banking system 
· Barriers is able to prevent or detect malicious transaction or malwares 
· Control portfolio is executed as designed  
· No significant gap in controls design and execution 
· Control portfolio did recover before the risk outcome 
 
70% - 100% 
(0.7 ≤ α ≤ 1) 
 
95% 
 
[0.7, 0.9, 1, 1] 
Sometimes  · Controls objective somewhat mitigate risk exposure 
· Controls portfolio did not completely deny or delay unauthorized access to the E-banking 
system 
· Barriers is primarily detective of malicious transaction or malwares  
· Control portfolio is reasonably executed as designed  
· Significant gap in controls design and execution 
· Control portfolio did not always  recover before the risk outcome 
 
50% - 70% 
(0.5 ≤ α <0.7 ) 
 
60% 
 
 
 
[0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.9] 
Very rarely · No controls in place to prevent or recover before risk outcome 
· Controls portfolio did not deny or delay unauthorized access to the E-banking system 
· Barriers did not detect malicious transaction or malwares 
· Control portfolio is irregularly executed as designed  
· Significant gap in controls design and execution  
 
0% - 30% 
(0 ≤ α < 0.5) 
 
15% 
 
[0, 0, 0.2, 0.4] 
Table 4.4 Control failure scale for (barriers to avoid UOS and recover before the risk outcome)  
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Approximate cost of UOS definition 
Qualitative values Quantitative values Trapezoid fuzzy numbers  Definition 
Very high [ ≥ 1m] [0.7, 0.9, 1, 1] · Loss to data or system integrity: unauthorized changes had been made to the data or E-banking system, 
leading to account compromise, fraud, identity theft, or erroneous decisions. 
· Loss of availability: mission critical to the E-banking system is unavailable to the customers and the 
organization’s mission is affected, leading to loss of productive time and delays in transaction processing. 
· Loss of confidentiality: unauthorized disclosure of confidential information and data, leading to jeopardizing 
privacy and identity theft. As result the organization suffers lack of public confidence, embarrassment, or 
legal actions. 
Average  [5k, 1m] [0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.9] 
Very low            < 5k [0, 0, 0.2, 0.4] 
Table 4.5 Approximate cost of UOS definition 
 
Risk Exposure level scale 
Qualitative values Quantitative values Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers 
(TrFNL) 
Definition 
Very low risk [ 10 – 40 %] [0, 0, 0.2, 0.4] · The organization will accept these levels of risk since they have small or negligible impact on the E-banking 
system. 
· The organization will accept these levels of risk since they could have a very noticeable impact on the E-
banking system, which needs to be monitored and / or dealt with as appropriate. 
· The organization will accept these levels of risk since they could have a very serious and critical impact on the 
business, which needs urgent and immediate attention. 
Medium risk [35 - 65%] [0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7] 
Very high risk [60 – 100%] [0.6, 0.9,1.0,1.0] 
Table 4.6 Risk exposure level scale definition 
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter presents a new methodology, framework and measurement metrics for 
an E-banking system OR exposure level and security level determination. The 
proposed methodology consist of four major steps: a risk assessment process, a risk 
model, assessment approach and an analysis approach. 
The proposed framework consists of six factors: frequency / probability of triggering 
events, effectiveness of the avoidance barriers, effectiveness of the recovery barriers, 
frequency of UOS occurrence, approximate cost of UOS, and severity of the (most 
probable) risk impact indicated in the Bow Tie analysis. The, ARMS Working Group 
framework was adopted and used as a guide; as it employs the principles of the BS 
ISO / IEC 31010:2010 and BS / ISO 31000:2009 standards. Recently published 
literature was reviewed to expand upon the ARMS Working Group framework, in 
order to include any undiscovered risk assessment factors or attributes. 
This chapter discussed the measurement approaches used to develop the E-banking 
OR assessment measurement metrics. A combination of RCSA approach and a 
threat-oriented metrics approach were used. Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers were 
presented for computing the joint probability function of the risk factors in the ORA 
framework. Following this, several statistical measurement tools and techniques such 
as factor analysis, FIS, Bow tie analysis, consequence / probability matrix and TAN 
classifier approaches are proposed for E-banking ORA.  
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter discusses how the research was conducted. It presents a clear 
understanding of the philosophical position and research methodology adopted and 
the relevant research approaches to answering the research questions.   
Research is the process of collecting, analysing, and interpreting data in order to find 
answers to unknowns or questions (Kumar, 2011). This process is often undertaken 
within a framework of a set of philosophies: which uses explicit rules and procedures 
(also known as methodology), methods and techniques that have been tested for their 
validity and reliability and is also designed to be unbiased and objective (Kumar, 
2011). It is difficult to determine a starting point based on these elements (Cullen, 
2004).  
In this chapter it is appreciated that research questions will inform the research 
design. However, the following section will firstly introduce the term methodology, 
including the research philosophy and types of research. There will then be a 
presentation of the research strategy, details of the research process, including the 
data collection methods used and discuss how the information was analysed.  
5.2 Methodology 
Methodology is a term often used in research with very different meanings (see 
Cullen, 2004; Crotty, 1998; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). In attempt to 
clarify the term, Kothari (2004) defined methodology as “a systematic way to 
answering the research questions or solving the research problems”. This definition 
includes the study of the various approaches and the entire process of a research 
study, which is particularly helpful in solving identified research problems or 
answering research questions and the rationale behind the choices.  
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In the context of this research, methodology is the explicit rules and procedures 
which shape our choice and use of particular methods and techniques, which forms 
the basis to answering the research questions. The research design therefore 
incorporates the methodology and the methods used for data collection.  The aims 
and objectives of the research was outlined in chapter 1, therefore the purpose of this 
section is to introduce the philosophical position adopted here.  
The term research philosophy refers to the development of new knowledge (Collins, 
2010). A chosen research philosophy means that the researcher accepts certain 
assumptions about how he / she view the world (Saunders et al., 2009; Collins, 
2010). These assumptions in turn provide the platform from which research 
strategies are made. It provide the framework of the research according to its 
configuration, evidences, data gathering and its way of interpretation to provide 
answers to the research questions.  
Within the social sciences in general, there is no consensus on the most appropriate 
philosophical position from which a research method can be derived (Cullen, 2004). 
Saunders et al. (2009) described four main types of research philosophy: pragmatism, 
interpretivism, realism, and positivism. However, Collins (2010) noted that to reflect 
and adopt a given research philosophy, three core approaches can be considered: 
ontology, epistemology and axiology. These core approaches will influence the way 
in which the researcher think about the research process. It will also enhance 
researchers’ understanding of how they will approach the study of their particular 
field of activity (Saunders et al., 2009; Collins, 2010).  
The following section will introduce the ontological and epistemological stance 
adopted, by firstly describing the pragmatic philosophy within this section, as it is 
frequently the case that the research question will inform the research design (Crotty, 
1998, Saunders et al., 2009).  
Pragmatism philosophy argues that in designing a research method the most 
important issue is the research question (Saunders et al., 2009). Therefore, the most 
important determinant of the ontology, epistemology and axiology the researcher 
adopts is the research question, because one may be more appropriate for answering 
the research question than the other. It also argues that it is possible to work with 
variations in the researcher’s epistemology, ontology, and axiology, if the research 
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question does not suggest unambiguously that either positivist or interpretivist 
philosophy is adopted.   
5.2.1 Ontology  
Ontology is concerned with the nature of reality. It refers to the way the social world 
and the entities that make it up operate and are viewed by researchers (Matthews and 
Ross, 2010; Collins, 2010). For example a gender or ethnic group, events or social 
behaviours and so on. Ontology is often discussed along the dimensions of 
objectivism, subjectivism and constructivism (see Matthews and Ross, 2010; Collins, 
2010). Each approach sets the hypothesis and the various methodological positions 
and therefore the brief description of the characteristics of the objectivist position 
adopted here is presented below. 
Objectivism holds that the social entities that make up our social world exist in 
reality (for example a tree) and independent to social actors (humans) concerned with 
their existence (for example, if it is seen in the forest). Therefore, meaning exist, 
waiting to be discovered and the researcher is independent from that being 
researched (Cullen, 2004; Saunders et al., 2009; Matthews and Ross, 2010).  
5.2.2 Epistemology   
Epistemology is a theory of knowledge; it presents a view and a justification of what 
constitutes acceptable knowledge in a field of study (Blaikie, 1993; Saunders et al., 
2009). Crotty (1998) described epistemology as the relationship of the researcher to 
the researched in terms of objectivism, subjectivism, constructionism and their 
variants. However, epistemology is also discussed along the dimensions of 
pragmatist, positivist, realism, and interpretivist philosophy (Cullen, 2004; Saunders 
et al., 2009; Matthews and Ross, 2010). Although there is a great deal of differences 
between the four positions, a distinction can be made by further exploring research 
philosophy, through the concept of research paradigms (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Paradigm is a term often used in research with many very different meanings and can 
lead to confusion (Saunders et al., 2009). A definition of paradigm is given by 
Matthews and Ross (2010: p.34) as “the bringing together theory about the social 
world with particular ontological and epistemological positions”. Saunders et al. 
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(2009: p.118) states that a paradigm is “a way of examining social phenomena from 
which particular understandings of these phenomena can be gained and 
explanations attempted”. Marlow (2001: p.7) described paradigm as “a map, 
helpfully directing us to the problems that are important to address, the theories that 
are acceptable, and the procedures needed to solve the problems”. In the context of 
this research, paradigm is a way of examining the social world from which E-
banking operational risk can be managed with particular ontological and 
epistemological positions, which will help to refer to the importance of risk 
assessment in today’s electronic world. The following section will present the 
positivist, realism, and functionalist (theoretical perspective) paradigms adopted 
within this research.  
Positivism - suggests that a philosophical stance of the natural scientist be adopted 
and that the research is undertaken in a value-free and detached way (Blaikie, 1993; 
Saunders et al., 2009). This approach develops from the objectivist ontological view 
and position that there is a social reality to research that is independent of the 
researcher and the field of study (Blaikie, 1993). The positivist approach supports the 
idea that knowledge is defined as that which can be observed by the senses. This 
process is referred to as phenomenalism, and therefore suggests that the uniqueness 
of experiences is the only reliable basis for scientific knowledge (Blaikie, 1993). 
A key implication of positivist research is that knowing what we know about the 
social phenomenon is based on what can be observed and recorded, rather than 
subjective understandings (Cullen, 2004; Matthews and Ross, 2010). In addition, 
data are often gathered to test a hypothesis which has been generated from existing 
theory. Further, the researcher is objective in the sense that he /she is independent of 
and has no impact on the data (Matthews and Ross, 2010). As a result, facts are 
regarded as scientific and seen as distinct from values. Typically quantitative data are 
collected to measure the social aspects of the world and the social phenomena. 
Causal relationships are then sought from the various aspects of the social world. 
This approach often uses large data sets and statistical analysis techniques (Saunders 
et al., 2009).   
Realism - similar to positivism, relates to scientific approach to the development of 
knowledge. This assumption underpins the collection of data and understanding of 
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the data collected (Saunders et al., 2009). Matthews and Ross (2010) note that 
realism accepts that the social world has a reality that is separate from the social 
actors involved in it and that this reality can be known through the senses. However, 
there is a dimension hidden from the senses that cannot be directly observed. This 
means including structures and mechanisms that trigger or affect the social reality 
that can be observed. Although, the structures and mechanisms cannot be observed, 
but their impact can be observed in the way people behave.  
Saunders et al., (2009) described two forms of realism (direct and critical). Direct 
realism argues that what you see is what you get; meaning what people experience 
through their senses portrays accurately the world. Critical realism on the other hand 
argues that what people experience are sensations, the images of the things in the real 
world and not the things directly. As such critical realism claims that there are two 
steps to experiencing the real world. First, there is the object itself and the sensations 
it conveys. Secondly, the mental processing that occurs after that sensation meets the 
senses. The direct realism however says that the first step is enough.  
It is perhaps important to note the distinction between the direct and critical realist, 
both of which are important to the pursuit of business and risk management. The 
direct realist relates the capacity of research to change the world which it studies. It 
would suggest the world is relatively unchanging and it operates in the business 
context and at one level (the individual, the group or the organisation). The critical 
realist would include the importance of multi-level study (the individual, the group 
and the organisation). Each of these levels has the capacity to change the researcher’s 
understanding of what is being studied (Saunders et al., 2009) such as the E-banking 
customers, the risk and IT officers, and the organisation stakeholders. Therefore, the 
research conducted here argues that the critical realist’s position that the social world 
(such the electronic world) is constantly changing is more often associated with the 
purpose of E-banking operational risk assessment and management research.     
It is perhaps clearer to view the extremes of the positivist, realism, and interpretivist 
research philosophies but rarely does research seem to fit exclusively into one. The 
three positions may be viewed as end points of a continuum where the assumptions 
of one gradually fuse into the other (Cullen, 2004). Table 5.1 summarises and 
clarifies the epistemologies presented, which will be particularly helpful in directing 
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the E-banking operational risk assessment research and data collection techniques 
adopted.  
Functionalist – explains social phenomena by means of their functions (Kincaid, 
1996). Saunders et al. (2009) states that objectivism is the ontological position most 
business and management research operates when a functionalist paradigm is 
adopted. They suggest that the functionalist paradigm is also considered from the 
regulatory perspective, in that it the researcher will most likely be concerned with 
rational and objective explanation of why a particular problem is occurring in an 
organisation, and developing a set of recommendations set within the management 
structure of the organisation. However, this approach is often problem-oriented in 
that it tends to provide practical solutions to practical problems (Burell and Morgan, 
1982).   
The functionalist paradigm is considered to offer a relevant systematic perspective 
for the intended research, because it places emphasis on the links between processes, 
structure, strategy and organization (Rossen and Reid, 1987). The functional 
paradigm here is an evaluation study of operational risk assessment methods, to 
assess its effectiveness and make recommendations as to the way in which it may be 
made more effective.  The research conducted here also seeks to explain and explore 
operational risk issues that influence the current E-banking operation, their causal 
relationships, and to determine the inherent risk exposure level. 
Regarding the positivism assumptions, it appears that adopting a functionalist 
perspective, the analysis of discrete objects is replaced by the possibility of 
examining a process, an organization or department within an organization as a unit 
of analysis. Therefore, the functionalist argument moves away from the idea of the 
whole is greater than the sum of the individual parts. Thus, it examines individuals 
within an organisation, the banking institute or the E-banking unit, and can be seen 
as a legitimate unit of analysis.  
 In addition, the notion of nominalism is also rejected by functionalism, that all 
concepts not directly experienced through the senses are meaningless. As a result 
complexity in representation and the ability to portray characteristics of intangible 
objects is allowed. Terms that cannot be translated from the unobservable into the 
observable can be used. This is pertinent here, although, the structures and 
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mechanisms of the E-banking operational risks cannot be observed but their impact 
can be observed in the way risk events occur and impact upon the E-banking system 
operations. 
 Positivism paradigm Realism paradigm 
Ontology: the 
researcher’s view of 
the nature of reality or 
being 
External, objective and 
independent of social actors 
Is objective, exists independently of human 
thoughts and beliefs or knowledge of their 
existence (realist), but is interpreted 
through social conditioning (critical realist) 
Epistemology: the 
researcher’s view 
regarding what 
constitutes acceptable 
knowledge 
Only observable phenomena 
can provide credible data, 
facts. Focus on causality and 
law like generalisations, 
reducing phenomena to 
simplest elements 
Observable phenomena provide credible 
data, facts. Insufficient data means 
inaccuracies in sensations (direct realism). 
Alternatively, phenomena create sensations 
which are open to misinterpretation (critical 
realism). Focus on explaining within a 
context or contexts 
Data collection 
techniques most often 
used 
Highly structured, large 
samples, measurement, 
quantitative, but can use 
qualitative 
Methods chosen must fit the subject matter, 
quantitative or qualitative 
Table 5.1 Research paradigms: taken from Saunders et al. (2009) 
Table 5.1 shows the comparison of the ontological and epistemological philosophies 
based on extremes of the positivist and the realism paradigms described by Saunders 
et al. (2009) and therefore highlights the implications of each paradigm. From the 
functionalist perspective for the purpose of this research, the method will involve the 
measurement of concepts through the use of surveys, perceived to be positivistic in 
approach. In addition, this study includes the use of secondary data to finding out 
about other research in E-banking, which is more often associated with the realism 
paradigm, in terms of identifying possible factors that may often affect E-banking 
adoption and influences operational risk.   
5.3 Types of Research 
Research is often categorized into four basic types: pure or applied; qualitative or 
quantitative; descriptive or analytical; and conceptual or empirical (Kothari, 2004). 
These four basic types of research are neither exclusive nor exhaustive (Kothari, 
2004). However, they can be viewed from three different perspectives: applications 
of the findings of the research study; objectives of the study; and the mode of enquiry 
used in conducting the study (Kumar, 2011). These three perspectives are briefly 
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presented in the following sections and depicted in Figure 5.1. Thereafter the adopted 
stance is presented. 
Types of Research
Application
Descriptive 
research
Objectives Enquiry mode
Exploratory 
research
Quantitative 
research
Qualitative 
research
Explanatory 
research
Correlational 
research
Pure research
Applied 
research
From the viewpoint of
 
Figure 5.1 Types of research (source: Kumar 2011) 
5.3.1 Application Perspective 
The application perspective is based on two broad categories; pure and applied 
research (Kumar, 2011). Pure research involves the process of developing, 
examining, verifying, and refining research methods, procedures, tools and 
techniques that form the body of research methodology for example, finding the best 
way to assessing people’s attitude towards E-banking adoption (Kumar, 2011). In 
addition, the pure researcher follows the process of developing and testing of theories 
and hypothesis (Kothari, 2004). This process is intellectually challenging to the 
researcher, as the area of research interest may or may not have practical application 
at the time of study or in the future (Bailey, 1978). Further, knowledge acquired from 
conducting a pure research is often added to the existing body of research methods.  
Applied research, on the other hand, is a descriptive process of applying the research 
methods, procedures, tools and techniques that form the body of research 
methodology, to a collection of information about certain aspects of a situation, 
issue, a phenomenon in order that the information collected can be used in areas such 
as: policy formulation, administration and so on (Kothari, 2004; Kumar, 2011). 
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However, this approach can be exploratory and is mainly applied within the social 
sciences in general (Kothari, 2004; Kumar, 2011).   
5.3.2 Objective Perspective 
An objective perspective can be classified from four major viewpoints: descriptive, 
correlational, explanatory, and exploratory. Descriptive research attempts to describe 
systematically an issue, problem, situation service or phenomenon (Kothari, 2004; 
Matthews and Ross, 2010; Kumar, 2011). For example, the services provided by an 
organization, or in the context of this research, descriptive research can be used to 
describe the operational risk experiences of E-banking customers. Therefore, 
knowledge is constructed by the researcher through a clear understanding of the 
prevalent aspect of understudy environment. Descriptive research often uses but is 
not limited to archival records, questionnaire, and secondary data, for qualitative 
analysis of the problem or phenomena (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Correlational research discovers or establishes knowledge based on relationships or 
association between two or more aspects of an issue, situation, or problem (Kothari 
2004; Kumar 2011). For example, what is the causal relationship between Internet 
banking adoption and fraud? In the context of this research, correlational research 
can be used to determine issues such as what is the causal interdependency between 
E-banking systems adopted, fraud (internal or external), and customers’ demographic 
profiles.   
Explanatory research explores further the relationship found in correlational 
research by attempting to clarify why and how there exists a relationship between 
two or more aspects of a situation or problem (Saunders et al., 2009; Matthews and 
Ross, 2010; Kumar, 2011). For example, explanatory research can be used to 
quantitatively analyse how E-banking fraud (external or internal) is enhanced by the 
literacy level and the economy status of the population or context domain 
understudy.  
Exploratory research is an initial attempt to find out what is happening or 
understand phenomena in a new light, where little is known (Saunders et al., 2009; 
Matthews and Ross, 2010; Kumar, 2011). It is particularly useful in investigating the 
possibilities of undertaking a particular research, also known as feasibility / pilot 
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study (Kumar, 2011). Exploratory research could be conducted to develop, refine and 
/ or test measurement tools and procedures (Kumar, 2011). Three principal ways to 
conducting exploratory research are extensive literature search, interviewing experts 
in the subject domain, and conducting a focus group interview.  
5.3.3 Mode of Enquiry Perspective 
The mode of enquiry is discussed along the dimensions of structured (quantitative) 
and unstructured (qualitative) approaches (Kumar, 2011). In the quantitative 
approach everything involved in the research process such as the objectives, design, 
sample, and the survey questions planned is predetermined and measured (Kothari 
2004; Saunders et al., 2009; Matthews and Ross, 2010; Kumar 2011). In other words 
it is applied to situations, problems, or phenomenon that can be measured 
quantitatively and can be represented numerically (Matthews and Ross, 2010). As we 
saw in Table 5.1, quantitative data is typically gathered when a positivist 
epistemological approach is taken and analysed statistically. Surveys are a primary 
method used for conducting quantitative researches, for example, a banking institute 
may decide to conduct a quantitative research by trying to understand how their E-
banking customers differ from non E-banking users. For the quantitative analysis, a 
count of adopters and non-adopters based on age, gender, education, computer 
literacy level and other relevant factors may be used.  
In contrast, qualitative research is concerned with discovering the underlying motives 
and desires in a situation, problem, issue or a phenomenon. This approach allows 
flexibility in any aspect of the research process, such that it is capable of handling 
subjective assessment of attitudes, opinions and behaviour (Kothari, 2004; Matthews 
and Ross, 2010; Kumar, 2011). Qualitative research is often adopted where the main 
objective is discovering the underlying motives of human behaviour and is not 
subjected to rigorous quantitative analysis (Kothari, 2004). Focus group interviews, 
projective techniques and in-depth interviews are often the data collection methods 
used for conducting qualitative research. Therefore qualitative data is collected when 
an interpretivist epistemological approach is adopted and when the data collected is 
expressed in words by the respondents in an attempt to describe people in natural 
settings.  
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However, the two extremes of the positivist epistemological (quantitative) and 
interpretivist epistemological (qualitative) approaches may not fit exclusively into 
one research. As a result, (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2004) and Berg (2001) 
greatly encouraged an integration of these approaches when conducting research, as 
it may result in increased validity of findings and reduced personal bias. However 
choosing any of these approaches will be dependent upon the aim of the enquiry (e.g. 
exploration, confirmation or quantification), the use of the findings (e.g. policy 
formulation or process understanding) and based upon their associated strength and 
limitations (Kumar, 2011).  
In the context of this research, an integration of the approaches was adopted and 
includes descriptive, explanatory, and exploratory perspective, and uses the positivist 
and realist epistemological (quantitative) data collection approach. In this study an 
integration of these various viewpoints will be presented in the research design in 
section 5.6 and implemented throughout chapter 6. 
5.4 Research Strategy 
Research strategy is a decision about the data collection methods employed in a 
research. It defines the general approach to conducting the research (Walsh & 
Wigens, 2003). There are several research strategies and includes; experiment, 
survey, case study, action research, grounded theory, ethnography and archival 
research (see Walsh & Wigens, 2003; Saunders et al., 2009; Matthews and Ross, 
2010). Each of these strategies can be used for exploratory, descriptive, explanatory 
and correlational research as discussed in section 5.3.2.  
However, the choice of a research strategy will be highly dependent on the research 
questions and objectives, the level of existing knowledge, the available resources and 
time constraints, as well the researcher’s philosophical underpinnings (Saunders et 
al., 2009). Therefore, no strategy is better than any other. Further, these strategies are 
not mutually exclusive (Saunders et al., 2009) for example, it is possible to use the 
survey strategy as part of a case study. Multiple data collection methods for example, 
questionnaires, interviews or observation to obtain data either as a piece of action 
research or survey (Walsh & Wigens, 2003) can also be used.  
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Survey strategy - is often used for exploratory and descriptive research because it is 
capable of answering “who” “what”, “where”, “how much” and “how many” 
questions (Saunders et al., 2009). As a result, it is a popular and common strategy in 
business and management research. Survey strategy allows researchers to collect 
large amount of data from a sizeable population and in a highly economical way. 
Surveys are perceived as authoritative by people in general and relatively easy to 
explain and understand. Further, data collected from using survey strategy can be 
used to determine possible reasons for causal relationships between variables and 
produce models for these relationships. Quantitative data can be collected and 
analysed using descriptive and inferential statistics. Further, survey strategy gives the 
researcher more control over the research process. Findings that are representative of 
the entire population can be generated at a lower cost, than collecting the data for the 
entire population (Saunders et al., 2009). However, surveys require a good 
representative sample, designing and piloting of the data collection instrument and 
ensuring good response rate. Therefore, it may be time consuming due to the reasons 
mentioned so far and also delays which may be experienced due to sole reliance on 
others for information. In addition, even though survey research is undertaken in 
context, the ability to explore and understand this context is restricted by the number 
of variables for which data can be collected.   
Case study - “involves an empirical investigation of particular contemporary 
phenomena within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson, 
2002: p.178). The case study strategy has, to a considerable level the ability to 
generate answers to why, what and how questions. As a result, case study strategy is 
often used in explanatory and exploratory research (Saunders et al., 2009). Case 
studies are used to investigate specific individuals, organisations or agencies that are 
exposed in great detail (Cullen, 2004). Investigations could range from simply 
descriptive, and aims to explain or illustrate processes, to a more analytical or 
theoretical case study, which aim to provide theoretical insights (Kelly, 1999).  
Different approaches can also be combined in a single case study, which may be 
simply descriptive at one level and theoretical at another (Kelly, 1999; Saunders et 
al., 2009). For example, interviews, observation, documentary analysis and 
questionnaire. This approach may require triangulation of multiple sources of data. 
Triangulation is the use of different data collection methods within one study in order 
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to produce understanding of the phenomenon and to ensure that the data are telling 
the researcher what he / she thinks they are telling (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Triangulation can provide increased validity of findings, reduce personal bias, and 
help to attain a fuller and richer understanding of the picture (Cullen, 2004). 
5.4.1 Case Study to Determine E-banking Operational 
Risks and Exposure Level 
The research here seeks to gain insight into E-banking operational risk factors, the 
likely risk exposure levels and in the process of designing an operational risk 
assessment framework to measuring OR exposure levels within the Nigerian banking 
institute. The case study approach was adopted, because of the several challenges 
currently facing the Nigeria banking institute such as the high prevalence of cyber / 
computer fraud, the lack of adequate regulatory framework for both banks and 
customers, adequate security technologies and operational infrastructure such as 
telecommunication, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), constant electricity supply 
among others discussed in section 2.2.4 and 2.3.1.  
Case study approaches has been identified to have many strengths (Cullen, 2004). 
These strengths to mention a few are: it is a good source of ideas about behaviour or 
real world object of analysis, it provides good opportunity for innovation, provide 
effective method to study rare phenomena, it is a good method to challenge 
theoretical assumptions and it provides good alternative or complement to focus 
groups or survey.  
However, the strength of a case study lies in its comprehensiveness (Kelly, 1999). It 
is hard to draw definite cause-effect conclusions from a case study, as it is subject to 
real world opportunities and constraints. It is also hard to generalize from a single 
case and possible bias in data collection and interpretation, since a single researcher 
may gather and analyse the information. However, Kelly (1999) highlighted that case 
studies and surveys are often complementary and contemporaneous, thus 
triangulation method is adopted as discussed in section 5.5.   
One perceived outcome of this research was that Nigeria economic issues will 
significantly increase fraudulent attacks, on E-banking systems and therefore 
increase the risk exposure level of the adopted system. In this regard the research 
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sought to identify operational risks and exposure level by selecting two commercial 
banks in Nigeria currently providing customers with E-banking products and 
services, in order to generalize the results to the Nigeria E-banking system.  
5.4.2 Survey to Determine E-banking Operational Risk 
Experience 
The survey strategy was considered relevant to generating answers to the research 
questions based on the chosen case study. In addition, it is possible to use a survey 
strategy as part of a case study as mentioned in section 5.4. Therefore, the objective 
of deploying a survey strategy in this research is to gain insight into customers’ and 
banks’ practical E-banking risk experiences, in order to identify the causal 
relationships between E-banking operational risk variables, such as operational risk 
itself and implemented control effectiveness level, triggering factors to these OR 
occurrences (such as cultural issues, demographic profile of the customers and so 
on), and new ideas relating to the research problem. In addition, to test the proposed 
ORA framework and to determine the operational risk exposure level from the senior 
/ risk officers of the two commercial banks under study.    
For these reasons, quantitative data was collected from the banking customers and 
bank officers of the two selected commercial banks in Nigeria, whom we believe are 
competent and are able to contribute new ideas, to ensure a representation of 
different types of OR experiences and validation of the proposed ORA assessment 
framework presented in section 4.6.1 and Figure 4.3. In addition, the survey strategy 
has many advantages such as the capability of allowing the researcher to collect and 
analyse quantitative data, revealing possible causal relationships between attributes 
as discussed in section 5.4. However, the survey approach may be time-consuming 
for the researcher to obtain multiple opinions or responses. It is biased tolerated and 
thus not removed from the discussion or responses, which may have some impact on 
the risk analysis as discussed in section 4.5.2.  
5.5 Research Process 
Kumar (2011) states that the path taken to find answers to research questions 
constitutes research methodology. This path or process of answering the research 
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questions consists of the desired sequencing of steps or actions needed to effectively 
conduct a research (Kothari, 2004; Kumar, 2011). These steps are not exclusive and 
include: formulating the research problem, conceptualising a research design, 
constructing an instrument for data collection, selecting the sample, writing a 
research proposal, collecting data, processing data, and writing a research report (see 
Kothari, 2004; Kumar, 2011).  
1. Formulating a research problem - is the first and most crucial step in the 
research process (Kumar, 2011). It involves the process of deciding what area of 
interest the researcher wants to find out about. The source of research problem 
consists of the study population (the people) and the subject area (the problems, 
programs and phenomenon). The main objectives and the sub-objectives are the 
goals the researcher aims to attain in the study area of interest. This process helps to 
inform the reader what the researcher is trying to achieve in the study.  
2. Conceptualising a research design - involves a clear explanation of how the 
researcher intends to find answers to the research questions formulated. Any research 
design should include the study design and logistical arrangements the researcher 
proposes to undertake, the measurement procedures, the sampling strategy, the frame 
of analysis and the time-frame. Selecting an appropriate research design is crucial 
because it sets out the specific details of research enquiry and enables the researcher 
to arrive at valid findings, comparisons and conclusions.  
3. Constructing an instrument for data collection - is possibly the first 
practical step in carrying out research. This process will require the researcher to 
determine and construct the relevant instrument or tools needed for data collection 
such as: questionnaires, interview guides and schedules, observation forms and so 
on. It is important at this stage to ensure the research instrument is valid and reliable 
in relation to the measurement scales. In addition, a pretesting of the research 
instrument should be carried out on a similar but smaller target population. 
4. Selecting a sample - this process is required in order to minimise, within the 
limitation of cost, the gap between the values obtained from a chosen sample and 
those prevalent in the study population. The argument here is that selecting a small 
number of units, if selected in a systematic way that truly represent the study 
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population, will provide sufficient high degree of probability of the sampling 
population that is being studied.  
5. Writing a research proposal – involves providing adequate information 
about the research study. The researcher is required to state clearly the research 
problem, operational plan for answering the research questions, which includes the 
methodology and methods for data collection, how to execute the proposed research 
strategy and the reason for choices made. In this study the research proposal is 
presented in appendix A. However, research objectives, data collection methods and 
target population sample, of the initial research proposal was modified in cause of 
literature investigation and other related issues.  
6. Collecting data – data is collected from which the researcher will draw 
inferences and conclusions for the study. There are several methods available for 
data collection. The choice will depend on the researcher’s plan and data instrument. 
However, prior to presenting the chosen research methods and the rationale for the 
selection, Figure 5.2 presents graphically, the general data collection methods and 
from which the adopted method is selected.  
Data
Secondary data Primary data
Literature (e.g. surveys, reports, 
interviews, and other documents)
Observation method 
(structured or unstructured)
Survey method (structured 
or unstructured)
Contact methodsParticipant 
observation
Non-participant 
observation
Disguised 
observation 
Mail 
Questionnaire  
Telephone 
Interviewing 
Personal 
Interviewing
Electronic Postal Intercept Focus group
Paper-and-pencil 
Questionnaire
 
Figure 5.2 Method of data collection- structured adapted from Kumar (2011) and 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (1997) 
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There are two basic types of data: primary data which are collected for the first time, 
and secondary data which have already been collected and analysed by others, such 
documents includes; earlier research, personal records, government reports such as 
census, newspaper interviews and so on (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, 1997; Saunders et al., 2009; Matthews and Ross, 2010). Primary 
data collection can be classified into two major forms. These two are: observational 
and survey methods. Within each type, there are many methods available (Yin, 2003; 
Kumar, 2011). Table 5.2 summarises the advantages, disadvantages, and the main 
characteristics for various methods of data collection. 
 CHARACTERISTICS ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES 
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
 D
a
ta
 
Individual or group data 
collected for purposes 
other than the particular 
research study (Food and 
Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations, 
1997). 
Cheaper to collect; 
require less search time; 
assembly and analysis of 
collected data improves 
researcher’s 
understanding of the 
research problem; 
extremely useful in 
defining the population 
structuring of the sample 
(Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the 
United Nations, 1997). 
Erroneous conclusions may 
be drawn when definition of 
terms changes; differences 
in levels of accuracy may 
occur when level of accuracy 
in data is unknown; source 
bias in figures, and 
frequencies; changes in 
reliability of data overtime; 
out –of-date data at the time 
of use (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United 
Nations, 1997).  
F
o
c
u
s
 G
ro
u
p
s
 
A panel of people who 
meet for up to two hours. 
Group dynamics are used 
to exchange ideas 
feelings and experiences 
on a specific topic 
(Cooper and Schindler, 
2003) 
Easy to conduct; explore 
topics and generate 
hypotheses; collect data 
from group interaction; 
high face validity; 
Quickly and 
inexpensively grasp the 
core issues of a topic, 
extremely inexpensive 
and flexible, participants 
respond in their own 
words, enable the 
exploration of new ideas 
(Cooper and Schindler, 
2003; Cullen, 2004) 
Group interaction may not 
mirror individual behaviour; 
not based in natural settings; 
researcher has less control 
over data generated limited 
sampling accuracy (Cullen, 
2004; Cooper and Schindler, 
2003) 
P
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
In
te
rv
ie
w
 Interview is face-to-face 
where an interviewer 
asks respondents 
questions (Cullen, 2004). 
Interviewed in person  
Flexibility in the 
questioning process, 
control over the interview 
process, high response 
rate, supplementary 
information available 
(Cullen, 2004) 
High cost, interview bias, 
lack of anonymity (Cullen, 
2004); follow up is labour 
intensive, not all 
respondents are available 
(Cooper and Schindler, 
2003) 
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T
e
le
p
h
o
n
e
 I
n
te
rv
ie
w
 
Defined as a semi 
personal method of data 
collection (Cullen, 2004) 
Interviewed on the 
telephone 
Moderate cost, can 
reach a large number of 
people in a short time, 
high quality of data 
(Cullen, 2004) 
Reluctance to discuss 
sensitive topics, respondents 
can terminate the interview 
before it is finished, less 
information that in meeting 
face to face (Cullen, 2004). 
Some target groups are not 
available by telephone 
(Cooper and Schindler, 
2003) 
P
o
s
ta
l 
Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
 
Questionnaires are 
mailed to be self-
administered with return 
mechanism generally 
included (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2003) 
Low cost,  biasing error 
reduced, high degree of 
anonymity, respondents 
have time to think about 
the questions, wide 
geographical access 
(Cullen, 2004) incentives 
can be used to increase 
response, requires 
minimal number of 
people to complete the 
process (Cooper and 
Schindler, 2003) 
Questions need to be simple, 
no opportunity to probe for 
further answers, no control 
over who completes the 
answers, low response rate 
(Cullen, 2004)  Accurate 
mailing lists needed (Cooper 
and Schindler, 2003) 
E
le
c
tr
o
n
ic
 Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
 
Questionnaires are 
electronically mailed to 
respondents with access 
to the Internet and 
computers (Rogers 
International, 2012)  
Low cost , fast access for 
the computer literate, 
rapid data collection 
(Cooper and Schindler, 
2003; Rogers 
International, 2012) 
Perceived as less 
anonymous, anxiety among 
some respondents, 
directions / software 
instructions needed, 
computer security, need a 
low-distraction environment 
to complete the survey 
(Cooper and Schindler, 
2003; Rogers International, 
2012) 
P
a
p
e
r-
a
n
d
-p
e
n
c
il 
Q
u
e
s
ti
o
n
n
a
ir
e
  
Questionnaires are 
delivered on paper to 
respondents (Yang et al., 
2009) 
Low cost,  biasing error 
reduced, high degree of 
anonymity, respondents 
have time to think about 
the questions, wide 
geographical access and 
incentives can be used 
to increase response. 
(Yang et al., 2009) 
Questions need to be simple, 
high cost printing, time 
consuming, requires face-to-
face administration (Yang et 
al., 2009) 
Table 5.2 Data collection methods (source: Cullen, 2004; Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 1997) 
7. Processing and displaying data – involves the selection of appropriate data 
analysis technique. This process will largely depend upon the type of information 
(quantitative, descriptive, qualitative or attitudinal) and the way the researcher intend 
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to communicate the research findings to the reader. For instance, a descriptive 
analysis may require the use of content analysis to present findings. Quantitative 
analysis may require the use of statistical analysis approaches such as: frequency 
distribution, cross-tabulations or other statistical procedures, such as regression 
analysis, factor analysis and analysis of variance. It also important to take into 
consideration the platform upon which data will be analysed (manually or by a 
computer). This process will also require a clear definition and selection of variables 
to be subjected to these statistical procedures. 
8. Writing a research report – this process informs the reader or the world 
about the research conducted, what has been discovered and what conclusions the 
researcher has drawn from the findings. Report writing be either quantitative or 
qualitative or combination which is practically a more realistic approach than solely 
quantitative or solely qualitative.  
In the context of this research, the research problem is how to identify operational 
risks inherent in an E-banking system, specifically in the context of the Nigeria 
banking industry. In addition, how to develop a new risk assessment methodology 
and framework, and finally, what risk assessment tools and techniques can be used to 
effectively identify, analyse and evaluate such operational risks. A clear and precise 
definition of the objectives is very important and it is presented in chapter 1.  
However, the next section describes within the research design, detailed description 
of the steps involved in this research. This is because the preparation of a research 
design involves taking into consideration the entire steps needed to answer the 
research questions.  
5.6 The Research Design 
Research design is the logical representation of the basic plan or strategy within 
which research is conducted (Oppenheim, 1992; Kumar, 2011). An overview of the 
research design is presented in Figure 5.3, to highlight the stages involved in this 
research. These stages include: an extensive literature review; qualitative descriptive 
study of factors for Internet banking adoption; development of a model for Internet 
banking adoption; development of risk assessment methodology, framework and 
metrics definitions; quantitative exploratory study of E-banking customers; 
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development of a model for risk identification; quantitative exploratory study of risk 
assessment professionals / senior banking officers;  and the development of a model 
for risk exposure level computation.  
Figure 5.3 therefore illustrates the research design and summarises the chapters 
within the thesis that describe and discuss each aspect. Table 5.3 lists the three stages 
of the research, the source of the data collected at each stage, the analysis carried out, 
the overall purpose of each stage and how it satisfies the proposed risk assessment 
methodology. This stages highlighted in Figure 5.3 are detailed within Table 5.3.  
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Discover and define preliminary 
research proposal
Literature review cont. 
Background of E-banking, operational, risk assessment, 
tools and techniques
Related work on risk assessment (methodologies and 
framework), E-banking operational risk assessment
(Chapter 2 & 3)
Identify issues and formulate 
research problem
Define research questions 
and objectives
(Chapter 1)
Develop FIS for Internet banking 
adoption
Case study and Experimental 
Results (Chapter 6)
Literature review
Background of Internet banking adoption  
(Chapter 2 )
Develop an operational risk assessment 
methodology, framework and 
measurement metrics 
(Chapter 4)
St
ag
e 
1 
Sy
st
em
 C
ha
ra
ct
er
iz
at
io
n
Stage 2 Risk Identification
Research Methodology 
(Chapter 5)
Design 
quantitative data 
collection 
instrument 
Define target 
population
Pilot & pre-
testing
Quantitative data 
collection –
 paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire
Refine 
questionnaire
Select sample 
&  size
Research Methodology cont. 
(Chapter 5)
Design 
quantitative data 
collection 
instrument 
Define target 
population
Pilot & pre-
testing
Quantitative data 
collection –
 electronic 
questionnaire
Refine 
questionnaire
Select sample 
&  size
Case Study and 
Experimental Results 
cont. (Chapter 6)
Analysis & 
Interpretation of 
paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire data
Pre-process data 
and develop TAN 
classifier
Compare TAN 
performance with 
ANN, DT, & NB 
classifiers
Identify risks and 
other factors
Pre-processing  of 
electronic  questionnaire 
data
Develop FIS model
Identify risks exposure 
level
Compare proposed ORA 
framework  performance 
with classical ORA 
methodology
Case Study and 
Experimental Results 
cont. (Chapter 6)
Conclusions & 
Recommendations 
(Chapter 7)
Research contributions
Research limitations
Recommendation for 
future work
Stage 3 Data analysis and risk evaluation 
Figure 5.3 Developed research design  
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As presented in Table 5.2, many data collection methods have associated weaknesses 
and strength. The data collection method used in this research, which includes the 
sources of data and purpose of analysis is outlined in Table 5.3. This method is 
referred to as triangulation of methods as discussed in section 5.4. In this research, 
both secondary and primary method of data collection has been deployed to 
identifying factors for Internet banking adoption, and risk identification / validation 
of the risk assessment framework respectively.  
 
STAGE 
 
SOURCE OF DATA 
 
FORM OF ANALYSIS 
 
PURPOSE OF ANALYSIS 
1 · Literature  
· Secondary data  
 
· Literature search 
(including individual 
research, 
government and 
non-governmental 
survey reports, other 
documents relevant 
to the project 
understudy) 
· Fuzzy logic analysis 
· Definition of research questions 
· Identify factor Internet banking adoption 
Identify risks and risks factors in E-
banking systems 
· Developed risk assessment framework 
and define risks assessment metrics 
· Model developed for risk identification 
· Model developed for risk exposure level 
and security posture computation 
· Model developed for Internet banking 
adoption and the adoption rate 
· Identify Internet banking adoption rate 
2 · Case study 
· Paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire  
 
· Frequency analysis 
· Reliability test and 
data screening 
· Factor analysis 
· Bayesian network 
analysis (including 
TAN and Naïve 
Bayes) 
· Decision tree 
analysis 
· Artificial neural 
network analysis 
· Model developed for risk identification 
· Check for major mistakes, missing values 
and major occurrences of parameters  
· Check the measure of questionnaire for 
consistency in what it is measuring  
· To reduce the dimensionality of the 
dataset into a smaller subset of 
measurable variables 
· Performance evaluation of soft computing 
tools 
· Learn the causal relationships among the 
variables and identify risk 
3 · Case study 
· Electronic mail / 
web questionnaire  
· Fuzzy logic analysis 
· Bow tie analysis 
· Consequence / 
probability analysis 
· Model developed for risk exposure level 
and security posture computation 
· Validation of risk assessment framework 
and methodology 
· Gain insight into the Nigeria E-banking 
system risk exposures 
Table 5.3 Categorisation of research stages- structure adapted from Cullen (2004) 
The literature search is an integral and continuing process that makes a valuable 
contribution to almost every operational steps of the research life cycle. Literature 
review was carried out in order to get acquainted with the available body of 
knowledge in the researchers’ area of interest. In this research the main literature 
review is presented in chapter two and three. However, the entire research cycle is 
considered a literature search as it involves building upon previously researched 
ideas, findings and models.  
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In summary the literature review and secondary data collected informed the 
development of a model for identifying factors for Internet banking adoption and 
adoption rate. It provided insight into the subject area prior to the empirical work. 
The case study enriched the information obtained throughout the literature review, 
and helped to clarify the questionnaires that were deployed using; paper-and-pencil 
and electronic. Data from the paper-and-pencil questionnaire provides a detailed 
quantitative report of E-banking customers and risk experiences within the Nigeria 
banking system. The data from the electronic questionnaire provided detailed insight 
into risk identified from the paper-and-pencil questionnaire, and the Nigeria E-
banking system risk exposures. It clarified and enriched the literature, the assessment 
methodology and framework, and the measurement metrics proposed.  
These approaches were considered to be the most appropriate methods to achieve 
research objectives and resolve the research questions presented in chapter 1. Both 
qualitative and quantitative research used is presented in section 5.7 and 5.8 
respectively. The rationale behind the methods and techniques used is presented 
within each section.  
5.7 The Qualitative Research Method 
This section presents the use of secondary data and the rationale behind this as one of 
the methods of data collection. Secondary data such as: reports and earlier empirical 
researches, which were already collected and analysed by other researchers were 
used within the 1
st
 phase of this research.  The purpose of the qualitative research 
was to explore and qualitatively describe issues relating to the adoption of Internet 
banking, develop factors for Internet banking adoption, identify adoption rate and 
gain insight into the main types of risk affecting E-banking system operation.  
The data extracted from the secondary data analysis was both country and industry 
specific. Specifically selected for investigation were secondary data and reports from 
six countries (United Kingdom, United State of America, Italy, Hong Kong, 
Romania, and Nigeria) on Internet banking adoption. These countries were chosen 
because they have different banking systems and are at various levels of 
technological development. Moreover, they represent a cross-regional perspective 
(Europe, Asia, America and Africa). In addition, other secondary data from existing 
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Internet banking references, the World Bank report on the global overview of 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) trends and policies in developing 
countries (The World Bank, 2006), and the 2006 World Factbook report (Central 
Intelligence Agency, 2007) were used for the analysis. 
This approach was considered appropriate as one of the data collection method for a 
number of reasons. It is difficult to obtain financial data or adoption trend and factors 
analysis data directly from the banks, due to privacy policies and data protection act 
across various countries and banking industries. For example, two of the United 
Kingdom banking institute were initially contacted by a written letter between 23
rd
 
and 25
th
 March 2009 to form part of the survey.  They however declined from 
participating in the study, due to ethical issues such as: they were unwilling to 
provide an individual student researcher, access to their website or their customers’ 
information. Secondly, would not part take due to confidentiality issues and data 
protection legislation in the United Kingdom. Moreover, real life data are often 
proprietary as a result no banking institute is willing to share their customer and 
product experiences with an outsider who will in turn understand their data mining 
process and activities. In addition, the data limitations become even more 
pronounced in cross-border investigation. 
5.8 The Quantitative Research Method 
The quantitative research of this study is classified into two phases (paper-and-pencil 
questionnaire and mail questionnaire).  The purpose of the quantitative researches 
was to explore issues relating to E-banking system operational risks, raised 
throughout the literature review and based on the analysis of the secondary data 
collected within the 1
st
 phase of the research.  
Specifically selected for investigation within these phases of the study are the E-
banking customers and senior / risk officers of the Nigeria banking institute.  The 
developed models, risk factors, causal relationships associated with E-banking risks, 
exposure levels, and other related issues, are therefore applied specifically to the 
Nigeria banking institute and their customers, for number of reasons. The rationale 
behind the chosen survey methods is presented in section 5.8.1 and 5.8.2 
respectively. However, a number of points are worth noting here: 
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1. Nigeria is regarded globally as the headquarters of Advance Fee Fraud16 
(419) and high Internet related frauds (Ezeoha, 2005). This may have implications 
for the adoption of E-banking systems and risk experiences within such systems. As 
Ezeoha (2005), Hesse (2007), Adenisa & Ayo (2010); and Ojeka & Ikpefan (2012) 
points out that fraud, corruption, erosion in public confidence among others are a set 
of disturbing issues in the adoption of E-banking system in the country. 
2. Nigeria is considered to have only about 68% literate people. Population 
below poverty level is about 70%, and about 50.2% households live in the rural areas 
(Ayo et al., 2008; Oke, 2008; The World Bank, 2010; Central Intelligence Agency, 
2011). This is a clear indication that many rural dwellers will have difficulty in 
accessing and most importantly, securing their financial transactions from the 
customer end. Therefore, the review of these systems’ adoption, performances and 
risk exposure levels has become necessary. 
3. Nigeria banking industries only began to use the E-banking systems after the 
last military regime handed over to a democratic government in 1999 (Ayo et al., 
2008) and in 2004 the banking industry saw a major banking reformation due to 
persistent cases of distress and failure, in addition to poor capital base, poor asset 
quality, fraud, corruption, and so on (Ezeoha 2005; Hesse 2007; Adenisa & Ayo 
2010; Ojeka & Ikpefan 2011).  
This may have implications for the uptake, high capital investment for banks to 
operate full and secure transactional E-banking system, technical know-how or 
otherwise of emerging technology. This may therefore, suggest an industrial sector 
study is more appropriate. 
4. Operational risks are ever present at any corporate, business or functional 
unit, and depending upon the uncertainties and their potential consequences, the 
management routine is by trying to prevent, minimise or accept them (Baker, 1997). 
The extension of this to the management of risks within the E-banking system is 
certainly heightened by the technological complexity of E-banking activities and its 
environment as mentioned in section 2.2.2. As a result, selecting the Nigeria banking 
                                                   
16
 The code “419” is named after section ‘419’ of the Nigerian Criminal Code that deals with 
obtaining property by false pretences and cheating (Ezeoha 2005). on the home front, bank 
frauds, forgeries, money laundry, insider abuse and erosion of public confidence 
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institute and the senior / risk assessment officers as a specific industry and 
professionals may be worthy strategy to adopt. 
5. Defining E-banking risks exposure levels using only loss data records from 
the banks view point may not be enough because, the end users (customers) have 
enough knowledge of the E-banking system operations but not the total picture 
(Tanampasidis, 2008). In addition, the banks may conceal certain risks information 
from the auditor or the risks analysts (Tanampasidis, 2008). For that reason, selecting 
the Nigeria banking customers and risk officers as specific case studies may be 
worthy strategy to adopt.   
5.8.1 Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaire based on 
Customers’ Experiences  
Kumar (2011) and Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (1997) 
list personal interviewing, telephone interviewing  and mail questionnaires as three 
methods of contacting respondents within survey method approach for information 
gathering. The data collection instrument used for the quantitative element of this 
phase of the study is the paper-and-pencil questionnaire. Cooper and Schindler 
(2003) indicated that comparing the research objectives with the advantages and 
disadvantages of each data collection method will help to simplify the selection 
process.  
One of the main objectives to be achieved with the quantitative research element of 
this survey, is to ascertain the details OR experiences of E-banking customers within 
the Nigeria banking industry. The need for simplicity, high cost of printing, time 
consuming and requiring face-to-face administration, makes paper-and-pencil very 
time consuming. Electronic questionnaire and postal questionnaire were considered 
as alternatives to the paper-and-pencil questionnaire. However, this approach was 
dropped, due to the cultural behaviour of respondents, lack of constant electricity 
supply in the country, ineffective postal services in the country, financial constraints 
on the researcher and time consuming nature of deploying these alternatives. In 
addition, the paper-and-pencil questionnaire, with its reduced biasing error, high 
degree of anonymity and relatively low cost, is the definitive choice to achieve the 
objectives outlined in chapter 1 and Table 5.3. 
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For that reason, identified risks attributes from literature and secondary data analysis, 
were arranged in a questionnaire format to collect a customer view on their E-
banking risk experiences and perception on E-banking systems in general.  
5.8.2 Electronic Questionnaire based on Bank Officers 
viewpoint  
The data collection instrument used in the quantitative element of this phase of study 
is the electronic questionnaire. One of the main objectives of this phase of the study 
is to ascertain the detailed E-banking OR experiences within the understudied banks. 
This stage of the quantitative survey was considered relevant because it helped in 
computing the risk exposure levels and comparison of the classical risk assessment 
approaches to the proposed risk assessment approach.  
The electronic questionnaire delivered via e-mail was considered appropriate for the 
investigation, because the senior / risks officers of the banks, has constant access to 
the Internet and computers in their offices. The electronic questionnaire, with its 
relatively low cost, quick data collection, ability to generate large samples, minimum 
hassle in almost all software platforms, easy and wide geographical coverage of 
target population and ability to show visual materials presented in Table 5.2, is the 
definitive choice to achieving the objectives presented in chapter 1 and Table 5.3.  
However, the electronic questionnaire had a number of disadvantages which include: 
the need to keep questionnaire short and precise, penetration of Internet usage, 
availability of e-mail addresses, inability of the interviewer to control who answers 
the questions, and a possible low response rate unless incentivised as presented in 
Table 5.2.  
Telephone interviewing and focus group were considered as alternatives to the 
electronic questionnaire. However, these approaches were dropped, due to the high 
cost and time consuming nature of deploying the telephone interview. In addition, 
bank executives were not willing to have a focus group which will discuss issues 
relating to their E-banking event risk classification.  
Therefore, careful planning and piloting of both customers’ and bank executive 
based questionnaire was carried out, in order to ensure easy to understand 
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questionnaire and avoidance of complicated questionnaire which may lead to low 
response rate or lack or responses from respondents (Cullen, 2004; Saunders et al., 
2009; Matthews and Ross, 2010).  
5.9 Sample Design and Sampling Procedure 
A population is referred to as the set of people or collection of all items that are 
under consideration in any field of enquiry e.g., an organisation, a country, a 
household or an industry (Hussey and Hussey, 1997; Kothari, 2004). A sample is a 
subset of the population defined, upon which conclusions can be drawn about the 
entire population. It is however not necessarily a full representative of the 
population, but should represent the main interest of the study (Oppenheim, 1992; 
Cullen, 2004).  
Sampling theory on the hand is described as “the process of drawing precise 
inferences on all units (a set) based on a relatively small number of units (a subset) 
with the subsets representing accurately the relevant attributes of the entire set” 
(Frankfort-Nachmais & Nachmais, 1996).  Sampling theory is therefore the study of 
the relationship between a population and the sample that is drawn from it (Chisnall, 
2001). This relationship is established so that accurate estimates of the unknown 
values can be easily calculated statistically (Frankfort-Nachmais & Nachmais, 1996).  
Oppenheim (1992 p.38) states that to identify the relationship between a sample and 
its population, their common characteristics must be stated. The source from which 
data will be collected must also be established (Cullen, 2004). A sampling strategy 
involves how units of analysis are selected for inclusion in the study and the obtained 
results can be used to generalize the entire population (Cullen, 2004). Thus two 
related issues is raised; sampling and statistical significance of the results. Sampling 
is an essential part of research and it is the part which lays down the selection of 
individual respondents needed for the information gathering (Rogers International, 
2012), which are representative of the population from which they were selected so 
that results can be generalised. Statistical significance addresses issues of the 
confidence that can be attributed to the results from the sample being found in the 
population from which the sample was selected (Cullen, 2004).  
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5.9.1 Sampling Procedures 
Sampling procedures may involve probability or non-probability sampling (Fink, 
2003; Kothari, 2004; Collins, 20010; Kumar, 2011). Probability sampling allows the 
selection of a representative sample and the probability that every member of the 
target population has a known and nonzero probability of being included in the 
sample (Fink, 2003; Collins, 2010). Non-probability sampling allows the use of 
researcher’s judgement to choosing the respondents based on the characteristics of 
the target population and what is needed in the survey (Fink, 2003). Unlike 
probability sampling, some members of the target population have the chance of not 
being included in non-probability sampling. Table 5.4 presents some commonly used 
probability and non-probability sampling methods. The various approaches adopted 
in this research are presented in the following sections.  
DESCRIPTION BENEFITS ISSUES 
Stratified Random Sampling(an 
example of probability 
sampling) 
Meaningful characteristics or 
strata are used to group the study 
population (Fink, 2003; Kothari, 
2004;  Kumar, 2011) 
Analysis of subgroups can 
be conducted (e.g. adopters 
and non-adopters). 
The sample presents a more 
likely representation of the 
population (Fink, 2003; 
Kothari, 2004; Kumar, 
2011). 
Sample sizes must be calculated 
for each subgroup. 
When many subgroups are 
considered necessary, it may 
become highly expensive to 
implement and time consuming 
(Fink, 2003; Kothari, 2004; 
Kumar, 2011). 
Convenience sampling (an 
example of non-probability 
sampling) 
Group of individuals or units 
which are readily available is 
used (Fink, 2003; Kumar, 2011). 
A practical approach as it 
relies on readily available 
units or groups (e.g. 
customers that visits a bank) 
(Fink, 2003; Kumar, 2011).  
Since sample is opportunistic and 
voluntary, participants may not 
represent most of the constituents 
in the target population (Fink, 
2003; Kumar, 2011). 
Judgement sampling(an 
example of non-probability 
sampling) 
 
Sample is selected based on 
judgement. 
A number of known sample 
known to be related to the topic 
area are selected (Aly et al., 
1971; Oppenheim, 1992; Collins, 
2010; Kumar, 2011). 
Lower cost of sampling and 
involves less processing 
time. 
 
Less chances of people that 
may distort the data. 
Good method for pre-testing 
a questionnaire (Aly et al., 
1971; Oppenheim, 1992; 
Kumar, 2011). 
 
Good for providing 
illustrative examples or case 
studies (Collins, 2010) 
Draws the entire sample from one 
representative city even though 
the population includes all cities. 
So the researcher must be 
confident that the chosen sample 
is truly representative of the entire 
population.  
It may be subjective to 
experimenter’s bias and 
stereotypes which may distort the 
results (Aly et al., 1971; 
Oppenheim, 1992; Collins, 2010; 
Kumar, 2011). 
Purposive sampling(an example 
of non-probability sampling) 
Focuses on sampling particular 
characteristics of a population, 
Availability of a wide range 
of sampling techniques that 
can be used across such 
It can be highly prone to 
researcher bias irrespective of the 
type. 
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where the units or population 
members that are investigated are 
selected based on interest of the 
researcher that will best provide 
relevant answers to the research 
questions (Devers & Frankel, 
2000; Lund Research Ltd, 2010). 
 
Types of Purposive Sampling 
Maximum variation sampling, 
Homogenous sampling, 
Typical case sampling, 
Extreme (or deviant) case 
sampling, 
Critical case sampling, 
Total population sampling, and 
Expert sampling. 
 
Total population sampling: In 
total population sampling an 
entire population which have a 
particular set of characteristics 
(e.g. specific experience, 
knowledge, skills etc.) are 
examined (Lund Research Ltd, 
2010). 
qualitative research designs. 
Purpose sampling is useful 
when the qualitative 
research design involves 
multiple phases because it 
provides a wide range of 
non-probability sampling 
techniques for the 
researcher to draw on 
(Devers & Frankel, 2000; 
Lund Research Ltd, 2010). 
 
It can be difficult to defend the 
representativeness of the sample 
due to the subjectivity and non-
probability based nature of unit 
selection (Devers & Frankel, 
2000; Lund Research Ltd, 2010). 
Table 5.4 Sampling methods  
5.9.2 Definition of the Target Population  
The first stage in the sampling procedure was to define the target population. It is 
important to note that decision to determine the scope of the population will 
inevitably affect the generalizability of the results obtained (Collins, 2010). 
Therefore, it is important to keep the size of the study manageable without limiting 
its generalizability. The population in this study is defined to be representative, so 
that results can be generalised to the entire commercial banks in the country and in 
some degree to the entire banking institute within Nigeria. In this study, the research 
focus is on the identification of risk experiences and their impact. Therefore, two set 
of respondents, namely, the E-banking customers and the senior / risk banking 
officers of the two commercial banks were involved.  
At the time of this study, Nigeria has a population of about 140,431,790 people 
(National Population Commission of Nigeria, 2011). It was impossible to survey the 
entire population, thus the survey did not cover the entire country. Rather it covered 
the banking customers from one state in the south-south geopolitical region, out of 
the six geopolitical regions in the country. The survey was performed on a 
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population of people from Delta State of Nigeria. Various reasons accounted for the 
choice of this region such as the level of detail information required, the high 
financial demand, cultural behaviour of respondents, and the time consuming nature 
of the survey, and most importantly to ascertain the details of risk experiences and 
their consequences. 
Historically, Nigeria is located in West Africa on the Gulf of Guinea between Benin 
and Cameroon republic. It has five major geographic regions: a low coastal zone 
along the Gulf of Guinea, hills and low plateaus north of the coastal zone, the Niger-
Benue river valley, a broad stepped plateau stretching to the northern border with 
elevations exceeding 1,200 meters, and a mountainous zone along the eastern border, 
which includes the country’s highest point Chappal Waddi (2,419 meters) (Federal 
Ministry of Women Affairs, 2004). Nigeria is made up of six geopolitical regions as 
shown in Table 5.5.  
Name of Zone  States within the Geopolitical Zone  
South West  Ekiti, Lagos, Osun, Ondo, Ogun, Oyo  
South East  Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo  
South-South  Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Rivers  
North Central  Benue, FCT, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, Plateau  
North East  Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, Yobe  
North West  Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa,, Zamfara  
Table 5.5 Nigeria geopolitical zones (source: Federal Ministry of Women Affairs, 
2004) 
Based on the population census conducted in 2006, Delta state is considered the 
second largest state in the south-south region, with a total population of about 4, 000, 
000 people, and which is about 20% of the south-south region (National Population 
Commission of Nigeria, 2011).  
The National Population Commission of Nigeria (2011) states that although the vast 
majority of the people of Delta state live in rural settlements, the urban centres have 
however seen a dramatic migration increase over the years as a result of oil 
production companies locating in these areas. Therefore, in this research, two of the 
major towns in the state; Warri town (the largest oil producing part of the urban area) 
and Abraka town (the area with the state university) was chosen for this survey, as it 
is envisaged that majority of the people in these areas are more likely to be familiar 
with E-banking systems, and basic ICT infrastructure, as well as share common 
characteristics mentioned earlier, thus satisfying Oppenheim (1992) suggestion.  
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Due to the difficulty of getting banking institutions to part take in an independent 
research project as stated in section 5.7, stratified random sampling method was used 
in selecting two commercial banks in Delta state for the survey, because it reduces 
sampling errors by selecting a subset of the population that share at least one 
common characteristic (Fink, 2003). In this case the decision was to select two 
commercial banks out of the 25 commercial banks in Nigeria. These banks were 
registered before the Nigeria banking reform in 2004, and are well geographically 
located in Delta state. In addition, the banks are providing customers with full 
transactional E-banking services as a result satisfies the condition for the research 
interest. However, in this study judgment sampling method was further used in 
selecting the particular office branch for the survey from the two chosen commercial 
banks in Delta state. Specifically, the questionnaire was distributed to customers who 
visited the branch offices of the two understudied banks in Warri and Abraka Town 
of Delta state.  
After an initial phone conversation with the managers of the two chosen banks, they 
suggested that a possible way of reaching their customers is to develop a paper-and-
pencil questionnaire for the respondents. In addition, they agreed to help in the 
distribution of the questionnaire to their banking customers. This approach was 
suggested for several reasons: the behavioural attitude of the respondents towards 
part taking in a survey either electronically or manually; the direct link and ease of 
communication with the respondents by bank officials; the well-established 
confidence and relationship between the banks and their customers; and also the 
financial constraints the researcher experienced at the time of conducting the survey. 
In this study, this approach was considered appropriate and as a result the bank 
officials (including bank managers and other member of staff) of these banks 
distributed and clarified questions about the questionnaire to the respondents. 
However, the researcher monitored closely this process of distributing and collecting 
from responses from the banking customers’ through frequent telephone 
conversations with the bank managers. In addition, three very close relatives (father, 
brother, and a friend to the researcher), whom very much had the interest of the 
research success, helped in monitoring the questionnaire distribution and collection 
process.   
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It was however envisaged that collecting the risk experiences’ data from customers 
alone, will not satisfy the research objectives discussed in chapter 1 and the proposed 
risk assessment methodology and framework in chapter 4. As a result, the findings 
from the initial analysis of the customers’ based survey, were used to develop a set of 
new questionnaire, which was distributed electronically to the risk officers, IT 
executives and other senior staff of the two commercial banks understudy.  
In this case, purposive sampling method described in Table 5.4 was used in selecting 
the risk officers for the survey. The entire population was selected because the size of 
the population was very small, and also because they share at least one common 
characteristic that are of interest in this research and includes: similar skills and 
knowledge about the risk management and assessment process; well-established 
knowledge about the risks and exposure levels inherent in their organization.  
5.9.3 The Questionnaire Design and Format 
The paper-and-pencil questionnaire was designed over an extended period of time 
from December 2010 to June 2011. On the other hand the electronic questionnaire 
was designed over a short period of time from January 2012 to March 2012. 
Considerable attention was given to developing both questionnaires and covering 
letters. This included consideration of the wording and sequence of the questions, 
structure, layout and aesthetics of all the documents, the content of the covering 
letters and instructions to respondents.  
The paper-and-pencil questionnaire: was created electronically by the researcher 
through a static HTML technology design. Thereafter the hard copies were 
distributed to the respondents. Static HTML design was used because the bank 
managers of the under studied commercial banks suggested that this approach, is 
probably the best option for the Nigeria banking customers’; as majority of the 
banking customers including the E-banking adopters, may refuse to part take in the 
survey due to their cultural behavioural issues, the difficulty in contacting the various 
banking customers, its convenience for respondents, and to ensure a good response 
rate. The general design of both questionnaires followed the seven important 
decisions illustrated by Tull and Hawkins (1990) as shown in Figure 5.4. 
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Figure 5.4 Questionnaire construction decisions 
There are three basic types of questionnaire: closed-ended, open-ended, and 
combination of both (see Kumar, 2011; Kothari, 2004; Fink, 2003; Hussey and 
Hussey, 1997; Oppenheim, 1992). A positivistic approach suggests that more of the 
questions are closed questions, coded before respondents complete the questionnaire. 
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In general open-ended questions are not conducive to large-scale surveys (Hussey & 
Hussey, 1997). Therefore, the closed-ended questions were developed and 
formulated from literature, the results obtained from the FIS model developed for 
Internet banking adoption, and based on the results of the paper-and-pencil survey. 
Next is a discussion of the questionnaire design, administrations, and the question 
content for both paper-to-pencil questionnaire and electronic questionnaire.  Issues 
relating to sample sizes and response rates are discussed in section 5.9.4.  
The paper-to-pencil questionnaire was designed to elicit information on E-banking 
risk awareness status, frequency of risks experiences, severity of risk events 
occurrences, bank control / actions measures for reported risks experiences, and E-
banking risk factors or contributors. In addition, factors affecting E-banking adoption 
were elicited from non-adopters of E-banking systems.  
Several measurement scales were considered during the questionnaire development 
and includes: ordinal, nominal, interval, and Likert scales (see Moser and Kalton, 
1971). Several of these scales were used in the development of the questionnaire. 
However, the five-point Likert scales were mostly used in the questions developed. 
A major reason for this approach was to enable smoothness, exploitation of 
approximation and imprecision in human-like reasoning, such that statistically and 
practically risks and risk exposure levels in the E-banking OR event data, can be 
identified. A five-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) 
strongly agree was also used to measure the reasons for E-banking non-adoption.  
The questionnaire consisted of 120 questions. The flowchart of the questionnaire is 
illustrated in the form of flow diagram, in Figure 5.5. The questionnaire consisted of 
four parts: 
Part 1 gives a brief profile of the respondent and their E-banking usage / opinion. 
Part 2 addresses the users’ E-banking risk awareness status and frequency of risks 
experienced within the last 12 months period.  
Part 3 asks respondents to estimate qualitatively the severity of the risks experienced 
in part 2. In addition, the respondents were asked to identify the control mechanisms 
or actions that were taken by the banks after their various risk experiences. Further, 
respondents were asked to rank some of the identified key risk indicators for E-
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banking operational risk. Following their risk experiences, respondents were asked to 
give their perception on their bank’s E-banking exposure level. 
Part 4 gives an indication about the perceived reasons for non E-banking adoption 
by non-adopters.  
Start
Section A
Personal Information / 
Opinion on E-banking 
system
Section B
E-banking Risk 
Awareness for System 
Adopters 
Section C
E-banking risk severity 
and control mechanisms
Section D
E-banking system for 
Non-adopters Questions about  Risk 
awareness
Questions about  frequency 
of risks/attacks experienced
Questions about severity of 
risks/attacks experienced
Questions about key risks/
attacks indicators or 
contributors
Questions about actions 
taken by banks for customers 
risks/attacks experiences
End
Questions about 
factors for non-
adoption
 
Figure 5.5 Flowchart of the questionnaire 
Through this survey, E-banking customers were asked to qualitatively rate the 
frequency and severity of risk experiences had over the last 12 months. They were 
also asked to identify their awareness status based on identified risk factors. In 
addition, E-banking customers were asked to rate how well they agree with some 
identified E-banking system key risk indicators such as: government regulations, the 
economy, computer literacy levels and so on. The questionnaire questions and 
measurement scales are presented in appendix A. 
The electronic questionnaire: was designed using Surveymethods.com, an online 
survey software application. The questionnaire was distributed to the respondents via 
e-mail because of its reduced cost, fast transfer time, and its convenience for 
respondents. The primary reason for using the surveymethods.com package was to 
enable the completed questionnaires to be electronically scanned and placed into a 
data file that can be exported in various forms and therefore can be used by many 
software data analysis packages. In addition, it is capable of collecting respondent 
data through graphical based analysis mode. The exported dataset was used as an 
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excel spread sheet and a SPSS data file.  
The electronic questionnaire was also created using the closed-ended questions and 
formulated from the findings on the customer-based questionnaire analysis presented 
in chapter 6.  
The electronic questionnaire was designed within a 3 month period, to elicit both 
quantitative and qualitative information on the frequency of triggering events for E-
banking OR, effectiveness of existing controls to prevent UOS occurrences and the 
frequency of failures, frequency of UOS occurrences, and approximate cost for UOS 
occurrences, effectiveness of existing controls to recover before risk outcome and the 
frequency of failures, and the severity of risk outcome based on account 
compromise, loss of data integrity, loss of availability, and loss of credibility. The 
questionnaire has 36 questions and consisted of seven sections:  
Section 1: obtained a brief profile of the respondent. 
Section 2: contains the main data collection element of the study. This section 
required completion of questions relating to details of E-banking operational risks 
within the last 24 months period based on the risk / factors identified from the 
analysis of the customer based questionnaire.  Respondents were asked to provide 
estimates about the frequency of identified E-banking OR factors (triggering events). 
This section contained 12 risk attributes. The risk attributes were arranged on a 
quantitative numeric rating scale (1 to 10+), where 1 indicated very rarely frequency 
of occurrence and 10 indicated very frequently. 
Section 3: respondents were asked to provide the frequency values for four security 
UOS or events in terms of: account compromise, loss of data integrity, loss of 
availability, and loss of credibility. This section was also arranged on a quantitative 
numeric rating scale.  
 Section 4: Further, respondents were asked to give approximate cost for the four 
UOS presented in section three of the questionnaire. The UOS were quantitatively 
classified on an interval rating scale (under 100,000 – 1,000,000, and above). This 
scale was adopted based on the salary structure of Nigeria. The monetary value were 
presented in Nigeria currency, as this enable the senior banking officers answering 
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the questionnaire, to easily understand and classify the monetary value for losses 
incurred in their E-banking systems. 
Section 5 and 6: respondents were asked to provide estimates on the control 
effectiveness level of their E-banking system based on two criteria: the effectiveness 
of controls in place to prevent UOS occurrences and the effectiveness of controls to 
recover before the risk impact is experienced. The four UOS presented in previous 
questions (account compromise, loss to data integrity, loss to availability, and loss to 
confidentiality) were used for the control failure evaluation. This section also 
repeated the quantitative numeric rating scale (1 to 10+). Where 1 indicated control 
will very rarely failed to prevent or to recover before risk impact, and 10+ indicated 
controls will very frequently fail otherwise.  
Section 7: Following their responses, respondents were asked to provide estimate for 
the severity of risk outcome based on the four security risk events (account 
compromise, loss to data integrity, loss to availability, and loss to confidentiality) 
and also using the quantitative numeric rating scale (1 to 10+). The collected data 
was then transferred into an Excel worksheet file in preparation for analysis. The 
questionnaire is presented in Appendix B.  
5.9.4 Piloting the Questionnaires 
As suggested by (Oppenheim, 1992) pilot studies of the questionnaires was 
conducted. The piloting process of the paper-and-pencil questionnaire included 
university students who are aware of E-banking systems. The piloting process was 
carried out in two stages. The initial stage involved a process where independent 
university students were asked to answer questions in the questionnaire and provide 
feedback. From the total of 72 responses, 39 were fully completed and 33 were 
partially completed. Comments were made on the clarity of the questionnaire 
questions. Next, modifications were made to the questions in the questionnaire based 
on the initial review of the questions, on how it complies with the research 
objectives, and based on the comments and suggestions obtained from the initial 
piloting stage. Five individuals were randomly selected for the 2
nd
 stage of piloting 
the questionnaire. These individuals were part of the initial piloting and are adopters 
of E-banking systems. Thereafter, a final revision was made on the questions in the 
questionnaire before it was sent to the main respondents.  
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The electronic based questionnaire was pre-tested by five individuals (three 
commercial bank officers, one deposit insurance corporation staff, and one oil 
producing company staff) who are well aware of E-banking systems and risks 
associated to E-banking. These respondents were not part of the final sample. Only 
minor corrections were suggested. Thereafter, the survey was distributed to the main 
respondents electronically via e-mail and through the website link specifically 
generated for the survey, which was provided by surveymethods.com.  
5.9.5 Rules on Ethics and Confidentiality 
The research ethics adopted here complies with the research ethics guidelines 
provided by the University of Bradford (Sture, 2010). As suggested by Sture (2010), 
ethical issues related to research projects were identified from the ethics checklist 
and looked at: voluntary participation, consent, doing no harm, privacy which 
includes anonymity, confidentiality, time and place.  However, it was not necessary 
to obtain an approval of the Research Ethics Committee of the University of 
Bradford, based on these research ethics guidelines (Sture, 2010) as described below.  
Before conducting the surveys, participants were informed that under the ethical 
rules, they were participating voluntarily, as no harm, (such as psychological, moral, 
legal or other risks), would occur to them. Surveys were conducted with the consent 
of the participants. Banks selected had indicated through willingness to participate in 
the survey questionnaires, they have also given consent on the part of their 
representation customers by telephone. Participants were informed that all responses 
are anonymous and all personal details and name of the banks will be confidential. 
Both surveys were conducted with the consent of the participating banks after several 
phone conversations and email explaining the objectives of the research. 
Participating banks were advised they could withdraw from the research project at 
any time. 
A cover letter was prepared to explain the purpose of the study and the ethical rules 
and was given to each participant, attached to the questionnaires. In addition, 
participants were informed that cookies and personal data stored by the web browser 
are not used in the surveys. Report findings will not be linked in any way to them as 
an individual or a bank. Participating banks were also informed that data collected 
will be destroyed / deleted after the data collected had been analysed. However, 
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should they require an acknowledgement we will be happy to do so. Further, the 
researcher advised respondents to refer any queries or complaints they may have 
about the way the study was conducted to her. An email address along with the 
researcher’s name and school name was provided on the cover letter. To summarise 
no private information or additional knowledge was collected. 
5.9.6 Response Rates and Sample Sizes 
The customer-based questionnaire: In this research an exploratory fieldwork was 
conducted on two leading commercial banks in Nigeria, over a six-month period 
(January 2011 to June 2011) to achieve the research objectives. The dataset used was 
extracted from this real life survey conducted on the banking customers. However, 
due to data protection act and privacy policy that was agreed upon by the researcher 
and the banks, the names of the banks cannot be revealed. Thus, the names of the 
banks are represented by bank AAA and bank BBB.  
Based on Delta state population (4,000,000 people), the sample size needed was 
calculated using the specified acceptable error level of 5%, confidence level of 90%, 
and estimated response rate of 50%. A total of 550 questionnaires were then 
delivered to the two commercial banks with an initial overall response rate of 66.4%. 
Of this total 300 questionnaires were delivered to bank AAA and 250 to bank BBB. 
Within bank AAA group, response rate of 80% was achieved for customers who 
visited the bank (i.e. 240 from 300) and within bank BBB group, response rate of 
50% was achieved, for customers who visited the bank (i.e. 125 from 250).  
That is an overall total of 365 questionnaires were returned by customers who visited 
both banks. Of this total, 65 incomplete responses to questions were seen in the 
questionnaire returned by respondents of both banks. Major reasons for incomplete 
responses to some questions in this survey, was because customers refused to answer 
them, and others felt the questions were too much. However, discussion on handling 
missing data is presented in section 5.10. 
The bank officers-based questionnaire: In order to test our proposed ORA 
framework and measurement approach, bank executive-based survey was carried out 
to evaluate, compare and determine the risk exposure level in E-banking system. 
Based on the risks identified from the analysis of the customer-based questionnaire 
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presented in phase 2, an electronic questionnaire was developed over a three-month 
period (January 2012 to March 2012) to achieve the research objectives. Total 
purposive sampling method was adopted and used in collecting data. The survey was 
carried out on a sample from a population of senior banking officers of the two 
commercial banks understudy. The questionnaire respondents fall into three main 
categories (risk management officers, IT executives, and senior bank executives).  
The dataset used was extracted from this real life survey conducted on the banking 
executives. However, the names of the banks or individuals cannot be revealed due 
to ethical issues such as: data protection act and privacy policy mentioned earlier. 
Thus, the names of the banks are represented by bank AAA and bank BBB as 
previously described. 
In March 2012, 10 sample data was collected from the two commercial banks, 6 of 
which were from bank AAA, while 4 of the respondents were from bank BBB.  Bank 
AAA consists of a team of 9 members, leading to a response rate of 66.7%. On the 
other hand, bank BBB response rate could not be determined as the Chief risk officer 
refused to provide information on the total number of team members responsible for 
risk management vis-à-vis E-banking risk management. He was very particular about 
privacy of individuals and the organization. As a result an unknown bias is 
experienced within this phase of the case study.  
However, purposive sampling was considered appropriate for this phase of the case 
study because it will help in revealing more clearly and precisely the detail 
occurrences of risks events in the organization, due to their specific experience, 
knowledge, skills etc. in the understudy research area. 
5.9.7 Non-Response Bias 
It is important to state here, that three commercial banks were initially considered for 
both customer-based and bank officers-based questionnaires. The customer-based 
questionnaire was initially sent to three selected commercial banks. Of these three 
banks, one of them opted out of the survey due to lack of time to help in 
administering the questionnaire to their banking customers and unwillingness to 
participate in the survey. Therefore, the decision made in this survey was to reduce 
the tolerable error level to 5%, the confidence level to 90%, and estimated response 
rate to 50%.  
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An overall total of 365 questionnaires were returned by customers who visited both 
banks. Of this total, 65 incomplete responses to questions were seen in the 
questionnaire returned by respondents of both banks. Major reasons for incomplete 
responses to some questions in this survey, was because customers refused to answer 
them, and others felt the questions were too much. However, discussion on handling 
missing data is presented in section 5.10. 
5.10 Data Analysis and Soft Computing System 
Description 
This section is primarily aimed at presenting how the quantitative data collected was 
analysed. It discusses the statistical tests used and surrounding relevant issues. A 
range of statistical procedures was adopted to explore the research questions and 
objective. Prior to in-depth analysis, an initial data pre-processing was undertaken to 
optimize and clean the data set collected.  Reliability of scale was then carried out on 
the pre-processed dataset, in order to test consistency of the scale and ensure that the 
scale is measuring the same construct. In addition, factor analysis was undertaken to 
reduce the dimensionality of the dataset.  
These processes were considered relevant to optimize performance and prediction 
accuracy of the proposed soft computing algorithms, as every prediction algorithm 
has its weaknesses and strength (Witten & Frank, 2005; Dunham, 2003) such as 
capability to handle noise, missing data, various attribute coding and so on. In 
addition, the proposed TAN classifier was tested and compared with three (C4.5 
decision tree, NB and ANN) soft computing tools, based on some generally accepted 
statistical analysis evaluation metrics (CPU training / testing time, prediction 
accuracy, both mean absolute error and relative error, and Receiver Operating 
Characteristics Curve (ROC)). These evaluation metrics is discussed in section 
5.10.6. 
This section also details the soft computing system tools adopted in this research. To 
perform the risk assessment task, the ORA analysis tools must be considered.  TAN 
an improvement to general Bayesian network model and Fuzzy Inference System, 
was proposed as the soft computing tools for assessing E-banking OR.  
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5.10.1 Data Pre-processing  
Data pre-processing in general refers to the process of inspecting, and cleaning of the 
selected database or collected dataset (Oppenheim, 1992; Dunham, 2003; Witten & 
Frank, 2005). Data pre-processing is necessary because the dataset may have 
incorrect or incomplete values and different dataset will determine the checking 
procedures needed (Oppenheim, 1992). However, it is suggested that running 
frequency distributions on the sampling variables may be a good place to start 
(Moser & Kalton, 1971; Oppenheim, 1992). This method was adopted in this 
research and presented in chapter 6. 
Further, data pre-processing is an important step in data mining, because a prediction 
algorithm for instance, will often perform badly on a dataset which contains high 
level of incorrect, inconsistent and missing values. Some prediction algorithms 
cannot exploit certain data features such as missing values, numeric attributes as 
mentioned earlier in section 5.10. Therefore, it is important to identify clearly the 
pre-processing procedure that will work best in achieving the research objectives.  
In the context of this research, collected data were analysed using the Statistical 
Package for the Social Sciences SPSS version 19, to pre-process and transform the 
datasets before conducting in-depth statistical analysis and model development. Here 
two aspects of data cleaning are dealt with: missing data and noisy data. A frequency 
distribution analysis was conducted for each variable, to check for noisy data (such 
as invalid or incorrect values) and missing values. Missing values occurs for several 
reasons; but in the customer-based dataset, missing values occurred because 
respondents in the survey refused to answer some of the questions. Oppenheim 
(1992) identifies two ways to handling missing values: listwise deletion and pairwise 
deletion.  
Listwise deletion refers to the process of deleting any respondent (instances) with 
missing data for any of the variables from the calculation. Pairwise refers to the 
process of temporarily excluding an instance from the analysis, only from 
calculations for which that particular instance has no entry (Oppenheim, 1992; 
Witten & Frank, 2005). Pairwise deletion may result in major computational 
problems as well as problems with statistical significance, thus leading to estimates 
that can go all over the place. On the other hand a major drawback to excluding data 
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instances using listwise, is that massive data loss may be found in the dataset when 
there are high levels of missing data. However, Comrey and Lee (1992) states that 
300 responses is a good sample size, 100 is poor while 1000 is excellent. A stance 
adopted in this research. 
5.10.2   Reliability of Scales and Analysis  
Reliability refers to the purity, consistency of a measure and repeatability of 
measurement scales used in conducting surveys (Oppenheim, 1992). That is the level 
to which individual items (or set of items) would have consistency in measuring the 
same construct and produce the same results if the investigation was repeated at a 
later time or with a different sample (Oppenheim, 1992; Field, 2009).  
Cronbach’s Alpha is one of the most commonly and widely used ways of measuring 
the reliability of scales and testing inter-item consistency (Field, 2009). The 
Cronbach’s Alpha is used to determine if the items on these scales are connected. It 
measures the extent to which the individual items comprising a scale go together 
(Cronbach, 1951). In this research, Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α) measure of scale 
reliability was calculated for the E-banking customers risk experience scales in 
respect of the Nigeria banking industry and due to its widely accepted measure for 
testing inter-item consistency. Cronbach’s α is: 
2
2
item item
Cov
s Cov
N


                                               (5.1)    
Based on Sekaran (2000) reliabilities less than 0.6 is considered poor, 0.7 is 
acceptable and greater than 0.8 is considered good. The closer the reliability 
coefficient is to 1.0 the better the reliability. In addition, the generally accepted value 
for Cronbach’s alpha is 0.70 (Peter, 1979; Pallant, 2005). However, Robinson et al. 
(1991) states that this could be reduced to 0.6 for exploratory research. 
5.10.3  Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is a statistical method used to describe variability among observed 
variables in terms of fewer unobserved variables called ‘factors’ (Collins, 2010). 
Fields (2009) states, that factors are clusters of large correlation coefficients between 
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subset of variable measuring the same aspect of underlying dimensions. Factor 
analysis refers to “using statistical analysis tool in finding out if there are any 
underlying dimensions between subset of variables, attributes, responses, or 
observations” (Oppenheim, 1992: p.166). The information gained about 
interdependencies can be used later to reduce the set of variables in a dataset 
(Collins, 2010).  
Factor analysis is often used interchangeably with principal component analysis. This 
is because the concept of a principal component analysis is largely identical to that of 
factor analysis (Field, 2009). This approach is also adopted throughout the analysis 
of the data discussed in this research. In addition, the two approaches are detailed to 
locating underlying dimensions in subset of variables. The difference however is that 
“factor analysis derives a mathematical model from which factors are estimated, 
while Principal component analysis is concerned with decomposing the original data 
into a set of linear variates” (Field, 2009: p.638).  
When factors are being interpreted there are no fixed cut-off values, it depends on the 
purpose of the study at hand (Field, 2009). However, Haire et al (1998) 
recommended that factor loadings >0.30 are considered significant, >0.40 are more 
important, and >0.50 are very significant. Since the main purpose of conducting the 
factor analysis in this research, is to identify the most important factors and reduce 
the dimensionality of the dataset, 0.5 was chosen as the cut-off value for factor 
loadings and 1 for eigenvalue.  
Moreover, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity suggested, that all factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 should be 
retained. This is because eigenvalues represent the amount of variation explained by 
a factor and that an eigenvalue of 1 represents a substantial amount of variation. 
Therefore, the KMO statistic should lie between the value of 0 and 1, where a value 
close to 1 indicates that patterns of correlation are fairly clustered and as a result 
factor analysis should give distinct and reliable factors (Field, 2009).  
In addition, to checking the overall KMO statistic, it is important to check the 
diagonal elements of the anti-image correlation matrix (which presents the KMO 
value for individual variables); these values should be greater than 0.50 for all 
variables (Field, 2009). However, Field (2009) suggests that variables with values 
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less than 0.50 should be excluded from the analysis, but care must be taken to ensure 
the new KMO statistics still achieve the minimum value requirement.  
Further, Kaiser (1974) recommends a minimum value of 0.5 for the overall KMO 
and that values between 0.5 and 0.7 are average, values between 0.7 and 0.8 are 
good, values between 0.8 and 0.9 are great and values above 0.9 are excellent 
(Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999). Moreover, the significant value for the Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity x
2
 (df) should be less than 0.05.  
In addition, factors can be described in terms of the variables measured and their 
relative importance for that factor. It is also possible to estimate a factor score for an 
attribute, after discovering the factors that exist, and estimating the equation that 
describes them. However, the scales of measurement will influence the resulting 
scores, and also when different variables uses different measurement scales, as a 
result factor scores for different factors cannot be compared (Field, 2009). This 
however led the adoption of Bartlett and Anderson-Rubin’s method for solving 
problems associated with the regression technique (Field, 2009).  
Bartlett method produces scores that are unbiased and correlate only with their own 
factors, while the Anderson-Rubin method is only a modification of the Bartlett 
method by producing factor scores that are uncorrelated and standardized. They 
usually have a mean value of 0 and standard deviation of 1 (Field, 2009). In this 
research the Anderson-Rubin method was used, because it is capable of overcoming 
collinearity problems in regression analysis (Field, 2009).  
Once factors have been extracted, it was then possible to calculate to what degree 
variables load onto these factors. It is common to find most variables, with high 
loadings on most important factors and small loadings on all other factors (Field, 
2009). As a result the interpretation of factor scores becomes difficult. To solve this 
drawback, factor rotation technique is often used to discriminate between factors. If a 
factor is a classification axis along which variables can be plotted, then factor 
rotation can effectively rotate the factor axes such that; variables are then loaded 
maximally only to one factor.  
However, there are two types of rotation, orthogonal and oblique rotation. 
Orthogonal rotates factors while keeping them independent or unrelated. Oblique on 
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the other hand, allows factors to correlate (Field, 2009). Choice of rotation method 
depends on whether there is a good theoretical reason for factors to either correlate or 
not (Field, 2009). These methods works well, the differences is however on how 
rotation is carried out. However, Field (2009) recommends varimax (orthogonal 
rotation method) to be used, when factors are expected to be independent and 
oblimin (an oblique rotation method) to be used when factors are expected to be 
related. The relevant assumptions of factor analysis adopted and how these are tested 
in this research is presented in chapter 6. 
5.10.4 Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes Classifier 
Friedman et al (1997) proposed a tree structure learning algorithm that learns 
maximum spanning tree from attributes, but retains Naïve Bayes model as part of its 
structure based on conditional mutual distribution (using the Chow-Liu algorithm) 
called Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes (TAN), which can be defined as:  
, ,
( , | )
( ; | ) ( , , ) log
( | ) ( | )x y z
P x y z
Ip X Y Z P x y z
P x z P y z
                             (5.2) 
where x, y, and z are the values of variables X, Y, and Z, respectively.  
C
XnX2X1
 
Figure 5.6 a simple TAN structure 
In TAN classification the class node directly points to all other nodes and allows 
each attribute apart from the class node, to have at most one other attribute as a 
parent. The TAN learning process consists of five main steps: 
1. Compute  ; |
DP i j
I A A C between each pair of attributes, .i j  
2. Build a complete undirected graph in which nodes are the 
attributes 1,..., nA A and annotate the weight of an edge 
connecting  to  byi jA A  ; |DP i jI A A C . 
3. Then build a maximum weighted spanning tree. 
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4. Transform the resulting undirected tree to a directed one by 
choosing a root variable and setting the direction of all 
edges to be outward from it. 
5. Construct a TAN model by adding a node labelled by C and 
adding an Arc from C to each iA . 
Although, the TAN classifier leads to a considerable improvement over the simple 
Naïve Bayes, it however adds a fixed number of edges irrespective of the distribution 
of the training data, thereby ignoring the influences from other attributes. In addition, 
structure learning is also unavoidable with TAN classifier. However, in the context 
of this research the TAN classifier has been adopted and applied to identifying the E-
banking risks and the causal relationship that lies within the dataset, because it leads 
to a considerable improvement and acceptable computational complexity over the 
widely adopted and simple Naïve Bayes.  
TAN vs. Bayesian Network Classifiers: Bayesian network as defined in section 
2.8.1 can be built from prior knowledge alone, from data or a combination of both 
data and prior knowledge. From the chain rule of probability, we have: 
   1
1
| ,...,
n
i i i
i
p x p x x x 

                                                  (5.3) 
Now, for every iX , there will be some subset  1 1,...,i iX X   such that iX  and 
 1 1,..., \i iX X   conditionally independent given i . That is, for any x, 
   1| ,..., |i i i i ip x x x p x                                                  (5.4) 
Combining equations 5.3 and 5.4, we obtain 
   
1
|
n
i i
i
p x p x 

                                                             (5.5) 
If we let  ipa x denote a set of values for 'iX s parents, then from equation 5.5 the 
full joint distributions (Liao and Ji 2009) is the product of all which can be expressed 
as: 
                              1 2
1
, ,..., |
n
n i i
i
p x x x p x pa x

                                              (5.6) 
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Consequently, to determine the structure of the BN, we determine the variables sets 
that satisfy equation 5.4 for 1,...,i n . Both the directed links appearing in the DAG 
and the values of the conditional probabilities   | pai ip x x can be learned from a 
dataset whose records hold values assumed by each iX  in independent experiments 
(Adusei-Poku, 2005; Wijayatunga, 2007; Aquaro et al., 2012). 
Once we have a BN structure from prior knowledge, data or a combination, then we 
can determine the various probabilities of interest from the model. The computation 
of the probability of interest given a model is usually known as probabilistic 
inference (Heckerman, 1996). Because in building a BN for X we can determine the 
joint probability distribution for X, then BN in principle can compute any probability 
of interest. For example, the conditional independence structure is seen in figure 5.7 
as:  
   1| ,..., |i i i i ip x x x p x                (5.7) 
   5 4 3 2 1 5 3 4| , , , | ,p x x x x x p x x x  and the full joint probability distribution is given 
as: P(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = P(x1) P(x2 | x1) P(x3 | x2) P(x4 | x2) P(x5 | x3, x4) P(x6 | x5)  
X1
X2
X3
X5
X4
X6
 
Figure 5.7 A simple Bayesian network 
This means that when the independence assumption is respected in the construction 
of a BN, the number of conditional probabilities to be evaluated can be reduced 
substantially.  
Although, computing conditional independence simplifies probabilistic inference, 
exact inference in an arbitrary BN for discrete variables is NP-hard (Cooper, 1990) 
and even approximate inference is also NP-hard (Dagum & Luby, 1993). This is due 
to the difficulty that lies in undirected cycles in the BN structure, where the 
directionality of the arcs is ignored. As a result, Heckerman (1996) argues that when 
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a BN structure contains many undirected cycles, inference is intractable. In addition, 
structure learning is a main bottleneck with BN learning, since the number of 
possible structures is extremely huge, which therefore results in a high computational 
complexity problem. Moreover, the task of computing the joint probability 
distribution function (PDF) becomes complex and increases exponentially with the 
number of variables (Taroni et al., 2006; Wijayatunga, 2007).  
As a result, the widely adopted practical approach for structure learning is to impose 
some restrictions on the structures of BNs, for example, learning tree-like structures, 
in which each node has at most one parent (Su & Zhang, 2006). Typical examples of 
such algorithms are; the simple Naïve Bayes, Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes, Hidden 
Bayesian Networks, SuperParent algorithm, StumpNetwork, AODE and so on (see 
Keogh & Pazzani, 1999; Zhang & Ling, 2001; Webb et al., 2005; Jing et al., 2008; 
Jiang et al., 2009). These algorithms are referred to as Bayesian probabilistic 
classifiers (Wijayatunga, 2007).  
Bayesian Network classifiers are often used to model the conditional distribution of 
the class variables given the attributes and the prediction of the class with the highest 
conditional probability. A BN classifier can therefore be seen as a learners’ attempt 
to parameterize or structurally construct a classifier from a given set of attributes 
with class variables.  
Assume that 1 2, ,..., nX X X are n attributes corresponding to attribute nodes in a BN. 
Let V be represented by a vector 1 2, ,..., nx x x  , where ix is the value of iX andC be the 
class variable. Let c denote the value that C takes and  c V  denote the class of V. 
Therefore the general BN classifier is defined in: 
                            1 2arg  max , ,..., |n
c C
c V P c P x x x c

                                         (5.8) 
Unlike other classifiers such as regression models, BN as a classifier has the 
computation capability with partial observations on attributes. It does not assume 
mutual independent covariates (feature variables) as often required in regression 
models (Wijayatunga, 2007). For example in figure 5.7 above;  
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Let x' denote the partial information on 1 2, ,..., nx x x  , where the n-dimensional 
random variable vector 1 2, ,..., nx x x   is often called features/attributes X[n]. If we let 
the class variable be X5 and considering all other variables as attributes, then we are 
interested in conditional distribution MBL(X) 
        1 2 3 4 6, , , ,x x x x x where 
   
   
 
5
5 3 4 6 5
5 1 2 3 4 6 5 3 4 6
5 3 4 6 5
| , |
( | , , , , ) | , ,
| , |
x'
p x x x p x x
p x x x x x x p x x x x
p x' x x p x x'
 

 
Therefore, conditional probability of the class variable given all other variables is 
fully determined by a subset of the attributes 3 4 6, ,X X X namely. This subset is 
called the Markov boundary of 5X . We consider only the joint distribution of class 
variable and its Markov boundary 1 2 3 4 5 6( , , , , , )p x x x x x x for predictions on the class 
variable when we have complete observations on Markov boundary variables of the 
class.  
In literature (Barbacioru et al., 2004; Pena et al., 2007; Wijayatunga, 2007), a 
Markov blanket or a Markov boundary is defined for a single variable in a 
probabilistic model. 
Definition 5.10.1 A Markov Blanket of a variable X, denoted by MBL (X) is any 
subset such that         \ |nX X MBL X X MBL X . The Markov boundary of 
node X is the minimal set of variables MBL(X), denoted by MB(X). 
 MBL  and MB( )X X , are defined w.r.t. the joint distribution of  nX . 
Further, the Markov condition states that a directed acyclic graph C is a causal graph 
for variables X if the nodes in C are in a one-to-one correspondence with X, and there 
is an arc from node X to node Y in C if and only if X is a direct cause of Y. If C is a 
causal graph for X, then C is also a BN structure for the joint probability distribution 
of X (Heckerman, 1996). 
Therefore, when we build a BN classifier, we need to identify the Markov boundary 
of the class first and then connect the rest of the attributes to it through the Markov 
boundary variables. Any BN structure learning algorithm with appropriate 
constraints can be used in this classification task. The process of using Markov 
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boundary of the class according to Friedman et al (1997) and Wijayatunga (2007) is 
referred to as feature selection. 
TAN vs. Naïve Bayes Classifiers: Friedman et al. (1997) observed that learning 
unrestricted BNs does not necessarily lead to a classifier with good performance. 
They observed that unrestricted BN classifiers do not outperform Naïve Bayes (the 
simplest BN classifier) in a large sample of benchmark datasets. This is due to the 
fact that the general BN learning algorithms tries to maximize the likelihood-based 
scoring function, rather than the conditional likelihood-based one. Secondly, the 
network structure may become complex, with high variance due to errors in 
probability estimation caused by insufficient and fully represented amount of training 
data / instances (Su & Zhang, 2006).  
In many real life problem domains it is almost impractical; for example in the 
context of E-banking risk assessment, there will be unknown priors and since there is 
no theoretical way of determining them, a way of estimating these probabilities in an 
unbiased way is sought. Further, the need to infer the labels for a subset of the 
variables (class variables) given an instantiation of the rest (attributes) may be 
desired (Jing et al., 2008) such as inferring the risk exposure level of an E-banking 
system from a customer given his / her personal information or the E-banking type 
adopted. In this task the analyst is interested in finding the most probable realization 
of a certain event (variable) given the information of other attributes associated with 
it. This type of analysis is usually known as classification task.  
However, Naïve Bayes classifiers assume that all attributes are conditionally 
independent given the class.  Classification in Naïve Bayes is done by applying 
Bayes rule to compute the probability of C (class variable) given the instances of
1 2, ,..., nX X X and then predicting the class with the highest posterior probability 
(Jiang et al., 2009). Each attribute node has the class node as its parent, but does not 
have any parent from attributes nodes. The Naïve Bayes classifier learns from 
training data the conditional probability of each attributes iX  given the class label C.  
The construction of Naïve Bayes is easy since the values of P(c) and  |iP x c can 
easily be estimated from training data. The computation is feasible because a strong 
probabilistic independence assumption is held in the sense that all attributes iX are 
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conditionally independent given the value of the class C, that is X is independent of Y 
given C wherever    | , |P X Y C P X C for all possible values of X, Y and C, 
whenever   0P C  (Friedman et al., 1997).  
The Bayesian approach to classifying the new instance is to assign the most probable 
class value  c V , given the attributes values 1 2, ,..., nx x x   that describe the instance.  
   1 2arg  max | , ,..., n
c C
c V P c x x x

                                                (5.9) 
Using Bayes theorem, 
 
   
 
1 2
1 2
, ,..., |
arg  max
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P x x x c p c
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P x x x
 
   
 
                                  (5.10) 
            1 2arg  max , ,..., |n
c C
P x x x c p c

                                        (5.11) 
The Naïve Bayes classifier simplifies further by making the assumption that the 
attribute values are conditionally independent given the class. The resulting Naïve 
Bayes is defined in equation 5.12 and structurally represented in Figure 5.8: 
                            
1
arg  max |
n
i
c C
i
c V P c P x c


                                                  (5.12)                                           
C
XnX2X1
 
Figure 5.8 the structure of a simple Naïve Bayes network 
Although, the predictive performance of Naïve Bayes is competitive with the state-
of-the-art classifiers, the conditional independence assumption is clearly unrealistic, 
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consider for example, a classifier for assessing the risk in E-banking adoption: it 
seems counterintuitive to ignore the correlations between age, literacy level, culture 
and income. Consider also an E-banking authorization and authentication process it 
will seem counterintuitive to ignore the correlations between malware attacks, 
weaknesses in cryptographic techniques of the system, and fraudulent attacks. These 
examples would result in high bias and low variance and therefore harm the 
performance accuracy of the Naïve Bayes strategy.  
In order to overcome the conditional independence assumption and avoid the 
intractable complexity of learning BN structure, various improvements on the so 
called Naïve Bayes have been proposed. These algorithms can be broadly divided 
into five main categories such as feature selection, attribute weighting, local learning, 
data expansion and structure extension (see Jiang, et al., 2009). This research is 
particularly focused on structure extension, specifically TAN classifier, due to the 
fact that it leads to an acceptable computational complexity and a considerable 
improvement over Naïve Bayes (Jiang et al., 2009). Therefore, other extension to 
Naïve Bayes is outside the scope of this research. 
5.10.5 Fuzzy Inference Systems 
Since the introduction of FIS discussed in section 2.8.2, several different FIS have 
been built and widely employed in various applications such as (Mamdani FIS, 
Sugeno FIS, Tsukamoto FIS and other variants) (Jang et al., 1997; Negnevitsky, 
2002; Vargas, 2009). The differences between these three FIS lie in the consequents 
of their fuzzy rules, which make their aggregation and defuzzification process differ. 
Unlike Mamdani FIS, the Sugeno FIS cannot follow the compositional rule of 
inference strictly in its fuzzy reasoning mechanism; as a result the Sugeno FIS poses 
some difficulties when the inputs are fuzzy (Jang et al., 1997). Further, the 
Tsukamoto FIS is not a popular approach because it is not as transparent as either 
Mamdani or Sugeno FIS. In the context of this research, the Mamdani FIS is adopted 
and presented next. 
Mamdani Fuzzy Inference Systems - a FIS proposed by Mamdani in 1975, as the 
first attempt to control a steam engine and boiler combination. The Mamdani FIS is 
implemented based on four basic steps if the inputs are crisp value: fuzzification of 
 150 
 
the input variables; rule evaluation; aggregation of the rule outputs, and 
defuzzification, otherwise the first step is omitted.  
1. Fuzzification- the first step is to determine the degree of membership to which 
the crisp inputs belongs to each of the appropriate fuzzy sets. Crisp inputs are always 
numerical values limited to the universe of discourse (Negnevitsky, 2002). The 
ranges of the universe of discourses can be provided by domain experts. Once the 
crisp inputs are obtained, they are then fuzzified against the appropriate linguistic 
fuzzy sets. Eventually, every input is fuzzified over all the membership functions 
used by the fuzzy rules (Negnevitsky, 2002; Vargas, 2009).  
2. Rule Evaluation - involves the evaluation of the fuzzified inputs, and applying 
them to the antecedent (IF) part of the fuzzy rules. Basically, if a given fuzzy rule has 
multiple antecedents, then the fuzzy operator (AND or OR) is applied to obtain a 
single value that best represents the result of the antecedent evaluation (Negnevitsky, 
2002; Vargas, 2009). This truth value is then applied to the consequent (THEN) 
membership function. Typically, in FIS, if the OR operator is used, the classical 
fuzzy union operation is used. The operation for forming the union of two fuzzy sets 
A and B on universe X can be given as: 
         min , ,   A B A B A Bx x x x x where x X                                (5.13) 
However, the OR operator can be customized and applied alternatively in two ways, 
to evaluate the degree of membership of the consequent (THEN) part: max and the 
probabilistic OR (probor) methods also known as the algebraic sum and calculated 
as either the: 
max operator in equation (5.13) or the probor operator as,  
             , -A B A B A B A Bx probor x x x x x x                             (5.14) 
Similarly, if the AND operator is applied in the antecedent, two operators, namely 
min and prod are used to evaluate the degree of membership of the consequent 
(THEN) part, expressed as: 
         min , ,   A B A B A Bx x x x x where x X                                 (5.15) 
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         ,  A B A B A Bx prod x x x x                                                     (5.16) 
Now, when the single value that best represents the result of the antecedent 
evaluation is obtained, it can then be applied to the membership function of the 
consequent (THEN) part. Basically, what this means is that, the consequent 
membership function is either clipped17 or scaled18 to the level of the truth value of 
the rule antecedent (Negnevitsky, 2002). 
3. Aggregation - it is an aggregation of the rule outputs, a process aimed at unifying 
the outputs of the rules. The inputs of the aggregation process is the list of the scaled 
or clipped consequent membership functions, and the output of rule, which has been 
aggregated into a single fuzzy set for the overall fuzzy output (Negnevitsky, 2002; 
Vargas, 2009). 
4. Defuzzification - the last step in the FIS refers to a way a crisp number is 
extracted from the aggregated output fuzzy set. In general, there are several methods 
for defuzzifying a fuzzy set A of the universe of discourse X (Jang et al., 1997; Cox, 
1994).  However, the most popular method is the centroid technique (Negnevitsky, 
2002; Vargas, 2009). The centroid technique finds the point where a vertical line 
would slice the aggregate set into two equal masses. The centre of gravity (COG) can 
be calculated as: 
           
 
 
b
A
a
b
A
a
x xdx
COG
x dx





                                                                             (5.17) 
In theory, the COG is calculated over a continuum of points in the aggregation output 
membership function, but in practice, an estimate can be obtained by calculating it 
over a sample of points, which can be calculated as: 
                                                   
17
 Clipping or correlation minimum is simply the cutting of the consequent membership 
function at the level of the truth antecedent, and it is the most common method of correlating 
the rule consequent with the truth value of the antecedent, because it is less complex and 
faster mathematics and generates an aggregated output that is easy to defuzzify. However 
when the top of membership function is sliced, the fuzzy set loses some information 
(Negnevitsky, 2002). 
18
 Scaling or correlation product preserves the original shape of the fuzzy set by adjusting the 
original membership function of the rule consequent and multiplying all its membership 
degrees by the truth value of the antecedent. This approach losses less information and 
offers a better approach. 
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                                                                               (5.18) 
  Awhere x is the aggregated output. In many cases the centroid technique will 
provide meaningful values and is capable of assimilating all the information 
represented by the fuzzy set (Vargas, 2009; Jang et al., 1997). In order words the 
COG technique performs well unless a fuzzy model requires a specialized method 
for defuzzification (Cox, 1994). However, the Mamdani COG defuzzification 
technique is time consuming, as a result other alternatives such as; the Sugeno-style 
fuzzy inference or Tsukamoto fuzzy inference can be used.  Cox (1994) noted that 
centroid defuzzification technique selects a value that is supported by the knowledge 
accumulated from each executed proposition, a manner similar to Bayesian estimate. 
Negnevitsky (2002) states that in building any FIS, the typical process includes the 
following steps: 
1. Specify the problem and define linguistic variables  
2. Determine fuzzy sets 
3. Elicit and construct fuzzy rules  
4. Encode the fuzzy sets, fuzzy rules and procedures to perform fuzzy inference 
into the expert system  
5. Evaluate and tune the system.  
 
Step 1: The problem specification is probably the most important and first step in 
developing a FIS. This process requires a clear determination of the input and output 
linguistic variables, as well as their ranges (Negnevitsky, 2002). The concept of 
Linguistic variables was proposed by Zadeh in 1971, as an alternative approach to 
modeling human like thinking, an approach which lies at the root of fuzzy set theory.  
Definition 5.10.2: a linguistic variable is characterized by a quintuple (x, µ(x), X, Y, 
Z) where x is the variable name; µ(x) is the term set of x, that is, the set of its 
linguistic values or linguistic terms; X is the universe of discourse; Y is a syntactic 
rule which generates the terms in µ(x); and Z is a semantic rule which associates with 
each linguistic value A, its meaning Z(A) denotes a fuzzy set in X.  
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Definition 5.10.3: Let A be a linguistic value characterized by a fuzzy set with 
membership function  A  .Then kA is interpreted as a modified version of the 
original linguistic value expressed as: 
    .
k
k
A
x
A x x                                                                         (5.19) 
In particular, the operation of concentration is defined as: 
   2CON ,A A                                                                              (5.20) 
While that of dilation is expressed as: 
    0.5DIL .A A                                                                               (5.21) 
The following example helps to clarify the two preceding definitions,  
IF  Phishing attack is extremely severe  
THEN  Risk exposure level is very high 
In this example, Phishing attack and Risk exposure level are the variables while 
extremely severe and very high are the values. The range of possible values of the 
linguistic variable represents the universe of discourse of that variable. Each subset 
also represents a linguistic value of the corresponding linguistic variable. Linguistic 
variable adopts the concept of fuzzy set qualifiers, called hedges. Hedges are terms 
that modify the shape of fuzzy sets, say, somewhat severe, slightly severe, very high, 
more or less, very likely and so on (Jang et al., 1997; Negnevitsky, 2002).   
Step 2: In determining the fuzzy sets, various membership function and 
corresponding shapes are used. There are several classes of parameterized functions 
for characterizing fuzzy sets. In an attempt to clarify the concept four of the 
commonly used classes of parameterization are defined and the stance adopted is 
presented.  
Definition 5.10.4: Triangular Membership Functions. 
A triangular membership function is specified by three parameters  , ,a b c as 
follows: 
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                                                               (5.22) 
By using the min and max, we have an alternative expression for equation 5.22 as: 
 ; , , min , ,0
x a c x
triangle x a b c
b a c b
    
   
   
                                                        (5.23) 
The parameters , , ,a b c d   with a b c d   determine the x coordinates of the 
three corners of the underlying triangular membership function. 
Definition 5.10.5: Trapezoidal Membership Functions. 
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                                                    (5.24) 
An alternative concise expression using min and max is expressed as: 
 ; , , , max min ,1, ,0 .
x a d x
trapezoid x a b c d
b a d c
    
   
   
                                     (5.25) 
The parameters  , , ,a b c d   with a b c d   determine the x coordinates of the 
four corners of the underlying trapezoidal membership function.  
Definition 5.10.6: Gaussian Membership Functions. 
A Gaussian membership function is specified by two parameters  ,c  and can be 
expressed as: 
   
21
2gaussian ; ,
x c
x c e

  
  
 
                                                   (5.26) 
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A Gaussian membership function is determined completely by c and σ; c represents 
the membership center and σ determines the membership functions width.  
Definition 5.10.7: Generalized Bell Membership Functions. 
A generalized bell membership function or simply bell membership function is 
specified by three parameters  , ,a b c and can be expressed as: 
  
  2
1
bell ; , , ,
1
b
x a b c
x c
a



                                                        (5.27) 
Where parameter b is usually positive, however if the value is negative then the 
shape of membership function becomes an upside-down bell. Jang et al (1997) states 
that a proper selection of the parameter set , ,a b c can often provide the desired 
generalized bell membership function.  
Although, fuzzy sets can have a variety of shapes, the triangular and trapezoidal 
membership function has been widely used, especially in real-time implementation, 
because they are simple and computationally efficient. In addition, the triangular and 
trapezoidal membership function can often provide an adequate representation of the 
domain expert knowledge (Jang et al., 1997; Negnevitsky, 2002). However, the 
triangular and trapezoidal membership function are not smooth at all points (i.e. the 
corner points) specified by the parameters. As a result, the Gaussian and Generalized 
bell membership functions are becoming increasingly popular for specifying fuzzy 
sets.  
In the context of this research, the Gaussian membership function had been applied 
to the Internet banking adoption model presented in chapter 6, due to the 
computational efficiency and simplicity capability it offers. Further, the Trapezoidal 
membership function had been adopted and applied for the E-banking OR 
assessment process presented in chapter 6, due to the smoothness and concise 
notation it offers. 
Step 3: This step requires the elicitation and construction of fuzzy rules. There are 
two major ways of specifying fuzzy rules. The domain experts may be required to 
describe how the problem understudy, can be solved using the previously defined 
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linguistic variables, or by acquiring knowledge collected from other resources such 
as: reports, books, computer databases, flow diagrams and observed human behavior 
(Negnetvisky, 2002). Fuzzy rules can be represented in a matrix form such as: a 
M N matrix or a M N K  cube depicted as a two-by-one and a three-by-one FIS 
input variables respectively (Negnetvisky, 2002).  
More specifically, a FIS approximates the true function Y =  1, 2, , Mf X X X  via a set 
of N fuzzy inference rules defined on the input-output state space 1 2 ... MX X X Y  
If each  1jX j M  can assume one jn  values, the total number of rules N is: 
1
M
j
j
N n

                                                                                                    (5.28) 
What this means is that as the number of possible states increases, so is the required 
number of inference rules, which is referred to as the “curse of dimensionality” 
(Kosko, 1997). The challenge is however on how to balance the need for analytical 
resolution with simplicity, which thus requires a trade-off between the number of 
input states for each linguistic variable in a FIS and the risk analyst’s tolerance for 
precision (McGill & Ayyub, 2007). 
Step 4: After defining the fuzzy rules the next step is to encode the fuzzy sets, fuzzy 
rules and procedures to perform fuzzy inference into the FIS. At this stage the FIS 
can be built using programming languages such as C, Java or Pascal. It can also be 
built using the fuzzy logic development tool such as MATLAB Fuzzy Logic toolbox. 
In the context of this research, the MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox has been 
adopted, because it relatively easy and convenient to use, and satisfies the objectives 
of this research. It provides a systematic framework for computing, with fuzzy rules 
and graphical user interfaces. Moreover, it is one of the most popular tools for FIS 
applications (Negnetvitsky, 2002). 
Step 5: Evaluating and tuning of the FIS is the last and most tedious task in 
developing the FIS. This step is usually conducted in order to determine if the 
application being developed meets the requirements specified at the beginning. One 
of the main reasons for evaluating and tuning of the FIS is that, even though the 
initial FIS may work well, we may however want to improve the performance of the 
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FIS inputs and outputs. One of the main approaches to tuning the FIS is by applying 
the defuzzification approach discussed earlier. Negnevitsky (2002) however 
suggested that the typical process for tuning fuzzy systems may include the 
following steps: 
1. The initial FIS input and output variables could be reviewed by paying 
particular attention to the variable units. If necessary redefine their ranges and 
ensure that variables used in the same domain must be measured in the same 
units on the universe of discourse.  
2. The fuzzy sets could be reviewed and if necessary additional fuzzy sets 
should be defined. This is because when wide fuzzy sets are used in the FIS, 
it may cause the FIS to perform roughly. 
3. To ensure sufficient overlap between neighbouring sets is provided. 
However, there is no precise method to determine the optimum amount of 
overlap, but Cox (1994) suggested that triangle to triangle and trapezoid to 
triangle fuzzy sets should overlap between 25% and 50% of their bases. 
4. The existing rules could be reviewed and if necessary the new set of rules 
should be added to the rule base. 
5. The rule base could be examined to check for opportunities to write hedge 
rules that could capture the pathological behaviour of the system. 
6. The rule execution weights could also be adjusted. This is to allow control of 
the importance of rules by changing a weight multiplier. For instance, the 
domain expert may decide to improve the FIS by reducing or increasing the 
force of any of the rule by adjusting its weights.  
7. Finally, the shapes of the fuzzy sets could be revised. However, fuzzy 
systems are highly tolerant of a shape approximation in most cases, and as a 
result the FIS may still perform well even when the shapes of the fuzzy sets 
are not precisely defined. 
FIS have been applied to wide range of areas such as automatic control, expert 
systems, pattern recognition, time series prediction, and data classification (Jang et 
al., 1997). Despite the advantages Fuzzy Inference Systems, they however suffers 
from the difficulty of generating rules and also the problem of tuning, as it is 
expensive, most time-consuming and tedious part in the modeling process. It often 
requires manual definition of membership functions and adjustment of existing fuzzy 
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sets, and fuzzy rules (Negoita et al., 2005). It relies heavily on human experts in 
building the fuzzy rules and suffers from lack of automatic learning capability in a 
new data instance and external environment (Negoita et al., 2005). 
In most real life data mining applications, it is very difficult to utilize effectively one 
single technique, as most practical problems requires the need to classify or make 
predictions from knowledge acquired from different sources and format, such as in 
the case of the E-banking OR assessment. Also, it is observed that no single 
technique has optimal solution for all problems and datasets, as every technique has 
its own strength and weaknesses (Negnevitsky, 2002; Negoita et al., 2005). For 
example FISs have the predictive capability of classifying instances that are inexact 
unlike TAN, ANN and C4.5 algorithms, whose predictions are either correct or 
incorrect. An instance classification in TAN, ANN, and C4.5 is crisp [0, 1], while in 
FISs an instance can be classified with a degree of membership. Thus, the degree of 
correctness is taken into consideration.  
In addition decision trees uses the “divide and conquer” approach, they tend to 
perform less if many complex interactions are present, but perform well if a few 
highly relevant attributes exist. Decision trees are also limited due to its over-
sensitivity to the training set, to irrelevant attributes and to noise. Artificial Neural 
Networks on the other hand are considered to be a black box, due to low 
comprehensibility problem inherent in the system; they are unable to explain how 
conclusions were reached and are not able to interact with conventional databases 
(Negoita et al., 2005). When the input data increases, the computational complexity 
of the ANN structure increases dramatically, thus experiences difficulty in training 
and structured knowledge representation (Negoita et al., 2005). Moreover, in real 
time classification or predictions, high computational complexity hinders the 
processing speed both in training and testing.  As a result researchers have stressed 
the need for a combination of different techniques. These combinations have led to 
the emergence of hybrid intelligent systems
19
, a core of soft computing 
(Negnevitsky, 2002).  
                                                   
19
 Hybrid intelligent systems (HIS) combine two or more intelligent systems capable of 
reasoning and learning in an uncertain and imprecise environment, to appropriately utilize 
the computational property of these intelligent systems (see Turban and Aronson, 1998; 
Negnevitsky, 2002; Negoita et al., 2005; Venugopal et al., 2009).   
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The objective of this thesis is to propose the use of soft computing tools and to 
provide the reader with an understanding of these systems and specifically on their 
effectiveness in real life practical application, especially in the context of E-banking 
ORA. In the context of this research, the basic FIS was adopted in modelling the 
Internet banking adoption factors and E-banking operational risk assessment 
problems. Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes classifier was then adopted for identifying 
E-banking operational risks and their causal relationships. These approaches where 
chosen due to the various factors relating to their functionality, capability, and 
suitability. The computational cost of deploying these techniques within the research 
time frame and to achieving the research objectives was also considered.  
5.10.6 Evaluation Metrics for Soft Computing Tools 
To measure the overall performance of a classifier on a given dataset there is the 
need to assess its error rate (success rate as it is generally called) on the dataset. The 
error rate is simply the proportion of errors made over the entire set of instances in 
the dataset (Witten & Frank, 2005). However, one of the main aims of classification 
is the ability to make future predictions based on the already trained instances in the 
training set. As a result, estimating the error rate on the training set is not likely to be 
a good indicator for classifying future performances or occurrences of risk events, as 
the estimate may be hopelessly optimistic (Dunham, 2003; Witten & Frank, 2005).  
Thus, to predict the true error rate of a classifier, it is recommended that a separate 
dataset (called the test set), which played no part in the training process be used for 
new instance classification (Witten & Frank, 2005). In order to achieve this, it is 
recommended that a large amount of data instances for both training and testing 
should be used, because this will yield a more accurate error estimate (Witten & 
Frank, 2005).  
However, in practical real world situation, large datasets are usually scarce (Witten 
& Frank, 2005; Su & Zhang, 2006; Liao & Ji, 2009). As a result, several methods for 
training and testing had been developed such as the holdout procedure, where a 
certain amount of data is held over for testing and the remainder for training. This 
method however has the disadvantage of the sample size not being representative 
enough (Witten & Frank, 2005). Moreover, we cannot generally tell whether a 
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sample is representative or not. To solve this problem a random sampling procedure 
had been proposed generally called ‘stratification’.  
Stratification procedure provides a proper way of randomly selecting instances for 
both training and testing the dataset (Dunham, 2003; Witten & Frank, 2005). 
However, stratification provides only a primitive safeguard against uneven 
representation in training and test sets. As a result a more general approach to 
mitigate any bias is to repeat the whole holdout, training and testing, several times 
with different random samples. Cross-validation is a simple variant for the holdout 
procedure. The stratification procedure can be applied to the cross-validation 
method, generally known as stratified cross-validation (Witten & Frank, 2005). 
Thereafter the mean of the estimates can then computed and the error rate is usually 
in percentage (Witten & Frank, 2005; Moran et al., 2009). 
It is often difficult for analysts or data miners to determine which classification 
algorithm or soft computing tools will perform most effectively in a given dataset or 
problem domain, as a result the performance of different learning methods is often 
compared. Using the repeated stratified cross-validation procedure may seem quite 
sufficient, the differences may however be caused by estimated error. Thus some 
statistical analysis based on generally adopted evaluation metrics is needed; some of 
which is described next 
CPU Training / Testing Time: When a more complicated algorithm is used the 
power consumption proportionately increases, because it consumes more CPU cycles 
in each classification process. Also the time to build and test the entire model and 
classify results is important for evaluating algorithms performance (Yang, 2010). 
Prediction Accuracy: is considered because a correct outcome predicted with a 
higher degree of probability correctness weighs heavily on an outcome predicted 
with a lower degree of probability correctness. Also when the prediction is subject to 
further analysis, or involves an assessment by a person or perhaps serves as an input 
to second level learning process (as in this research), then it is important to take into 
consideration the prediction probabilities (Viaene et al, 2004; Witten & Frank, 2005; 
Moran et al, 2009).  The accuracy of each classifier is evaluated as: 
True Positive Rate (TPR) 
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 .       
TPR =
 .   
Total no of samples withcorrectlyclassfied outcome
Total no of samples                         (5.29) 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 
 .       
FPR =
 .   
Total no of samples withincorrectlyclassified outcome
Total no of samples                       (5.30) 
False Negative Rate (FNR) 
 .        
FNR =
 .   
Total no of samplesincorrectlyclassified as false
Total no of samples                                     (5.31) 
False Positive Rate (FPR) 
 .        
FPR =
 .   
Total no of samplesincorrectlyclassified astrue
Total no of samples                                 (5.32) 
Therefore the  
Prediction accuracy  
 .    
Accuracy =
 .   
Total no of samplescorrectlyclassified
Total no of samples                                               (5.33)  
 
Mean Absolute Error and Relative Absolute Error: An absolute error is the range 
of possible values in terms of the unit of measurement. The mean absolute error is 
the weighted average of all the absolute errors found from the cross validations. 
When considering performance measure an absolute error does not exaggerate the 
effect of outliers - instances whose prediction error is larger than the others but 
instead it treats all sizes of individual errors evenly according to their magnitude and 
without taking into account their sign (Moran et al., 2009).  
Relative absolute error on the other hand is the total absolute error and having the 
same kind of normalization as absolute errors (see Moran et al., 2009). However, 
sometimes the relative error values are of importance rather than the absolute error 
values. For example, if a 25% error is equally important whether it is an error of 60 
in a prediction of 240 or an error of 42.5 in a prediction of 170, then averages of 
absolute error will be meaningless, while relative errors will be appropriate. This 
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effect is usually taken into account by using the relative errors in the mean absolute 
error calculation. The lower the percentage, the better the performance of the 
classifier compared to just predicting the mean. Thus we present our statistical 
analysis using the relative absolute error method (Witten & Frank, 2005).  
Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve: A Receiver Operating Characteristics 
(ROC) curve is a two dimensional visualization graph of the FPR plotted on the 
horizontal axis against the TPR plotted on the vertical axis. The ROC curve 
represents the performance of a classifier without taken into consideration the class 
distribution or the cost of errors. The FPR and the TPR values are expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of positives and negatives included in the sample. The 
closer the ROC is to the point (0, 1) which is the upper left of the graph, the better 
the scoring rule in general (Viaene, et al., 2004; Witten & Frank, 2005). The ROC 
curve presents the decision-making behaviour of the scoring rule in terms of: 
ROC curve = TPR vs. FPR 
        
     
,
 
     
  
     =
   
 
  
False Positives True Positives
False Positives True Negatives True Positives False Negatives 
 
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                           (5.34)
 
To summarize ROC in a single quantity, Area under the ROC (AUROC) is often 
used because the larger the area the better the model (0, 1); 1 being optimal. Also it is 
an appropriate performance measure because the area has a smooth and easy 
interpretation, and it is equivalent to the nonparametric Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney 
statistic which estimates the probability that the classifier ranks a randomly chosen 
positive data instance greater than a randomly chosen negative data instance (see 
Viaene, et al., 2004; Witten & Frank, 2005). However, this measure is only useful if 
costs and class distributions are unknown or vague. The AUROC result is reported 
based on the shaded area (convex hull) of the curves, and operates at the point that 
lies on the upper boundary of the convex hull. 
5.11 Summary 
The research methodology followed in this thesis presents topics on different forms 
of research, which are useful to find an appropriate approach and method in this 
study. This chapter has discussed the research methodology. The detail of the 
qualitative phase and two phased quantitative research methods employed in this 
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research has been discussed. The chapter also present the rationale behind the 
developed research design considered. Further, the chapter has set out a detailed 
description of both the paper-and-pencil questionnaire process conducted on the 
Nigerian banking customers and the second phase of the quantitative research 
element which involved designing and administering an electronic questionnaire to 
the senior / risk assessment and management officers in the Nigerian banking 
industry.  
The analysis of both customer-based and risk officers-based data has been presented 
and issues relating to bias and validity addressed. The sample design, sampling 
procedure, target population, details of the questionnaire design and issues relating to 
response rates and reliability have been addressed. The chapter concludes with a 
description of the statistical tests used and includes: data pre-processing; reliability of 
scales testing; and factor analysis to reducing dimensionality of the dataset. The 
development of the research process provides the foundation for the empirical 
element of this study.  
The chapter also provides details of the soft computing tools adopted for assessing 
and validating the proposed E-banking operational risk assessment process. Fuzzy 
Inference Systems and Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes classifiers have been discussed. 
Advantages and disadvantages of TAN have been presented against the general 
Bayesian Network classifiers and the simple Naïve Bayes classifier. The chapter also 
presented some statistical analysis evaluation metrics for comparing soft computing 
tools performances. The quantitative data analysis and experimental results for the E-
banking operational risk assessment process is presented in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
Case Study and Experimental Results 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter focuses on the case study and the experimental results. It details the 
procedure of the technical experiment; as a feasibility test for our proposed E-
banking ORA methodology and framework presented in chapter 4. It is divided into 
three phases which reflect the chronological order of our proposed risk assessment 
methodology and framework. The chapter details also the results of the data analysis 
of both secondary and primary data generated. Within phase 1, 2, and 3 include 
details of the experimental tools used for; identifying Internet banking adoption 
factors and establishing the risk assessment context domain, identifying the 
operational risks, and calculating the risk exposure level respectively. Moreover, it 
shows the results can be interpreted, in order to provide suggestions for future 
improvements and recommendations.  
This chapter is organised as follows: the next section provides an overview of the 
experimental procedure. Subsequent sections present a detailed application and 
analysis of the data with reference to the methodology, framework and the defined 
measurement approaches proposed in chapter 4. The results obtained from the third 
phase of our experiment are then compared with the classical risk assessment 
approach (specifically, the NIST SP 800-30 risk assessment methodology) discussed 
in section 3.2. Finally, it concludes with a detailed discussion of these results 
6.2 Experimental Plan and Procedure  
This section summarises the three main phases proposed in this thesis. As illustrated 
in Figure 6.1, the ORA process starts by identifying the asset and characterising the 
system under study as proposed in Figure 4.1 and section 4.5. Then a three-phase 
plan for data collection was carried out to identify, analyse and evaluate the risks.  
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Choose the best classifier
Yes 
No 
Train and Test best 
classifier (TAN classifier)
Identify risks and causal 
relationships based on Markov 
conditional independence 
assumption
Build FIS model
Store data 
Determine risk exposure 
level / security posture
Document 
report 
Exit B
Store data
Phase 1: system
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docum
entation 
Collect 
data 
(internal
)
 
Figure 6.1 Flowchart of the E-banking operational risk assessment process 
Within the first phase, a secondary data analysis was carried out on six countries to 
determine the adoption factors and adoption rate for Internet banking system. The 
results of the analysis, helped to clarify the significance of adopting E-banking 
operational risk assessment, and the Nigerian banking industry as the research area of 
interest. In the second phase, a customer-based survey was carried out to identify key 
operational risks and triggering factors for E-banking OR. Through this survey, E-
banking customers were asked to rate the frequency and severity of risk experienced 
over the last 12 months. They were also asked to identify their risk awareness status 
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based on some identified risk factors. In addition, E-banking customers were asked 
to rate how well they agree with some identified E-banking system KRIs such as 
government regulations, the economy, computer literacy levels and so on. Results 
obtained from the data analysis, was then used to develop a bank officers-based 
survey on four known security risk events.  
In the third phase, a quantitative survey targeted at senior executives of the two 
commercial banks under study was carried out, to determine quantitatively the 
frequency of risks identified during the data analysis of the customer-based survey. 
Through this survey the magnitude of risk occurrences and effectiveness of controls 
(barriers) to either prevent or recover before the risk outcome was also determined. 
The adversarial frequency of the undesirable operational security events described in 
terms of account compromise, loss of data integrity, loss of availability, and loss of 
confidentiality was also explored. The bank executives were also asked to provide 
approximate cost for such undesirable operational security events and their impact 
based upon consideration on existing control effectiveness. The data extracted from 
these surveys and secondary data will be applied in the next sections, to the proposed 
ORA framework and measurement approach defined in sections 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7.  
6.3 Phase 1: Fuzzy Inference System for Internet 
Banking Adoption 
This section focuses on the first phase of the experiment, where the secondary data 
generated from both literature and reports was used to characterize the system / 
identify the asset presented in step 1 of the pseudocode in Figure 4.1. Before starting 
the experiment, several literature were examined to identify the various types of 
Internet banking services that were being offered by the United Kingdom, United 
State of America, Hong Kong, Italy, Romania, and Nigeria as discussed in section 
2.2.4. Table 6.1 shows the result of the various types of Internet banking services 
offered by these countries.  The table illustrates the informative, communicative and 
transactional banking services adopted for each country. 
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Country Informative 
Banking  
Communicative 
Banking 
Transactional Banking 
Low-value-added High-value-added 
United Kingdom Yes Yes Yes Yes 
United State of America Yes Yes Yes Yes [ but not every bank] 
Hong Kong Yes Yes Yes Undetermined 
Italy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Nigeria Yes Yes Yes No 
Romania Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 6.1 Types of Internet banking services offered in the six countries analysed 
Informational banking offers information about the bank’s products and services, 
while Communicative banking offers account-related information such as address 
and personal information updates. Transactional banking on the other hand allows 
customers’ to execute financial transactions. It can also be classified into two main 
categories namely: low-value-added transactions (e.g. bill payments, balance 
inquiries, account transfer) and high-value-added transactions (e.g. applying for 
mortgages, shopping for the best loan rates, comparing insurance policies and prices) 
(Ramakrishnan, 2001; Wang, 2005). Transactional banking often carry the highest 
risk, because it allows customers’ to carry out detail financial transactions on their 
computers, without the physical face-to-face transaction process of the traditional 
banking system. In addition, the banking services are often provided by a third-party 
service provider, which may result in a loss of an overall control from the transacting 
bank (Ramakrishnan, 2001).  
The description within the table gives some indication that a complete transactional 
banking service was yet adopted by the majority of the banks. Security risk issues 
such as fraud, phishing attacks, trust, authentication processes, Trojans horses and so 
on were perceived as the main reason why most of the banks have yet to adopt the 
complete transactional banking system. This was further confirmed by the 
Information in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2, where specific factors affecting Internet 
banking across the countries investigated were identified. 
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Factors Country Affected by the factors 
Romania United 
Kingdom 
United State 
of America 
Hong 
Kong 
Italy Nigeria 
Government prioritization/ 
regulations Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
Literacy Yes Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
Access to Internet Yes Yes Yes - - Yes 
Perceived web security Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank size Yes - Yes - Yes Yes 
Consumer age - Yes - Yes - - 
Population density - - Yes - Yes - 
Perceived ease of use - Yes Yes Yes - - 
Attitude to new technology Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
Geographic regions Yes - Yes - Yes - 
Capital per income Yes - Yes Yes Yes - 
Competition Yes Yes Yes - Yes Yes 
High branch intensity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Internet only banks - Yes Yes - - No 
Web site accessibility Yes Yes Yes Yes - - 
Credibility of the Internet banking 
provider - Yes - - - - 
Perceived usefulness of 
technology - Yes - Yes - - 
Incentive programs provided by 
banks  Yes  Yes   
Economy status Yes  Yes   Yes 
Internet usage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6.2 Factors for Internet banking adoption 
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Figure 6.2 Factors affecting Internet banking adoption 
The “Yes” value in the columns above indicates country affected, the “No” value 
indicates that a country is not affected. The “-” in the column means that the factor is 
undetermined from the data source. Clearly within the table and figure, government 
prioritization / regulation, Internet usage, literacy level, competition, perceived web 
security and high branch intensity are major issues for concern.  
Next, a Fuzzy Inference System was designed and tested to determine the Internet 
banking adoption rate based on the facts reported so far, and the quantitative data 
collected from the World Bank, and the Central Intelligence Agency reports as 
discussed in section 5.7.  Table 6.3 synthesizes and shows the quantitative data that 
was extracted from these two reports. 
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Countries 
United 
States of 
America 
United 
Kingdom Italy 
Hong 
Kong Romania Nigeria 
Population (millions) 294 59 58 7 22 140 
Adult Literacy rate (% ages 15 
and over) - - - - 97 67 
Level of competition: Internet 
Service Provider C C C - C C 
Government prioritization of ICT 
(scale 1-7) 5.2 5.0 3.9 5.3 4.3 3.9 
Telephone main lines (per 1,000 
people) 606 567 461 552 198 8 
Internet Users (per 1000 people) 569 533 321 508 184 7 
Personal Computers (per 1000 
people) 760 496 232 453 83 6 
Broadband subscribers (per 1000 
people) 129.1 103.3 81.7 216.9 0.7 0.0 
International Bandwidth (bits per 
person) 3,308 13,156 1,572 4,819 107 1 
Price basket for fixed line (US$ 
per month, residential) 25.0 29.5 23.8 15.1 9.6 13.7 
Price basket for mobile (US$ per 
month) 10.8 19.1 14.0 3.4 8.8 11.6 
Price basket for Internet (US$ per 
month) 15.0 23.9 16.5 3.9 25.3 45.5 
ICT expenditure (% GDP) 8.8 7.3 4.1 8.4 2.8 - 
E-government readiness index 
(scale 0-1) 1.00 0.97 0.55 - 0.61 0.14 
Secure Internet Servers (per 1 
million people) 674.9 354.1 34.6 141.0 3.0 0.1 
Table 6.3 Economic, social context and performance of the ICT sectors (extracted 
from World Bank report on the global overview of ICT trends and policies in 
developing countries (The World Bank, 2006), and 2006 World Factbook report 
(Central Intelligence Agency, 2007) 
In table 6.3 the symbol “-” means that data are not available or that aggregates 
cannot be calculated because of missing data. The symbol C represents full 
competition. The price basket for Internet usage is calculated based on the cheapest 
available tariff for accessing the Internet 20 hours a month (i.e. 10 hours peak and 10 
hours off peak).   The adoption rate of Internet banking is ascertained for chosen 
factors: high web security (secure Internet servers), average Internet users, average 
government prioritization / regulations of ICT, high level of competition (Internet 
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service provider), and high literacy level (rate) which may imply a very high 
adoption rate or very low risk level.  
6.3.1 The Fuzzy Inference System Design 
The initial FIS was designed based on the five most significant factors affecting 
Internet banking adoption: web security (secure Internet servers), Internet users, 
government prioritization / regulations of ICT, level of competition (Internet service 
provider), and literacy level (rate). These factors were used as the input variables, 
and adoption rate as the output variable. Results obtained for the five inputs and one 
output FIS, were then compared with the set of FIS having just two inputs from the 
same range of data. We tried in an empirical way to address the significance of the 
number of inputs as well as feature selection issue.  
The Mamdani fuzzy inference engine was adopted and implemented based on the 
four basic steps (fuzzification of the input variables, rule evaluation, aggregation of 
the rule outputs, and defuzzification) discussed in section 5.10.5. The information 
flow for the FIS is depicted in Figure 6.3 and the range definition for the FIS inputs 
is shown in Table 6.4. The proposed FIS has been implemented in MATLAB Fuzzy 
Logic development toolbox. The system designed is intended to satisfy the following 
requirements:  
1 Determine the required fuzzy variables (inputs and output) and their ranges.  
2 Determine the fuzzy sets 
3 Form the rule base 
4 Evaluate and tune the system. 
 
Figure 6.3 A FIS for Internet banking adoption  
Fuzzifier
Defuzzifier
Aggregation
Fuzzy 
inference
Inputs (security, 
government prioritization, 
literacy level, Internet 
users, and competition)
Output
Fuzzy inputs
Adoption rate
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Step 1: The Fuzzy Variables and Range Definition 
The initial complex FIS system has five inputs (secure Internet server, literacy level, 
government prioritization / regulation of ICT, Internet users, and level of 
competition) and one output (adoption rate). The input ranges are defined based on 
the synthesized data presented in Table 6.3. The output range is defined by the 
researcher as adoption rate in % with range between [0 – 100].  
Membership values of the fuzzy sets (i.e. linguistic value) were produced using 
fuzzification to the integer crisp values of the five factors and one output. Table 6.5 
and 6.6 shows the linguistic value and ranges definition of both inputs and output of 
the FIS, described by three membership functions. 
Factors (inputs) Range 
Literacy level (% ages 15 and over) 0-100 
Competition: Internet service provider (%) 0-100 
Government prioritization / regulation of ICT (scale 1-7) 0-7 
Internet users (per 1000 people) 0-600 
Secure Internet servers (per 1 million people) 0-700 
Table 6.4 Range definition for the FIS inputs 
Output  Linguistic value Numerical range 
Adoption rate Low  [0 - 50] 
Average  [20 - 80] 
High  [50 - 100] 
Table 6.5 Linguistic variables and range definition for the FIS output 
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Inputs Linguistic value Numerical range 
Secure Internet Server Low  [0 - 350] 
Average  [200 – 500] 
High  [350 - 700] 
Internet users Low [0 - 300] 
Average  [250 - 350] 
High  [300 - 600] 
Literacy level Low  [0 - 50] 
Average  [20 - 80] 
High [50 - 100] 
Competition: Internet service provider Monopoly [0 - 45] 
Partial  [30 - 70] 
Full competition [60 - 100] 
Government Prioritization (ICT) Weak  [0 – 3.5] 
Average  [2.5 – 4.5] 
Strong  [3.5 - 7] 
Table 6.6 Linguistic variables and range definition for the FIS inputs 
Step 2: The Fuzzy Sets Determination 
The inputs are fuzzified via Gaussian membership functions (in definition 5.10.6), 
whose parameters are Secure Internet Server, Government Prioritization, Literacy 
Level, Internet Users and Competition. This approach was chosen because of the 
capability of being concise and smooth at all point. The Gaussian membership 
function was used without restricting the generality of the experiment. However, the 
output membership function for the FIS uses the trapezoidal membership function (in 
definition 5.10.5). The trapezoidal membership function was chosen because of the 
computational efficiency and simplicity capability it offers, and it can often provide 
an adequate representation of the domain expert knowledge. Figure 6.4 and 6.5 
graphically represent the fuzzy sets of the five inputs variables and output variable 
respectively.  
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Figure 6.4 Fuzzy sets: a) Secure Internet Server; b) Literacy Level; c) Government 
Prioritization [ICT]; d) Internet Users; e) Competition (Internet Service Provider) 
 
Figure 6.5 Fuzzy sets: Adoption Rate 
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Step 3: The Fuzzy Rules  
The rule base for the initial complex FIS has five input parameters and one output, 
and contains 45 IF-THEN rules, while the rule base for the reduced version of FIS 
has two input parameters and one output, and contains 18 IF-THEN rules that were 
defined by the domain expert (the researcher). Examples of the rules derived from 
the five inputs and one output FIS is given as: 
If (secure Internet server is low) AND (government prioritization is weak) AND 
(literacy level is Low) AND (Internet users is low) AND (competition is Low) THEN 
adoption rate is low.  
If (secure Internet server is average) AND (government prioritization is weak) AND 
(literacy level is low) AND (Internet users is low) AND (competition is low) THEN 
adoption rate is low. 
However, a complete rule base of one of the two inputs and one output FIS (secure 
Internet server and Government prioritization) is given below. 
1 If  secure Internet server is low AND Government prioritization is weak 
THEN Adoption rate is low 
2 If  secure Internet server is low AND Government prioritization is average 
THEN Adoption rate is low 
3 If  secure Internet server is low AND Government prioritization is average 
THEN Adoption rate is average 
4 If  secure Internet server is low AND Government prioritization is strong 
THEN Adoption rate is low 
5 If  secure Internet server is low AND Government prioritization is strong 
THEN Adoption rate is average 
6 If  secure Internet server is average AND Government prioritization is 
weak THEN Adoption rate is low 
7 If secure Internet server is average AND Government prioritization is 
weak THEN Adoption rate is average 
8 If  secure Internet server is average AND Government prioritization is 
average THEN Adoption rate is average 
9 If  secure Internet server is average AND Government prioritization is 
average THEN Adoption rate is high 
10 If  secure Internet server is average AND Government prioritization is 
strong THEN Adoption rate is average 
11 If  secure Internet server is average AND Government prioritization is 
strong THEN Adoption rate is high 
12 If  secure Internet server is high AND Government prioritization is weak 
THEN Adoption rate is low 
13 If  secure Internet server is high AND Government prioritization is weak 
THEN Adoption rate is average 
14 If  secure Internet server is high AND Government prioritization is weak 
THEN Adoption rate is high 
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15 If  secure Internet server is high AND Government prioritization is 
average THEN Adoption rate is average 
16 If  secure Internet server is high AND Government prioritization is 
average THEN Adoption rate is high 
17 If  secure Internet server is high AND Government prioritization is strong 
THEN Adoption rate is high 
18 If  secure Internet server is average AND Government prioritization is 
average THEN Adoption rate is low 
Clipping method was used for aggregating the consequences. Mamdani method was 
used to finding the Centre of Gravity of the aggregated surface of the rule evaluation 
from equation 5.16 (see Appendix C for some of the FIS rule viewer). The centroid 
defuzzification technique is calculated as the weighted average of the output fuzzy 
region and corresponds to the point in the x-axis which divides the output fuzzy 
region into two equal subareas. This technique was used because it is a well-balanced 
and consistent approach. It is sensitive to the height and width of the total fuzzy 
region and the smooth changes in the expected value of the output across 
observations as discussed in section 5.10.5.  
Step 4: The FIS Evaluation and Tuning 
On the average, the Internet banking adoption rate is about 55.5% when all five 
inputs (secure Internet server, government prioritization / regulation of ICT, literacy 
level, Internet users, and level of competition) are on the average. The FIS was tuned 
by adjusting the fuzzy rules. The results of some input combinations are listed in 
Table 6.7. The FIS were tuned because we want to see that our fuzzy system meets 
the requirements specified at the beginning, and also to address performance 
optimization. A stage of evaluation and tuning was then performed, of which some of 
the most common cases include the literacy level may be as high as possible, but in 
the context of low security level, the adoption rate is kept to a flat minimum (Table 
6.7 and Figure 6.6). In an average security-level environment, a good government 
prioritization, good literacy level, high Internet user’s rate and high rate of 
competition by Internet service providers, increases the chance of adoption, although 
still lower than a safe and secure access.  
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S/N Secure 
Internet 
Server 
Government 
Prioritization 
[ICT] 
Literacy 
Level 
Internet 
Users 
Competition [Internet 
Service Provider] 
Adoption 
Rate % 
1 Low Strong  High High High 24.3 
2 Low Weak Low Low High 24.3 
3 Low Weak Low High High 30.2 
4 High Weak Low low Low 31.3 
5 Low Weak High High High 32.9 
6 High Weak High Low Low 41.1 
7 High Strong Low Low Low 41.8 
8 High Weak Low Low High 50.0 
9 High Strong High Low Low 54.7 
10 High Strong High High Low 54.7 
11 Average Average Average Average Average 55.5 
12 Average Strong Average Average Average 58.7 
13 Average Average High Average Average 58.7 
14 Average Average Average High Average 58.7 
15 Average Strong Average High Average 59.6 
16 Average Average High High Average 60.2 
17 High Strong Average Average Average 68.8 
18 High Strong High Average Average 68.8 
19 High Average Average High Average 68.8 
20 Average Average Average Average High 68.8 
21 Average Strong High High High 68.8 
22 High Average Average Average Average 68.8 
23 High Average High Average Average 77.0 
24 High Average Average Average High 81.3 
25 Average Average Average High High 81.5 
26 High Average High High Average 81.5 
27 High Strong High High Average 81.5 
28 High Strong High High High 81.5 
Table 6.7 Tuning of the FIS by adjusting the fuzzy rules 
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Figure 6.6 One of the surface viewer of the system with five inputs: secure Internet 
server and literacy level 
The FIS results show that security is the most important factor for Internet banking 
adoption because no matter how high or strong the government prioritization, the 
literacy level, the Internet users, and the competition are; as long as the security level 
is low, the Internet banking adoption rate will be at the lowest minimum of about 
24.3% (as shown in Figure 6.6 and Table 6.7). But keeping security high with two or 
more inputs high will produce a very high adoption rate for internet banking (see 
Appendix D for FIS surface viewer plots). 
6.3.2   Comparing the Performance of Five Inputs with 
Two Inputs FIS 
Although, our fuzzy system with five inputs and one output works well, we want to 
compare the performance with a reduced version using two inputs and one output 
combination. The FIS with five inputs is quite better in most of the cases, because on 
the average the adoption rate is 55.5%, while most of the FIS with two inputs and 
one output have average adoption rate less than 55.5%, with the exclusion of literacy 
level, government prioritization and Internet users, which have the adoption rate of 
about 68.7% as shown in Table 6.8. 
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S/N Average Adoption Rate % when all inputs are on the average 
1 Secure Internet Server Literacy Level 53.9 
2 Secure Internet Server Government Prioritization [ICT] 47.8 
3 Secure Internet Server Internet Users 49.5 
4 Secure Internet Server Competition [Internet Service Provider] 49.5 
5 Internet Users Government Prioritization [ICT] 68.6 
6 Internet Users Literacy Level 51.1 
7 Internet Users Competition [Internet Service Provider] 51.1 
8 Literacy Level Government Prioritization [ICT] 68.7 
9 Competition [Internet Service 
Provider] 
Government Prioritization [ICT] 51.1 
10 Literacy Level Competition [Internet Service Provider] 51.1 
Table 6.8 The average adoption rate of the FIS with two inputs and one output 
However, a common case with the two FIS designed is that literacy level, 
government prioritization,  Internet users, and competition may be as high as 
possible, but in the context of low security level, the adoption rate is kept to a flat 
minimum (Figures 6.7 and 6.8). 
 
Figure 6.7 One of the surface viewers of the FIS with two inputs: secure Internet 
server and literacy level 
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Figure 6.8 One of the surface viewers of the FIS with five inputs: secure Internet 
server and government prioritization 
It can be seen that security is the most relevant variable because no matter how weak 
the other factors are, as long as there is high security levels, the adoption rate will be 
on the average. But a balance between these inputs will give a very high adoption 
rate.  
S/N Input  Very High Level Adoption Rate 
1 
Secure Internet server 693 
71.4 
Literacy level 99.4 
2 
Secure Internet server 693 
65.3 
Internet users 592 
3 
Secure Internet server 693 
80.2 
Competition 99.4 
4 Secure Internet server 693 
49.5 
Government prioritization 6.9 
Table 6.9 The adoption rate of the FIS with two inputs at a very high level 
These results show that FIS with five inputs has a better adoption rate compared to 
the FIS with two inputs at the highest level for each category (see Tables 6.7 and 
6.9).  
Overall the designed FIS and literature shows that security concern accounts for 
more than 70% of the factors for Internet banking adoption across these countries. 
These results help in revealing various risks that are inherent in Internet banking 
system vis-à-vis E-banking systems. A focus on security and risk assessment to 
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determine inherent risk exposure level and residual risk to Internet banking vis-à-vis 
E-banking is therefore necessary. These results helped the researcher to define the 
research area of interest (i.e. an exploration of E-banking operational risk 
assessment). In addition, attributes identified here will be used as the input for the 
second phase of the operational risk assessment process. The following section will 
present the implementation of the E-banking operational risk identification process 
defined in section 4.5.2 and Figure 6.1. 
The research in this phase, adopted a FIS and secondary data analysis to identify 
Internet banking adoption rate and factors. However, the developed FIS could be 
applied to different systems to provide a good basis for system adoption rate 
researches. 
6.4 Phase 2: E-banking Operational Risk 
Identification 
In this phase, we identified key operational risks for E-banking systems based on 
threats, threat agents, vulnerabilities and other risk factors from; the literature 
reviewed, the FIS designed for Internet banking adoption, and the customer-based 
survey conducted on E-banking users discussed in chapter 5. These risk factors / 
attributes were further assessed to gain insight into some known security events and 
their causal relationships in the context of E-banking operational risk. Figure 6.1 
shows the ORA flowchart to answering the research questions and objectives.  
We computed the key operational risks and their causal relationships by applying the 
TAN classifier discussed in chapter 5 and step 3 of the ORA steps presented in 
Figure 4.1. The TAN experimental results were then reported and compared with 
three (C4.5 decision tree, NB and ANN) soft computing tools discussed in chapter 2 
and 5. Further, we used some of the widely accepted performance evaluation metrics 
defined in section 5.10.6 to identify the overall best classifier for our customer-based 
dataset. However, the customer-based dataset was pre-processed by using factor 
analysis to reduce the dimensionality of the data. Factor analysis was considered 
necessary, because even though many soft computing tools can statistically and 
practically identify risks, describe hidden structures and relationships in risk dataset, 
the description and performances of the prediction algorithms usually becomes 
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reduced in terms of prediction accuracy and results optimization when there are for 
example, noise, missing data, various attribute coding and so on. As a result, one of 
the major issues is to pre-process the dataset before applying the TAN classifier. The 
overall data analysis and model development process for the E-banking operational 
risk identification is illustrated in Figure 6. 9. 
Pre-processing
Target input 
data
Pre-processed 
data
Transformed 
data
Soft computing Classifier 
(model) Knowledge 
Transformation Data mining
Interpretation / 
Evaluation
· Data cleaning using 
frequency analysis to 
remove noise and check 
for missing values
· Reliability test to check 
for research result 
reliability if repeated at a 
later date
· Data screening to 
increase reliability levels
· Data reduction 
using factor 
analysis
· NB
· TAN
· ANN
· C4.5
 
Figure 6.9 E-banking OR data analysis process (modified from: Dunham, 2003) 
6.4.1  Data Pre-processing 
The customer-based survey had an initial 89 questions (target input attributes). In 
order to make the dataset more meaningful, and to provide more accurate results, the 
dataset was pre-processed and transformed by conducting a factor analysis procedure 
using SPSS 19 statistical measurement tool, to reduce the dimensionality of the 
dataset into a smaller subset of measurable variables. Here we deployed three aspects 
of data pre-processing: data cleaning, reliability test and data screening. The steps of 
the data pre-processing is illustrated in Figure 6.10.  
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Preparing the collected data for analysis
Frequency analysis Reliability test Data screening 
Checking that the collected data is suitable for factor analysis
Calculate the 
determinant of the 
correlation matrix
Kaiser-Mayer-Oklin 
measure of sampling 
adequacy 
Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity 
Check the diagonal 
elements of the anti-
image correlation matrix
Check 
sample 
size
Factor Analysis (Data Transformation)
                                                        Soft Computing Classifiers Analysis
 
Figure 6.10 Steps for data analysis 
A frequency analysis was conducted for each variable to check for noisy data (such 
as invalid or incorrect values) and missing values. Missing values occur for several 
reasons, but in this survey missing values occurred because the survey respondents 
refused to answer some of the questions.  Missing values were excluded by using 
listwise procedure because data were missing at random; meaning for any instance 
with missing value for any variable is excluded from calculation. In addition, 300 
responses after exclusion of missing values is considered a good sample size as 
discussed in section 5.10.1. Therefore excluding missing values from calculation will 
not affect our analysis.  
A frequency analysis was conducted on each variable to check for incorrect data 
entry, missing values and major occurrences of parameters. From the 365 responses 
49.3% of the participants were females, and 50.7% were males. Further, 74.5% of the 
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respondents were E-banking adopters and 25.5% were non-adopters. Of the 
respondents that contributed, the majority 41.9% use ATM, 9.0% use Mobile phone, 
7.9% use Internet, 2.5 % use Telephone, 0.8% use PC banking, while others use a 
combination of two or more E-banking types as shown in Figure 6.11.  
Participants are had various qualifications, 47.4 % had Bachelor’s degree, 15.1% a 
Master’s degree, 4.1 % holds PhD, 9.0% , 12.9 %, and 7.1% had HND, OND, and 
High school degree respectively, while the remaining 4.4 % had secondary school 
leavers degree as illustrated in Figure 6.12. In addition, the majority of the 
respondents in the sample were computer literate. 
 
Figure 6.11 Distribution of E-banking system adopters and non-adopters within the 
collected sample 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12 Respondent level of education attained within the collected sample 
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From the sample it can be implied that on the average Nigerian income is between 
[34,000 – 62,999] naira, while the average age of respondents that contributed were 
between the age of 25 -34, which can therefore indicate some level of bias towards 
the age range and income levels. However, the survey reveals that majority of E-
banking adopters and frequent users are within this age range, therefore helps to 
validate the survey; as the focus area is on E-banking users risk experiences.  
The results for variables frequency analysis in each dimension shows that the data is 
valid and ready to be analysed as missing values, noisy data and data screening were 
conducted during the frequency distribution analysis. 
Next a reliability test was conducted on the dataset, a process of checking the 
measure of the questionnaire for consistency in what it is measuring. That is the level 
to which individual items (or set of items) would produce the same results if the 
investigation was repeated at a later time or with a different sample. We used the 
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha (α) in equation 5.1 to carry out testing and measuring 
the reliability of scale for each inter-item consistency.  
Reliabilities less than 0.6 is considered poor, 0.7 is acceptable and greater than 0.8 is 
considered good. The closer the reliability coefficient is to 1.0 the better the 
reliability. The generally accepted value for Cronbach’s alpha is 0.70. However, our 
initial reliability test gave some values (0.487, 0.608, 0.817, 0.843, 0.912, and 0.958) 
below accepted Cronbach’s alpha (discussed in 5.10.2) within the six factors.   
As a result a data screening process which helps in increasing the reliability levels 
was conducted on the initial reliability test result (see Churchill and Gilbert, 1979). 
The collected data was screened by deleting 12 attributes: 
1 Gender,  
2 E-banking future usage 
3 E-banking satisfaction rating 
4 E-banking risk exposure level 
5 Phishing attacks awareness 
6 Number of virus attacks 
7 Number of fraudulent attacks 
8 Fraudulent attacks severity 
9 Government policies 
10 privacy protection law 
11 Two password and biometrics authentication and  
12 System security techniques 
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Which had low correlations coefficient [<0.30] between each item and the total score 
from the questionnaire, were deleted from the analysis. Thus, the reliability level of 
Cronbach’s alpha increased to 0.753, 0.810, 0.817, 0.832, 0.886 and 0.906 for all 
factors: personal profile /opinion and E-banking perceptions, key risk indicators, 
actions taken for risks experienced, E-banking risk awareness status, frequency of E-
banking risk experienced, and severity of E-banking risk experienced respectively. 
6.4.2 Factor Analysis (Data Transformation) 
Based on the reliability test results, the dataset was then transformed by conducting a 
factor analysis on 77 attributes with orthogonal (verimax) rotation to check the 
dimensionality of the construct (dataset). As discussed in section 5.10.3, that factor 
loadings >0.30 are considered significant, >0.40 are more important, and >0.50 are 
very significant, and that there are no fixed cut-off value when interpreting factors; 
but dependent on the purpose of the study at hand, 0.5 was therefore chosen as the 
cut-off value for factor loadings and 1 for eigenvalue because the main purpose of 
conducting the factor analysis in this research, is to identify the most important 
factors and reduce the dataset.  
Moreover, Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity discussed in section 5.10.3 was performed. Table 6.10 illustrates the 
KMO measure of sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity. 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .715 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 2412.403 
Df 325 
Sig. .000 
Table 6.10 KMO and Bartlett's Test 
The KMO measure of sampling adequacy statistic was checked to ensure that KMO 
statistic lies between the value of 0 and 1, where a value close to 1 indicates that 
patterns of correlation are fairly clustered and as a result the factor analysis gives 
distinct and reliable factors. In addition to checking the overall KMO statistic, we 
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checked the diagonal elements of the anti-image correlation matrix
20
, to see that the 
KMO value for individual variables, are greater than 0.50 for all variables.  
However, variables with values below 0.5 were found with the 77 attributes used in 
the analysis. These variables were then excluded, and a re-run of the factor analysis 
was conducted on the reduced attributes (26 attributes), which gave values in the 
range between [0.556 … 0.818].  
In our reduced dataset, the KMO value is 0.715, which is considered good and the 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity is less than 0.01, which indicates that the correlations 
between items is highly significant. This shows that factor analysis is an appropriate 
method for our customer-based dataset and therefore there is confidence in the 
results obtained. 
In addition, factor score (the Anderson-Rubin method) discussed in section 5.10.3 
were then used to find an individual score on the subset of measures. Factor scores 
were used to overcome collinearity problems in regression analysis. As a result there 
is confidence that the Anderson-Rubin method ensures no multicollinearity exists in 
the data. 
As a result of conducting the factor analysis, we carried out an initial analysis to 
obtain eigenvalues for each factor (component) in the data. Before extraction, SPSS 
has identified 26 factors within the dataset. SPSS then extracts all factors with 
eigenvalues greater than 1; as a result 9 factors were obtained and in combination 
explained 68.01% of the variance. Table 6.11 lists the eigenvalues associated with 
each factor before extraction, after extraction and after rotation. 
From the scree plot shown in Figure 6.13, the point of inflexion on the curve on 
eleven components is in conformity with the results shown in Table 6.11.  
                                                   
20
 See Appendix E 
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Figure 6.13 Scree plot  
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1 4.226 16.252 16.252 4.226 16.252 16.252 2.848 10.955 10.955 
2 3.044 11.706 27.958 3.044 11.706 27.958 2.603 10.012 20.967 
3 2.262 8.702 36.660 2.262 8.702 36.660 2.517 9.682 30.649 
4 1.926 7.408 44.068 1.926 7.408 44.068 2.084 8.016 38.665 
5 1.669 6.417 50.486 1.669 6.417 50.486 2.052 7.891 46.555 
6 1.307 5.026 55.512 1.307 5.026 55.512 1.595 6.135 52.691 
7 1.216 4.679 60.191 1.216 4.679 60.191 1.437 5.528 58.219 
8 1.030 3.961 64.152 1.030 3.961 64.152 1.437 5.527 63.746 
9 1.002 3.855 68.007 1.002 3.855 68.007 1.108 4.261 68.007 
10 .818 3.147 71.154 
      
11 .809 3.111 74.265 
      
12 .752 2.891 77.155 
      
13 .679 2.610 79.765 
      
14 .625 2.405 82.170 
      
15 .590 2.271 84.441 
      
16 .518 1.991 86.432 
      
17 .490 1.883 88.315 
      
18 .485 1.867 90.182 
      
19 .440 1.691 91.873 
      
20 .425 1.636 93.509 
      
21 .371 1.425 94.935 
      
22 .347 1.333 96.268 
      
23 .327 1.259 97.527 
      
24 .261 1.006 98.532 
      
25 .216 .831 99.363 
      
26 .166 .637 100.000 
      
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Table 6.11 Total variance explained 
Table 6.12 shows the rotated factor (component) matrix, which is the matrix of the 
factor loadings for each variable onto each factor. Factor loadings less than 0.5 have 
not been displayed because these values have been suppressed. As a result the 
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dimensionality of the dataset had been reduced by discarding these factor loadings 
less than 0.5, leaving 24 variables in total. This factor analysis shows that there are 
24 important attributes as compared with the initial 77 attributes. However, E-
banking types adopted attribute was excluded from the analysis, as it is the target 
output attribute. In addition, factor analysis finds this attribute problematic as it is a 
string attribute. The transformed E-banking OR attributes selected based on the 
factor analysis result is shown in Figure 6.14.  
Rotated Component Matrix
a
 
Risks factors 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Monthly income .813                 
Weekly E-banking 
usage 
.748                 
Customers age range .709                 
Computer literacy level .664                 
Level of education 
attained 
.635                 
Number of Trojan 
horses attacks 
experienced 
  .833               
Number of spyware 
attacks experienced 
  .769               
Virus attack awareness   .617               
Trojan horses attack 
severity 
  .557               
Transferring of money 
to other banks 
    .735             
Insider fraud as key 
risk indicator 
    .726             
Quality of service as 
key risk indicator 
    .706             
Phishing attack severity       .830           
Spyware attack 
severity 
      .677           
Identity theft severity       .529   .524       
Lack of customers 
proper training as key 
        .813         
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risk indicator 
Lack of free or 
subsidized antivirus 
software as key risk 
indicator 
        .801         
Lack of intrusion 
detection systems as 
key risk indicators 
        .663         
Economy growth as 
key risk indicator 
          .862       
Regular staff training 
as key risk indicator 
                  
Upgraded the E-
banking security 
techniques 
            .809     
Outsider fraud as key 
risk indicator 
            .553     
Spam E-mails 
awareness 
              .791   
Two password 
authentication only 
              .636   
Mobile phone banking 
agents 
                .699 
Number of server 
failure experienced 
                  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 10 iterations. 
 
Table 6.12 Rotated Component Matrix
a
 factor loadings for each attribute
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Figure 6.14 Transformed E-banking risk attributes based on factor analysis 
 
E-banking Risk Attributes Selected Based on Factor Analysis
Personal Information 
Risk Awareness 
Status
Risk Attacks 
Frequency
Risk Attacks 
Severity
Key Risk Indicators
Risk Treatment / 
Response
Age
Education level
Computer literacy 
level
E-banking weekly 
usage
Monthly income
Virus 
Spam e-mails
Spyware 
Trojan horses
Trojan horses
Phishing 
Spyware
Upgraded E-banking 
security techniques
The economy
Outsiders fraud
Fraud by employees
Quality of service
Two password authentication 
technology
Mobile phone banking agents
Money transfer to other banks
Lack of free / subsidized 
antivirus software
Lack of Intrusion detection 
systems
Lack of proper customers 
training
E-banking type 
adopted
Identity theft
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6.4.3 Soft Computing Tools Implementation and 
Performance Analysis 
Based on the factor analysis results, four soft computing tools were applied on the 
attributes shown in Figure 6.14 to generate the desired operational risk issues (or 
simply operational risk) for further risk assessment. In this research, ANN, C4.5, and 
two Bayesian network classifiers (TAN and NB) were applied to our E-banking 
operational risk dataset. WEKA was used as the developmental tool for training and 
testing the classifiers. Each classifier has a variety of parameter settings available. 
However, in this research, all parameters used are done with the default settings 
available in WEKA implementation. It was necessary to use default settings on the 
classifiers to enable a fair performances analysis to be made on the dataset. These 
parameters are listed and explained in Table 6.13 below. The parameter settings that 
each classifier makes use of is indicated by ‘X’. 
Parameters Parameter Description TAN NB C4.5 ANN 
SimpleEstimator  - Used for estimating the 
conditional probability tables of a 
Bayes network once the structure 
has been learned. Estimates 
probabilities directly from data 
- alpha used for estimating the 
probability tables and can be 
interpreted as the initial count on 
each value. The default value is 
0.5 
X    
markovBlanketClassifier  - when set to true, a Markov 
Blanket correction is applied to the 
network structure after a network 
structure is learned 
- it ensures all nodes in the 
network are part of the Markov 
blanket of the classifier node 
X    
Entropy  - entropy was used as the score 
type  
determines the measures used to 
judge the quality of a network 
structure 
- can be BDeu, Minimum 
Desciption Length (MDL), Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), and 
Entropy 
X    
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initAsNaiveBayes When set to true, the initial 
structure used for learning is a 
Naïve Bayes network. When set to 
false, an empty network is used as 
the initial network structure.  
X X   
useADTree - improve search speed when set 
to true X    
useKernelEstimator - designed for use with numeric 
attributes rather than a normal 
distribution when set to true 
- it implies that differences in 
performance will be seen based 
on the number of numeric values 
available 
 X   
useSupervisedDiscretization - used to convert numeric 
attributes to nominal attributes  X   
confidenceFactor - The confidence factor used for 
pruning (smaller values incur 
more pruning) 
  X  
minNumObj - The minimum number of 
instances per leaf   X  
numFolds - Determines the amount of data 
used for reduced-error pruning.   
One fold is used for pruning, the 
rest for growing the tree 
  X  
seed - The seed is used for 
randomizing the data when 
reduced-error pruning is used 
- used to initialise the random 
number generator. Random 
numbers are used for setting the 
initial weights of the connections 
between nodes, and also for 
shuffling the training data 
  X  
subtreeRaising - Whether to consider the subtree 
raising operation when pruning   X  
autoBuild - adds and connects up hidden 
layers in the network    X 
hiddenLayers - defines the hidden layers of the 
neural network.  
- It is a list of positive whole 
numbers. 1 for each hidden layer. 
To have no hidden layers 0 is 
specified. This will only be used if 
auto build is selected. There are 
also wildcard values 'a' = (attribs + 
classes) / 2, 'i' = attribs, 'o' = 
classes, 't' = attribs + classes 
   X 
learningRate - The amount the weights are 
updated    X 
momentum - It is the momentum applied to 
the weights during updating    X 
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nominalToBinaryFilter - This will pre-process the 
instances with the filter.  
- It could help to improve the 
performance if there are nominal 
attributes in the data. 
   X 
normalizeAttributes - It normalizes the attributes and 
help to improve the performance 
of the network.  
- it is however not reliant on the 
class being numeric.  
- it normalizes the nominal 
attributes after they have been run 
through the nominal to binary filter 
so that the nominal values are 
between -1 and 1 
   X 
mormalizenumericalClass - It normalizes the class if it is 
numeric.  
- It could help to improve the 
performance of the network and 
normalizes the class to be 
between -1 and 1. internally,  
- the output is then scaled back to 
the original range 
   X 
trainingTime - The number of epochs to train 
through. If the validation set is 
non-zero then it can terminate the 
network early 
   X 
validationSetSize - The percentage size of the 
validation set. 
- The training will continue until it 
is observed that the error on the 
validation set has been 
consistently getting worse, or if the 
training time is reached 
   X 
validationThreshold - Used to terminate validation 
testing. 
- The value here dictates how 
many times in a row the validation 
set error can get worse before 
training is terminated 
   X 
Table 6.13 Parameter settings for the soft computing tools 
To better understand the effectiveness of each of the algorithms on the E-banking 
dataset, a statistical analysis was carried out. The performances of the classifiers 
were evaluated using metrics described in section 5.10.6. For evaluation purposes a 
10 runs of 10-fold stratified cross validation was adopted for both training and 
testing of the dataset, in order to provide a true error estimates of the classifiers. In 
addition, cross validation procedure was also used because it is the widely accepted 
standard way of predicting the error estimates of a learning technique given a single, 
fixed sample of data. For each of the learning method the same dataset of the same 
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size was used to obtain an accuracy estimate of the dataset, using the stratified 10 
fold cross-validation. The error rate is usually in percentage. 
The performances of these classifiers were collated statistically against the dataset in 
form of a table. Scores were assigned based on classifiers with the highest AUROC, 
the highest percentage of successful predictions on the cross-validation, the lowest 
CPU testing time, and the lowest mean and relative absolute error rate. Next, the 
classifiers were compared via two-tailed t-test with a 95% confidence level. Table 
6.14 to 6.18 respectively show the accuracy, AUROC, mean absolute error, relative 
absolute error, CPU testing time and the results of the paired t-test with significance 
level 0.05, in which each entry w / t / l means that the model in the corresponding 
row wins in w, ties in t, and loses in l of the dataset, compared to the model in the 
corresponding column.  
 ANN NB C4.5 (J48) 
TAN 0/1/0 1/0/0 1/0/0 
ANN  1/0/0 1/0/0 
NB   0/1/0 
Table 6.14 Comparison of the results of two-tailed t-test on accuracy with 95% 
confidence level 
 ANN NB C4.5 (J48) 
TAN 0/1/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 
ANN  0/1/0 0/1/0 
NB   0/1/0 
Table 6.15 Comparison of the results of two-tailed t-test on AUROC with 95% 
confidence level 
 ANN NB C4.5 (J48) 
TAN 0/1/0 0/0/1 0/0/1 
ANN  0/0/1 0/0/1 
NB   1/0/0 
Table 6.16 Comparison of the results of two-tailed t-test on mean absolute error with 
95% confidence level 
 ANN NB C4.5 (J48) 
TAN 0/1/0 0/0/1 0/0/1 
ANN  0/0/1 0/0/1 
NB   1/0/0 
Table 6.17 Comparison of the results of two-tailed t-test on relative absolute error 
with 95% confidence level 
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 ANN NB C4.5 (J48) 
TAN 0/1/0 0/1/0 0/1/0 
ANN  0/1/0 0/1/0 
NB   0/1/0 
Table 6.18 Comparison of the results of two-tailed t-test on CPU testing time with 
95% confidence level 
The algorithm with the overall best performance across the five measurement 
metrics is assigned the ranking ‘first to last’. If two or more algorithms had the same 
performance across the metrics, they were both given the same ranking.  
Classifiers  PC AUROC Mean 
absolute 
error 
Relative 
absolute 
error 
CPU testing 
time in 
milliseconds  
Classifier 
Ranking 
TAN 72.79(5.95) 0.87(0.18) 0.07(0.01) 38.24(6.81) 0.00(0.01) 1 
ANN 72.76(5.45) 0.82(0.28) 0.05(0.01) 38.71(6.79) 0.00(0.01) 3 
C4.5 66.23(5.76) 0.80(0.27) 0.05(0.01) 60.47(5.75) 0.00(0.00) 2 
NB 65.38(6.41) 0.85(0.23) 0.06(0.01) 49.90(7.19) 0.00(0.00) 4 
Table 6.19 PC, AUROC, Mean absolute error, Relative absolute error, and CPU 
testing time and standard deviation 
The best performing algorithm for each parameter is underlined as shown in Table 
6.19 for easy identification. However, when there are two or more algorithms with 
the same performance, they were both underlined. The experiment findings show 
that the performance of TAN, not only in the classification and the AUROC, but also 
in the relative absolute error and the CPU training time, is overall the best among the 
models.  
After the models were evaluated, the appropriate classifier for our problem domain 
was chosen. In this case the TAN classifier was chosen and used for identifying the 
risk issues inherent in the E-banking system under study, based on its performance 
ranking suitability for the problem domain.  
The next step in the ORA stage is to identify the risks (i.e. identify attribute 
dependencies and parameter values from the network), so as to develop potential risk 
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scenarios, analyse potential risk scenarios, describe the barriers and estimate the cost 
for UOS, and then determine the risk exposure level using a risk scale. However, the 
models used in this experiment are not exhaustive, as the parameters where not tuned 
and default settings were used. 
It is important to note here that an attempt was made towards the use of Adaptive 
Neuro-Fuzzy Inference System (ANFIS) in identifying the E-banking operational 
risks. This idea was later dropped because the ANFIS performance criterion is not 
compatible with other classifiers. It is also implemented on a different platform 
(MATLAB) unlike the other classifiers, which were implemented in WEKA, having 
the same performance assessment criteria.  
6.4.4 The Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes Classifier 
Before delving deeply into the details of the applied TAN classifier, first this section 
will provide a general overview of the processes involved. As mentioned earlier 
Bayesian networks classifiers are inference models that allow for the representation 
of both dependencies and independencies in a given dataset. Bayesian networks 
classifiers can be used as predictive or descriptive classifiers. Within this phase, the 
aim is identify operational risks issues by learning both the structure of the network 
(structure learning) and the set of CPTs (parameter learning) from the customer-
based survey. Thereafter, to describe the causal relationships among risk attribute.  
The starting point of the TAN classifier is to identify the network structure. The 
nodes in the network are in one-to-one correspondence with the variables. Lack of 
possible arc in the network encodes conditional independencies. Secondly, the 
parameters of the network are represented by the probability distribution table 
(CPT)
21
, which define the probability distribution of a node given its parents. The 
CPTs are stored as multidimensional arrays, where the dimensions are arranged in 
the same order as the nodes. Hence the child is always the last dimension as 
discussed in section 5.10.4. If a node has no parents, as in the case with the class 
                                                   
21
 See Appendix F for the graphical interfaces of one of the CPTs and the TAN classifier 
output  
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attribute (E-banking system adopted), then its CPT is a column vector representing 
the prior.  
Next is the construction of the directed acyclic graph for the TAN structure that 
encodes assertions of conditional independence. One of the approaches is based on 
the BN chain rules of probability given in equations (5.3), (5.4), (5.5) and (5.6). 
However, computing the full joint probability grows exponentially with the number 
of variables, thus it will require large space to represent and high computational time 
complexity, but when the independence assumption is respected in the construction 
of the BN, the number of conditional probabilities to be evaluated can be reduced 
substantially as mentioned earlier in section 5.10.4. The TAN graphical network 
structure for the E-banking operational risk issues is shown in Figure 6.15. 
Thus, our TAN structure is determined by ordering the variables from the parent 
node (E-banking system adopted), and determining the variables sets that satisfy 
equation 2.3 for 1, ,i n .  
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Figure 6.15 The E-banking operational risks TAN structure 
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In this research, using the ordering (Esa, Ths, ITs, Sua, Sps, Tp, Phs, MI, IDS, A, Edl, 
Ct, Mt, Thf, Spf, E-Bwu, Ccll, F-Ss, M-Ba, QoS, Vas, E, IF, Sma, and OF), we have 
the conditional independencies 
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   
 
Where 
 Esa – E-banking system adopted 
 Ths – Trojan horses severity 
 ITs – identity theft severity 
 Sua – security upgrade action 
 Sps – spyware attacks severity 
 Tp – two password use only as a key risk indicator 
 Phs – phishing attacks severity 
 MI – monthly income 
 IDS – lack of intrusion detection system as a key risk indicator 
 A – age  
 Edl – education level  
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 Ct – lack of proper customers training as a key risk indicator 
 Mt – money transfer from bank to bank as a key risk indicator 
 Thf – frequency of Trojan horses occurrence  
 Spf – frequency of spyware occurrence  
 E-Bwu – E-banking weekly usage 
 Ccll – customers computer literacy level 
 F-Ss – lack of free or subsidized antivirus software as key risk indicator 
 M-Ba – M-banking agents as a key risk indicator 
 QoS – quality of service as a key risk indicator 
 Vas – virus attacks awareness status 
 E – economy as a key risk indicator 
 IF – insider fraud as key risk indicator 
 Sma – spam-email awareness status 
 OF – outsider fraud as key risk indicator 
Although, using the independence assumption reduces substantially the number of 
conditional probabilities to be evaluated, choosing the variable ordering may fail to 
reveal many conditional independencies among the variables, thus in order to obtain 
the best and fully connected network structure the variable ordering should be 
explored n!.  However, as mentioned earlier exact or approximate inference is 
difficult when the network structure contains many undirected cycles, making the 
inference intractable.  
To overcome these drawbacks, observing causal relationships among variables from 
experts or causal relationships that correspond to assertions of conditional 
dependence can be used as discussed in section 5.10.4. In this research, the interest is 
on learning and describing the causal relationships among the variables.  The causal 
Markov assumption about the causal and probabilistic dependence was used. Given 
the causal Markov condition deployed in learning the TAN structure, we can infer 
causal relationships from conditional independence and conditional dependence 
relationships for the E-banking OR data.  
Inference of the causal relationships from conditional independence and conditional 
dependence relationships for the E-banking OR data presents some interesting 
findings: 
· Twelve risk attributes were seen as the risk issues of interest based on their 
conditional independence: outsider fraud, insider fraud, Phishing attacks 
severity, Identity theft severity, Spyware attack frequency, Trojan horses 
frequency, E-banking weekly usage, computer literacy level, M-banking 
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agents as key risk indicators, virus attack awareness, spam email awareness 
and upgraded E-banking security as a control mechanism, which are directly 
influenced by the type of E-banking system adopted. 
· From the observation of users’ weekly usage, banks aiming to not only 
acquiring new customers, but also retaining existing customers may be 
interested in understanding their customers’ level of education, as weekly 
usage is directly influenced by their level of education. 
For reasons of computational efficiency, simplicity, and validation, the probabilistic 
inference is analysed based on six conditional independences. Now we summarize 
these conditional independences structure as follows: 
Given  
1. Outsider fraud (OF), the independence structure is seen in the network as 
 
| , , , , , , , , , , , ,
| ,
, , , , , , , , , , ,
OF E QoS F Ss Ct IDS Tp Ths Esa ITs Sua Sps Phs
p p OF Esa E
MI A Edl Mt Thf Spf E Bwu Ccll M Ba Vas IF Sma
 
 
  
This means that E and Esa influences directly OF, while QoS influences OF 
indirectly through E.  
2. Insider fraud (IF), the independence structure is seen in the network as  
 
| , , , , , , , , , , , ,
| ,
, , , , , , , , , ,
IF QoS F Ss Ct IDS Tp Ths Esa ITs Sua Sps Phs MI
p p IF Esa QoS
A Edl Mt Thf Spf E Bwu Ccll M Ba Vas E Sma
 
 
  
This means that QoS and Esa influences directly IF, while F-Ss influences IF 
indirectly through QoS.  
3. Phishing attack severity (Phs), the independence structure is seen in the network 
as  
   | , , , , , , , | ,p Phs Sps Ths Esa ITs Sua Tp Phs IDS p Phs Esa Sps  
This means that Sps and Esa influences directly Phs, while Ths influences Phs 
indirectly through Sps. 
4. Identity theft severity (ITs), the independence structure is seen in the network as  
   | , , , , | ,p ITs Ths Esa Sua Sps Tp p ITs Esa Ths  
This means that Esa and Ths influences directly ITs. 
5. Spyware attack frequency (Spf), the independence structure is seen in the 
network as  
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 
| , , , , , , , , , ,
| ,
, , , , , , ,
Spf A MI Sps Ths Esa ITs Sua Tp Phs IDS
p p Spf Esa A
Edl Ct Mt Thf E Bwu Ccll F Ss M Ba
 
 
   
 
6. Trojan horses attack frequency (Thf), the independence structure is seen in the 
network as 
 
| , , , , , , , , , ,
| ,
, , , , , , ,
Thf A MI Sps Ths Esa ITs Sua Tp Phs IDS
p p Thf Esa A
Edl Ct Mt Spf E Bwu Ccll F Ss M Ba
 
 
   
 
This means that both Spf and Thf are directly influenced by customers age and Esa. 
Also they are both indirectly influenced through MI. 
Using Bayes’ rule, the posterior probability and probabilistic inference on any of the 
given risks identified above, can be computed based on observed evidence. However 
in this research the interest is on identifying the OR issues for further risk 
assessment, thus these factors are structured into a questionnaire for validation and 
risk exposure level determination for the system under study.  
Based on the results reported so far, the indication is that types of E-banking system 
adopted by the customers, influences their various risk experiences and severity level 
of attacks. In more detail, Table 6.20 lists the identified conditional independent risks 
and risk factors associated with the E-banking system.  
Identified risk attribute Conditional independence structure based on TAN classifier 
Direct influence Indirect influence 
Insider fraud 
Quality of service 
 
Free or subsidized anti-virus 
software 
E-banking type adopted 
Outsider fraud 
Economy Quality of service 
E-banking type adopted 
Phishing attacks severity 
Spyware severity Trojan horses  
E-banking type adopted 
Identity theft severity 
Trojan horses severity  
E-banking type adopted 
Spyware attack frequency 
Customers age  Monthly income 
E-banking type adopted 
Trojan horses frequency 
Customers age  Monthly income  
E-banking type adopted 
Table 6.20 TAN conditional independence structure for each operational risk 
attribute   
From this table, the direct factors and indirect factors affecting E-banking system can 
be identified. These operational risks attributes are then deployed in the third phase 
and discussed in the following section.  
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6.5 Phase 3: The Proposed Fuzzy Inference 
System for ORA  
In many risk assessment problems, information about the probabilities of various risk 
items is vaguely known or assessed. In this experimental phase, the focus is on 
computing the risk exposure level inherent in the E-banking system, using the 
framework and measurement metrics defined in sections 4.6.1 and 4.7 and thus 
satisfying step 2 of the ORA steps presented in Figure 4.1. Pending the preparation 
of the risk assessment, knowledgeable experts in the problem domain were asked to 
quantitatively provide input values, based on the six factors defined in the ORA 
framework presented in section 4.6.1, and the operational risks identified in phase 2 
of our experimental analysis of the TAN classification algorithm. Each risk factor 
identified were aggregated and used as one of the main input (frequency of triggering 
events) in the ORA framework. Then the aggregated score for frequency of 
triggering events occurrence and the remaining five ORA factors were calculated as 
the average of the values of the related metrics using equation (4.2).  
Finally, and similarly to the FIS designed in phase 1, the overall risk exposure level 
scores were computed along the proposed ORA framework, the measurement 
metrics, and the quantitative values obtained from each instances in the bank 
officers-based survey, a based upon the four security events (account compromise, 
confidentiality, integrity and availability). MATLAB Fuzzy Logic development 
toolbox was used for the ORA implementation. In the next section and the rest of the 
chapter, detailed implementation of the data collected is presented. 
6.5.1 Fuzzy Inference System for E-banking Operational 
Risk Analysis 
In order to assess the E-banking system risk exposures, Fuzzy Inference System 
technique was used to process the system operational risks. To build the application, 
MATLAB Fuzzy Logic Toolbox Release 2011a was used as the standard tool for 
measuring the risk exposure level. As discussed previously in section 5.10.5 
Mamdani-style inference is one of the unique techniques to capture expert 
knowledge in fuzzy rules and to effectively optimize and adapt other techniques. In 
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this phase, the Mamdani style was adopted for inference. Figure 6.16 shows the 
fuzzy model for the E-banking OR assessment implementation. 
Fuzzifier
Fuzzy 
inference
Rule 
Aggregation
Defuzzifier 
Risk exposure levelOutput 
Inputs (TErp, FAuos, 
Fuos, Frro, Ecuos, Sro, 
Reli)
Fuzzy inputs
Figure 6.16 E-banking operational risks assessment model  
In building the FIS, the typical process includes four basic steps: fuzzification of the 
input variables, rule evaluation, aggregation of the rule outputs, and defuzzification.  
Step 1: Risk Fuzzification  
The Trapezoidal membership function was used for the fuzzy sets across the six 
ORA factors. Let the frequency (likelihood) of triggering events be defined by the 
trapezoidal number TrFNx,  the likelihood (probability) of failure of controls to avoid 
UOS be defined by the trapezoidal fuzzy number TrFNa, the likelihood (probability) 
of failure to recover before risk outcome be defined by the trapezoidal fuzzy number 
TrFNb, the frequency (likelihood) of UOS occurrence be defined by TrFNc, the 
estimated cost of UOS be defined by the trapezoidal number TrFNd, and the severity 
(consequence) of risk outcome be defined by the trapezoidal number TrFNe. Table 
6.21 describes a 3-grade scale for x, a, b, c, d, and e.  
Let the resulting risk exposure class be defined by the 3-grade scale TrFNL, described 
in Table 6.22. The six inputs are fuzzified via Trapezoidal membership functions 
whose parameters are defined in Table 6.21, while the output defined in Table 6.22, 
provides a single number corresponding to the inputs and rules. 
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S 
/ 
N 
Qualitative 
scale for Fte 
Qualitative 
scale for 
FAuos 
Qualitative 
scale for Fuos 
Qualitative 
scale for 
Frro 
Qualitative 
scale for 
ECuos 
Qualitative 
scale for 
Sro 
Trapezoidal 
fuzzy 
numbers  
1 Very rarely Very rarely Very rarely Very rarely  Very low Not at all 
severe 
[0, 0, 0.2, 
0.4] 
2 Occasionally  Sometimes  Occasionally  Sometimes  Medium  Moderately 
severe 
[0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 
0.7] 
3 Very 
frequently  
Practically 
always 
Very 
frequently  
Practically 
always 
Very high  Extremely 
severe 
[0.6, 
0.9,1.0,1.0] 
Table 6.21 Linguistic definitions of risk calculation factors using TrFNx, TrFNa, TrFNb, 
TrFNc, TrFNd, and TrFNe 
 
S/N Qualitative scale for Rel Trapezoidal fuzzy numbers (TrFNL) 
1 Very low [0, 0, 0.2, 0.4] 
2 Medium  [0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.7] 
3 Very high [0.6, 0.9,1.0,1.0] 
Table 6.22 Linguistic definitions of risk calculation factors using TrFNL 
The trapezoidal membership function was used for logical consistency and simplicity 
of computation and also because it can provide an adequate representation of the 
expert knowledge. Sufficient overlap is maintained in adjacent fuzzy sets to enable a 
smooth response of the FIS
22
.  
Step 2: Fuzzy Rules 
Having specified the risks assessment factors and membership functions, the next 
step is to specify how the E-banking OR probability varies. Experts often provide 
fuzzy rules in the form of if…then statements that relate E-banking OR probability 
to various key risk indicators / factors based on their knowledge and experience. In 
this research, it was practically impossible for the bank executives to provide the 
rules. As a result, the rules were defined by the researcher. The set of all possible 
combinations of the linguistic values assigned to the premises represent an 
exhaustive set of fuzzy rules, which contained 729 rules according to equation (5.28), 
using the three fuzzy numbers in Tables 6.21 and 6.22.  
                                                   
22
 See Appendix G for the graphical membership functions 
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The fuzzy system consist of 6 inputs variables each with three possible states, is 
therefore characterized by 3
6
 = 729 rules. As discussed in 5.10.5, the challenge here 
is on how to balance the need for analytical resolution with simplicity, which thus 
requires a trade-off between the number of input states for each linguistic variable in 
a FIS and the risk analysts’ tolerance for precision. Fuzzy logic operators discussed 
in equations (5.13) and (5.15) were used in the rule evaluation, because they allow 
assessing propositions with respect to the fuzzy sets. Existence of these fuzzy logic 
operators allow us to develop and evaluate fuzzy inference rules, which are the rules 
for deriving truths from stated or proven truths in our problem domain. Table 6.23 
illustrates the specific fuzzy logic operators used for the ORA FIS. 
S/N Fuzzy Operator Operator  
1 AND min 
2 OR max 
3 Implication min 
4 Aggregation  max 
5 Defuzzification  centroid 
Table 6.23 Fuzzy logic operator of the E-banking ORA FIS 
Below are some of the rules derived from the six inputs and one output FIS. 
1 IF frequency of triggering OR events is very frequently AND Barriers to 
prevent UOS is sometimes AND frequency of UOS occurrence is 
occasionally AND Barriers to recover before UOS occurrence is very rarely 
AND Estimated cost of UOS is very high AND Severity of risk outcome is 
extremely severe THEN Risk exposure level is very high 
2 IF frequency of triggering OR events is very frequently AND Barriers to 
prevent UOS is practically always AND frequency of UOS occurrence is very 
frequently AND Barriers to recover before UOS occurrence is practically 
always AND Estimated cost of UOS is very high AND Severity of risk 
outcome is extremely severe THEN Risk exposure level is very high 
Step 3 and 4: Risk Aggregation and Defuzzification 
In the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox, all rules have a default weight of (1.0), but the user can 
reduce the force of any rule by adjusting its weight. However, in this research the 
default weight is adopted for simplicity. The clipping method described in section 
5.10.5 was used in aggregating the consequences, and the aggregated surface of the 
rule evaluation is defuzzified using Mamdani type FIS to find the Centre of Gravity. 
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Centroid defuzzification technique shown in equation (5.17) was used. The centroid 
defuzzification technique is calculated as the weighted average of the output fuzzy 
region and corresponds to the point in the x-axis which divides the output fuzzy 
region into two equal subareas. This technique was used because it is a well-balanced 
and consistent approach, it is sensitive to the height and width of the total fuzzy 
region and due the smooth changes in the expected value of the output across 
observations as mentioned earlier in phase 1 FIS development. This technique was 
also chosen because it selects a value that is supported by the knowledge 
accumulated from each executed proposition, a manner similar to Bayesian estimate. 
Moreover, it is the widely used method. The experimental finding of the FIS will be 
presented next. 
6.5.2 The Operational Risk Exposure Level Calculated  
To examine the operational risk exposure level and security level of the E-banking 
system, the bank executives (i.e. the domain experts) were asked to give numbers 
between 1 and 10, under 100,000k and 1,000,000k and above, which represents the 
frequency of triggering events, failure of avoidance control, failure of recovery 
control, frequency of UOS, cost of UOS occurrence and severity of risk occurrence 
based on the proposed measurement metrics in Tables 4.1 to 4.6. 
These crisp values obtained from the domain expert judgment were then fuzzified 
against the defined and appropriate linguistic fuzzy sets. The crisp inputs dataset 
rated by the experts for the six factors TErp, FAuos, Fous, Frro, ECuos, Sro on the four 
security events are presented in Tables 6.24 to 6.27. The defuzzification results for 
each instance, is a crisp output value, which is also the risk exposure level (Reli) as 
shown in the last column of Tables 6.24 to 6.27.  
In order to determine that our fuzzy system meets the requirements specified at the 
beginning and has the best performance, evaluation and tuning of the FIS was carried 
on the dataset. However, the initial complex system has on average an operational 
risk exposure level of about 85.1% when all six inputs (TErp, FAuos, Fous, Frro, ECuos, 
Sro) are on the average. The results of the three dimensional surface plots, the 
membership function plots and the inference rules of the proposed ORA fuzzy 
system are presented in Appendix G.  
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Calculating the risk exposure level associated with account compromise, loss of data 
integrity, loss of availability and loss of confidentiality using equation (4.2) can now 
be extended to compute the aggregated risk exposure level for instances in the 
dataset as: 
1
Re
Re  = ,
  instances
i
n
x
i
x
l
l
Number of


 
No of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of Account Compromise 
TErp FAuos Fuos Frro ECuos Sro Reli 
1 6.67 2 5 2 750,000 - 1,000,000 2 0.383 
2 6.33 8 5 5 750,000 - 1,000,000 5 0.506 
3 5.83 9 9 8 250,000 - 749,999 8 0.823 
4 7.25 1 1 2 under 100,000 3 0.184 
5 8.08 2 8 1 under 100,000 2 0.165 
6 6.25 2 5 1 100,000 - 249,999 4 0.771 
7 7.42 4 7 0 100,000 - 249,999 4 0.505 
8 4.42 7 8 6 250,000 - 749,999 9 0.809 
9 6.17 2 4 4 250,000 - 749,999 10 0.215 
10 4.83 0 4 0 250,000 - 749,999 0 0.507 
Table 6.24 Dataset based on account compromise 
                                                  
0.383 0.506 0.823 0.184 0.165 0.771 0.505 0.809 0.215 0.809 0.215 0.507
Re
10
acl
          
  
= 0.4868 * 100  
= 48.68% risk exposure level of account compromise 
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No of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of Loss of Data Integrity 
TErp FAuos Fuos Frro ECuos Sro Reli 
1 6.67 2 1 1 under 100,000 2 0.394 
2 6.33 9 3 7 100,000 - 249,999 4 0.505 
3 5.83 9 9 5 100,000 - 249,999 9 0.823 
4 7.25 1 1 1 under 100,000 2 0.184 
5 8.08 2 5 1 under 100,000 1 0.163 
6 6.25 2 5 1 100,000 - 249,999 4 0.771 
7 7.42 3 6 4 100,000 - 249,999 5 0.742 
8 4.42 6 5 7 750,000 - 1,000,000 9 0.191 
9 6.17 6 5 9 100,000 - 249,999 8 0.252 
10 4.83 0 2 0 100,000 - 249,999 0 0.506 
Table 6.25 Dataset based on loss of data integrity 
0.394 0.505 0.823 0.184 0.163 0.771 0.742 0.191 0.252 0.506 
Re  = 
10
dil
        
 
 = 4.531  
 = 0.4531 * 100 
 = 45.31% risk exposure level of loss to data integrity  
No of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of Loss of Availability 
TErp FAuos Fuos Frro ECuos Sro Reli 
1 6.67 2 3 1 100,000 - 249,999 2 0.394 
2 6.33 3 5 8 under 100,000 5 0.757 
3 5.83 3 4 4 under 100,000 3 0.506 
4 7.25 1 1 2 under 100,000 2 0.184 
5 8.08 1 3 1 under 100,000 1 0.177 
6 6.25 2 5 2 100,000 - 249,999 3 0.468 
7 7.42 3 6 3 250,000 - 749,999 5 0.505 
8 4.42 6 5 6 750,000 - 1,000,000 8 0.165 
9 6.17 4 7 9 750,000 - 1,000,000 6 0.505 
10 4.83 0 8 0 100,000 - 249,999 0 0.506 
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Table 6.26 Dataset based on loss of availability 
0.394 0.757 0.506 0.184 0.177 0.468 0.505 0.165 0.505 0.506
Re  = 
10
lal
        
 
 = 4.167 
 = 0.4167 * 100 
 = 41.67% risk exposure level of loss to availability 
 No 
of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of Loss of Confidentiality 
TErp FAuos Fuos Frro ECuos Sro Reli 
1 6.67 1 4 1 250,000 - 749,999 3 0.394 
2 6.33 7 9 1 250,000 - 749,999 5 0.505 
3 5.83 3 9 1 100,000 - 249,999 5 0.823 
4 7.25 1 1 1 under 100,000 3 0.184 
5 8.08 1 1 1 under 100,000 1 0.163 
6 6.25 2 5 2 100,000 - 249,999 4 0.771 
7 7.42 3 6 3 under 100,000 5 0.505 
8 4.42 7 7 6 250,000 - 749,999 9 0.809 
9 6.17 8 3 10+ 100,000 - 249,999 10+ 0.823 
10 4.83 0 2 0 250,000 - 749,999 0 0.505 
Table 6.27 Dataset based on loss of confidentiality 
0.394 0.505 0.823 0.184 0.163 0.771 0.505 0.809 0.823 0.505
Re  = 
10
cl
        
 
 = 5.482  
 = 0.5482 *100 
 = 54.82% risk exposure level of loss to confidentiality  
Now to calculate the overall operational risk exposure level for the E-banking system 
using equation 4.6 is: 
te
1Re  = 
  
n
uos uos rr uos ro
i
RP
F FA F F EC S
l
Number of risks

    
 
 = 0.4868 + 0.4531 + 0.4167 + 0.5482 / 4 
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 = 0.4762 *100 
 = 47.62% operational risk exposure level associated with the E-banking 
system. 
The overall operational risk exposure level for the FIS with six inputs and one output 
factors is about 48%. In addition, using the risk exposure level scale defined in Table 
4.6, the OR inherent in the Nigerian E-banking system is classified as “medium risk” 
with a degree of 0.48 in approximation.  
Although, our FIS with six inputs and one output factor works well, we want to 
compare the performance with the classical methodologies used for calculating risk, 
which uses the classical risk formula i.e. severity x likelihood (frequency) to create a 
two dimensional matrix, that guides the risk tolerability judgement. Specifically our 
experiment is compared with the NIST SP-800-30 revision 1 risk assessment 
methodology described in section 3.2.  
   
6.5.3 Comparing the Performance of the Proposed ORA 
Framework with Classical Risk Assessment 
Methodologies 
Although, the proposed fuzzy system with six inputs and one output works well, it 
was considered necessary to test its performance with the classical risk assessment 
methodologies and frameworks discussed throughout chapter 3, specifically the 
NIST SP-800-30 revision 1 risk assessment methodology, in order to validate the 
research methodology and to satisfy one of the research objectives. The two Fuzzy 
Inference Systems presents some interesting findings
23
: 
 On average the risk exposure level of our initial FIS (six inputs factors), 
without the expert specified input data is 85.1%, while the classical risk assessment 
FIS (two inputs factors) is 50.2%.  
                                                   
23
 See Appendix H for the two inputs and one output computation and also the initial FIS 
implementation 
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 Calculating the overall risk exposure level using our proposed ORA approach 
gave a value of 47.62%, while the classical ORA approach gave an overall risk 
exposure value of 41.03% for when expert specified inputs were applied.  
 Based on the security events for the proposed six inputs FIS, the risk to 
account compromise = 48.68%, data integrity = 45.31%, availability = 41.67% and 
confidentiality = 54.82% respectively. While based on the security event for the 
classical two inputs, the risk to account compromise = 40.59%, data integrity = 
46.89%, availability = 36.02% and confidentiality = 40.61% respectively. These 
results indicate that the proposed ORA framework with six factors compared with 
the classical two factors has a higher operational risk exposure level of 6.59%. 
 Suppose the risk-level scales proposed in section 4.6.5 and the risk-level scale 
recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (2011) are 
applied to both ORA fuzzy systems, the overall operational risk exposures inherent 
in the Nigerian E-banking system, will be classified as “medium risk” for our 
proposed ORA process as well as the classical ORA process with a percentage of 
47.62 and the 41.03 respectively; as both values lies between 50 and 35 = medium 
risk. 
These results are however best presented as surface plots. The next figure shows our 
proposed FIS operational risk exposure level as a combination of frequency of 
triggering events and severity of risk outcome, where the remaining ORA factors are 
held constant. Figure 6.18 shows the classical FIS operational risk exposure level as 
a combination of frequency of triggering events and severity of risk outcome. 
 
Figure 6.17 Proposed six inputs FIS operational risk exposure levels as a 
combination of frequency of triggering events and severity of risk outcome 
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Figure 6.18 Classical two inputs FIS operational risk exposure levels as a 
combination of frequency of triggering events and severity of risk outcome 
 
Comparing Figures 6.17 and 6.18 helps in distinguishing the different effects of 
changes other input factors will have on the operational risk exposure level 
determination according to the expert’s knowledge. Because the slope or contour of 
the operational risk exposure level indicator with respect to the six input factors is 
greater than the slope or contour with respect to the classical two input factors. It 
may be asserted that effectiveness of controls to either prevent or recover before the 
risk outcome helps in defining clearly the overall risk exposure.   
In addition, the classical risk assessment approach even though indicated lower risk 
exposure level for the fuzzy system, it is however not clear in the assessment the 
effectiveness of controls in place to either prevent or recover before risk outcome. 
Moreover, when controls in place are considered, it can be perceived immediately 
the effectiveness of control mechanisms in place and how it may affect the overall 
risk exposure level. With the ever changing and open nature of the Internet and E-
banking systems environment, it is difficult or impractical to identify all system 
threats and vulnerabilities for assessment. Further, human activities and objectives 
are unpredictable, thus human factors in risk assessment may render this classical 
approach ineffective. Consequently, it can be stated that using the proposed ORA 
framework could give a good indication of the ORA in an E-banking context, which 
could be very useful for E-banking system developers, adopters, and risk analysts.  
Regarding the automated approach, the number of possible states increases, so is the 
required number of inference rules, the challenge is therefore on how to balance the 
need for analytical resolution with simplicity, as a result a trade-off between the 
number of input states for each linguistic variable in a FIS and the risk analysts’ 
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tolerance for precision is required. Thus the FIS is unlike the classical approach that 
uses either a 3 x 3 or 5 x 5 matrixes in determining the resulting risks class, which 
makes calculation relatively easy.  
Nevertheless, it is possible to see from the FIS that there is space to improve the 
automated approach for a number of fuzzy membership functions such that, it can 
help to represent more effectively the human-like expressions and uncertainty. It is 
believed that these improvements should be made mainly in the definition of the 
membership function and rule evaluations. This is because a major influence is seen 
including the effectiveness of risk controls. It is also believed that no system is 
immune to risk or is risk free and therefore considering the frequency of UOS, rather 
than an entire Asset is an effective measurement approach. 
It is possible to conclude that the results of the conducted case study reveals that our 
proposed model for ORA in an E-banking context could be used as an overall risk 
assessment indicator. Although, the automated approach could give good results, it 
could be improved to mimic the bankers’, analyst and auditors viewpoints.  
Indeed, there should be more experiments to determine and highlight which parts of 
the defined measurement metrics are responsible for the existence of differences. 
6.6 Risk Evaluation 
Despite measuring the operational risk exposure levels, a major objective of this 
research is to identify the overall process of assessing risk. As a result the next stage 
of the ORA methodology was to evaluate the risk as defined in the fourth and 
seventh step of the ORA methodology and framework respectively. However, in this 
experiment it was not possible to compare the obtained overall risk exposure level 
with the defined organization risk criteria, to make decisions on the need to treat, 
monitor and review risk, using the costs and benefits of implementing improved 
controls as discussed in section 4.6.5, in order to determine the significance of the 
level, type of risks and make security prediction.  
This is due to the difficulty of acquiring more information from the bank executives, 
as they rejected the idea of partaking in further surveys or focus group interviews, 
due to ethical issues. However, the process of determining the security level within 
an organization in a real life implementation, will not affect the performance of the 
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proposed FIS, as the output obtained from the risk exposure level identification 
stage, serves as an input factor to the risk evaluation process. Thus, conclusions on 
the ORA process is based on the risk exposure levels inherent in the Nigerian 
banking industries. 
6.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of TAN and FIS 
The TAN classifier is considered the best solution to overcome the over sensitivity 
problem of Decision trees, the ANN inability to interact with conventional databases 
and explain how conclusions were reached, the FIS heavy reliance on human experts 
in building the fuzzy rules and lack of automatic learning capability in a new data 
instance and external environment,  and the high computational complexity problem 
of learning a general BN structure, especially in its ability to perform well when 
there are undirected cycles and extremely huge number of possible structures in the 
BN structure.  
Applying the FIS on the six risk factors proposed in the ORA framework in section 
4.6.1, reveals clearly the effectiveness of controls in place, unlike the hidden and 
vague application of the controls effectiveness computation of the classical risk 
assessment approach.  
However, both TAN and FIS approaches have experienced two main limitations: 
firstly, the number of possible states (structure) increases and also the required 
number of inference. The challenge is therefore on how to balance the need for 
analytical resolution with simplicity, as a result a trade-off between the number of 
input states for each variable in a FIS or TAN classifier and the risk analysts’ 
tolerance for precision is required. 
Secondly, the developed TAN and FIS approaches, which generate causal 
relationships and make human-like predictions can have some high variance, due to 
error in the probability estimation and if the inputs are over fitted, which could then 
lead to obtaining local optimal results.  
6.8 Summary  
In order to evaluate, compare and determine the risk exposure level inherent in the E-
banking system, 12 risk attributes were identified and six factors were specified 
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within the proposed ORA framework. Associated metrics and measurement metrics 
were then identified and defined. In this chapter, a case study was carried out as a 
feasibility test for the proposed ORA framework and the defined measurement 
approach. 
To complete this experiment it was necessary to go through three basic phases as 
shown in Figure 6.1. First a secondary data analysis was carried out using a FIS 
technique, to determining the most important factors for Internet banking adoption 
and their adoption rate. Based on the literature reviewed, this phase revealed that 
Internet banking adoption is dependent not only on technological and economic 
factors, but also on local and cultural parameters. The overall concern was not only 
acquiring new customers, but also retaining them, as bank-specific factors are largely 
the main drivers for Internet banking adoption vis-à-vis E-banking systems. The 
results obtained, helped to clarify the significance of adopting the E-banking system. 
It revealed the importance of security as the main issues for concern. This phase also 
helped to clarify the significance of choosing E-banking operational risk assessment 
as the research area of interest and helped to establish the scope of the assessment 
effort.  
Following this, in the second phase of our experiment, an end users’ perspective 
survey was conducted to determine the key operational risks / issues in the E-banking 
systems. Through this survey, E-banking customers were asked to qualitatively rate 
the frequency and severity of risk experiences within a 12 month period. They were 
also asked to identify their risk awareness status based on some identified risk 
factors. In addition, E-banking customers were asked to rate how well they agree 
with some identified E-banking system KRIs. Based on the original survey data, this 
phase of the experiment showed that ATM system is widely adopted by E-banking 
system adopters and of which majority of the respondents are holding bachelor’s 
degree. The survey also revealed that gender related differences were not significant 
enough to be taken into account in the overall factor analysis.  
Within this 2
nd
 phase, reliability test was conducted on the dataset to check the 
measure of questionnaire for consistency in what it is measuring. Some attributes 
however gave values below accepted Cronbach’s alpha value as a result they were 
deleted from the analysis. A factor analysis approach was then used as a means of 
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reducing and checking the dimensionality of the data set. Finally, a TAN classifier 
was used to identify some risk issues inherent in the Nigerian E-banking systems. 
The causal relationship capability of BN is widely responsible for why it is a more 
suitable approach for the E-banking risk identification as against expert systems.  
The proposed TAN network structure initially consisted of twelve conditional 
independences. These risk attributes were then arranged in a questionnaire format to 
further assess the E-banking risks exposure level and validate the proposed risk 
assessment framework from the banks’ viewpoint. 
In the third phase, a quantitative survey targeted at senior executives of the two 
banks under study was carried out, to determine quantitatively the frequency of risks 
identified during the data analysis of the customer-based survey. Through this survey 
the magnitude of risk occurrences and effectiveness of controls (barriers) to either 
prevent or recover before the risk outcome was also determined. The non-adversarial 
frequency of the undesirable operational security events described in terms of 
account compromise, loss of data integrity, loss of availability, and loss of 
confidentiality was also explored. The bank executives were also asked to provide 
approximate cost for such undesirable operational security events and their impact 
based upon consideration on existing control effectiveness. 
The model was implemented with identified risk factors in phase 2 and evaluated 
using a FIS technique, to determine the overall risk exposure level within the 
identified measurement metrics. Finally, a comparison was made between the results 
from the proposed ORA framework and the classical risk assessment methodology. 
Although, results and findings from the case study are limited by the relatively small 
sample size, the lack of data based on organization’s risk criteria, cost / benefit 
analysis, and the fact that the study only considered two commercial banks, it 
however provides an initial exploratory idea about the feasibility of our proposed 
ORA measurement approach and this can be used to draw conclusions. In fact, the 
comparison results indicate that our proposed methodology, framework and 
measurement metrics could give a good indication about risk exposure level in E-
banking systems.  
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
E-banking system has progressed from the simple informational delivery channel to a 
more detailed transactional delivery channel. However, E-banking has increased and 
modified some of the traditional banking risks as mentioned earlier in chapter 1. In 
particular, operational risk is certainly heightened by the technological complexity of 
E-banking activities and its environment. Majority of frameworks, models, and 
methodologies developed for calculating OR has been the use of the classical risk 
formula i.e. severity x likelihood to create a two dimensional matrix that guides the 
risk tolerability judgement. Consequently, new methods have to be proposed in order 
to identify triggering events and frequency of occurrences (which include threats, 
vulnerabilities and other attributes), the effectiveness of both preventive and 
detective controls, as well as the impact of risk that the event carries as it occurs. 
7.1 Research Contributions 
The research in this thesis mainly focused on improving existing approaches and 
studying new proposals for risk assessment methodology, framework, and tools and 
techniques particularly in the context of E-banking operational risk. Although, there 
are several studies which have attempted to assess E-banking operational risk, these 
studies differ from the work presented in this thesis in two aspects: 
· The nature and process of assessing E-banking operational risk are different 
in terms of that, just (severity and likelihood) risk factors / attributes is used 
in computing risk exposure levels. In contrast, the study in this thesis 
calculate the risk exposure level using six risk assessment factors / attributes: 
frequency of triggering event, effectiveness of avoidance barriers, frequency 
of undesirable operational state, effectiveness of recovery barriers before the 
risk outcome, approximate cost for undesirable operational state occurrence, 
and severity of the risk outcome.  
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· To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no reported work which uses 
soft computing tools in assessing internally E-banking operational risk. All 
previous studies analysed results by using a single risk assessment tool or 
technique. This research presents a novel contribution because it proposed a 
solution to the problem resulting from an absence of consensus regarding 
evaluation, tools and techniques for measuring E-banking operational risks. 
This research suggested the use of soft computing tools (such as TAN and 
FIS) to automate the risk analysis process, in order to deliver certain and 
accurate quality assessment and effective risk management decisions, and 
also to reduce the level of effort and time spent.  
In the first phase of this thesis, a new risk assessment methodology and framework, 
to identify operational risks exposure level inherent in the E-banking system, which 
is represented in four different contexts areas: system characterization / asset 
identification, risk identification, dataset analysis and risk evaluation was proposed. 
A Fuzzy Inference System was then implemented to establish the context area of the 
research study, as well as to identify the “adoption rate” for Internet banking systems 
across six chosen countries. Some interesting results from the FIS are shown, 
accompanied by 3D surface plots
24
 as presented in appendix D. Original result of the 
work on this subject has been published in (Ochuko et al., 2009). 
The second phase of the research in this thesis that was presented in section 6.4 is 
concerned with satisfying the 2
nd
 steps of the proposed risk assessment process 
described in section 4.5 and by identifying key operational risks and calculating the 
risk exposure level inherent in the E-banking system. The operational risks 
identification process was carried out by applying the TAN classifier, where all 
potential risks, risk scenarios, and other domain knowledge related to the context 
area were collected and listed in customer-based questionnaire. The novelty of the 
TAN classifier lies in learning maximum spanning tree from attributes, but retaining 
Naïve Bayes model as part of its structure based on conditional mutual distribution. 
Therefore having an acceptable computational complexity and a considerable 
improvement over the simplest Naïve Bayes and the general BN. Original work on 
this subject has been published in (Ochuko et al., 2012).  
                                                   
24
 A 3D surface plot is used to visualize the dependency of the output on any one or two of 
the inputs that is, it generates and plots an output surface map for the Internet banking 
adoption system. 
 222 
 
The final phase of the research in this thesis, which was presented in section 6.5, 
addresses the 3
rd
 step of the proposed risk assessment process described in section 
4.5, and is related to determining the risk exposure level inherent in the system. The 
implementation was applied on the quantitative survey data collected from the bank 
officers of the two under studied commercial banks in Nigeria using a FIS to 
calculating the risk exposure level. Regarding the automated approach, fuzzy logic 
provides a language with syntax and semantics to translate qualitative human 
knowledge into numerical reasoning.  
Overall the aims and objectives of the thesis involves determining risk measurement 
metrics, methodology, framework, tools and techniques to determining the risk 
exposure level, which will further serve as input to evaluating the risks and thus help 
the organization in developing their risk strategy as well as compute their capital 
requirement for such risk exposures.  
7.2 Research Limitations 
Although, this research presented promising and positive results, the research 
however has some limitations that are discussed below:  
· Despite the size of the datasets the proposed risk assessment methods were 
limited to the number of instances in the dataset. This limitation was due to 
ethical issues (data protection and privacy policy), where the author had 
difficulty in acquiring detailed financial information from the banking 
industries. This made the extraction of all relevant attributes and risk factors 
difficult and may have produced inadequate results. Especially in the 
evaluation of risk specified in step 4 of the risk assessment process. 
· The cultural issues of both E-banking end users and bank executive 
unwillingness to participate in surveys also made it difficult to use more 
rigorous data collection approaches such as: focus groups to obtain quick, 
low cost and high volume data. 
· One result of time constraints was that well-known soft computing tools were 
used to calculate the causal relationships among operational risk attributes 
and to determine operational risk exposure level by defaults, instead of 
building a new algorithms or tuning parameters to achieve optimal solutions. 
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· The soft computing tools were also implemented on well-known 
commercially available toolboxes, instead of building the applications using 
new toolboxes and programming languages such as Java, C++ and so on. 
Those limitations indeed affected the performance and automation of the 
ORA process. 
· Once again, as a result of time limitations and unwillingness of banking 
industries participation in surveys, only two commercial banks were used in 
this research. 
7.3 Recommendations for Future Work 
Further to the work reported in this research, several advances could be suggested for 
further research and development. Possible further research to include 
· Missing information due to privacy issues and data protection acts will need 
to be factored into studies which analyse information from the banking 
industries. This information may have a major effect on the E-banking 
operational risk exposure levels. 
· Implement the 4th step of the ORA process presented in chapter 4. Note that 
extra ethical approval may be required to allow banks reveal details of their 
risk criteria defined during context establishment and the organization risk 
strategy. 
· Updating of the proposed operational risk assessment framework and 
methodology continually, by examining newly published literature to 
discover any new risk assessment factors or attributes.  
· Comprehensive banks comparison study be undertaken in order to generalise 
the findings. The suggestion is also that adopters and non-adopters of E-
banking could be investigated to detail issues with technological 
advancement in the case study.  
· The feasibility test for the proposed operational risk assessment framework 
and the defined measurement approach within this thesis is based on a single 
case study. Enlarged sample size and case studies are suggested in order to 
determine and highlight which parts of the defined measurement metrics are 
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responsible for the existence of differences and high or low risk 
classification.  
· Although, the applied soft computing tools and toolboxes gave good results, 
building a new one for risk calculation should be considered for future work. 
· Another suggested future work, would involve applying the defined ORA 
process for a whole dynamic E-banking systems and to operational risks in 
the organization as a whole. It could also be tailored to a specific risk domain 
such as asset driven risk (e.g. Modem, FTP), vulnerability driven risk (e.g. 
two password authentication only), threat and threat agent driven risk, or 
processes (e.g. loan application process, account opening processes, 
authentication and authorization processes), system adoption process, as 
mentioned earlier. 
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                              (a)                                                                                               
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
    (d) 
The surface viewer of the FIS with five inputs: 
a) Secure Internet Server and Literacy Level; 
b) Secure Internet Server and Government 
Prioritization; c) Secure Internet Server and 
Internet Users; d) Secure Internet Server and 
Competition [Internet Service Provider] 
 
(a) 
(b) 
  
(c)                                                                                      
(d) 
The surface viewer of the FIS with two inputs: 
a) Secure Internet Server and Literacy Level; 
b) Secure Internet Server and Government 
Prioritization; c) Secure Internet Server and 
Internet Users; d) Secure Internet Server and 
Competition [Internet Service Provider]
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Severity vs. barriers to prevent UOS  
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Severity vs. estimated cost of UOS 
 
 
 
 
The five inputs rule viewer
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The two inputs membership functions 
 
 
The two inputs rule viewer 
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No of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of 
Account Compromise 
TErp Sro Reli 
1 6.67 2 0.36 
2 6.33 5 0.501 
3 5.83 8 0.5 
4 7.25 3 0.184 
5 8.08 2 0.163 
6 6.25 4 0.502 
7 7.42 4 0.505 
8 4.42 9 0.5 
9 6.17 10 0.5 
10 4.83 0 0.344 
 
No of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of 
Loss of Data Integrity 
TErp Sro Reli 
1 6.67 2 0.36 
2 6.33 4 0.501 
3 5.83 9 0.5 
4 7.25 2 0.814 
5 8.08 1 0.163 
6 6.25 4 0.502 
7 7.42 5 0.505 
8 4.42 9 0.5 
9 6.17 8 0.5 
10 4.83 0 0.344 
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No of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of Loss 
of Availability 
TErp Sro Reli 
1 6.67 2 0.36 
2 6.33 5 0.501 
3 5.83 3 0.353 
4 7.25 2 0.184 
5 8.08 1 0.163 
6 6.25 3 0.353 
7 7.42 5 0.505 
8 4.42 8 0.5 
9 6.17 6 0.502 
10 4.83 0 0.344 
 
No of 
Instances 
Security Risk in Terms of Loss 
of Confidentiality 
TErp Sro Reli 
1 6.67 3 0.36 
2 6.33 5 0.501 
3 5.83 5 0.502 
4 7.25 3 0.184 
5 8.08 1 0.163 
6 6.25 4 0.502 
7 7.42 5 0.505 
8 4.42 9 0.5 
9 6.17 10+ 0.5 
10 4.83 0 0.344 
Appendix I. Research Protocol 
 
268 
 
The E-banking Risk Assessment and Risk Management among Banking and 
Finance Industries in Nigeria 
Abstract 
To describe the research protocol that will be used to investigate E-banking systems 
operational risk exposure levels in the context of the Nigerian banking industry. E-
banking risk assessment is a key strategy for identifying security / operational risks 
as well as developing key risk management strategy. However, our knowledge of 
operational risks and exposure levels in the Nigerian banking industry is limited. A 
Fuzzy Inference System, a Tree Augmented Naïve Bayes classifier and an extended 
operational risk assessment framework and methodology will be used to identify, 
analyze and evaluate the causal relationships and measure the risk exposure levels, 
based on the severity, frequency of risk occurrences and controls in place. Initial 
propositions regarding the identification of factors for Internet banking use will be 
generated through interviews with the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). CEOs 
interviews, document analysis, E-banking customers’ and Risk Management Officers 
survey participant will be used as evidence to support, refine, or redevelop the initial 
propositions. This will allow the development of a new risk assessment framework 
and methodology that identifies clearly operational risks / exposure levels in the 
Nigerian banking industry. This study is self-sponsored (January 2007). E-banking 
systems adoptions in Nigeria are well documented. However, studies investigating 
the nature of E-banking operational risks, frameworks, and assessment tools in 
practice in the Nigerian banking contexts are not common. Nigerian banking industry 
also presents research design, particularly data collection challenges. This proposed 
research is one of the first to identify the factors for Internet banking adoption, 
operational risk exposure levels that will facilitate the need for effective risk 
assessment and risk management techniques, which will further enhance the 
performance and acceptance of the banking and finance industry in Nigeria. This is 
particularly important, given the continuing increase and modification E-banking 
system adoption presents on the traditional banking risks in Nigeria as well as the 
global community. 
 
Introduction 
In Nigeria, the private sector is seen as the driving engine of the IT sector 
particularly the Banking and Finance industries. These industries plays a very crucial 
role in achieving the Nigeria’s aspiration of becoming a fully IT developed nation. 
One of the thrust of banking and financial institutions, is to meet the challenges of a 
globalize environment by encouraging the utilization of the Internet as well as other 
electronic means for banking and financial activities by the general public. However, 
in adopting fully E-banking systems, some well-founded practice for the 
identification of security / operational risks as well as the application of appropriate 
controls to manage identified risks is required.  
Background 
A review of published literature shows that, to date, a number of studies have been 
conducted to identify the need to securely and fully adopt the Internet for banking 
and finance purposes (Ezeoha, 2005 & 2006; Soroor, 2005; Furst, Lang, & Nolle, 
2006; Mattila & Mattila, 2005). Literatures on risk management for Internet Use 
world-wide have also been conducted (Sonaike, 2004; Cornu, 2004; Jagboro, 2003; 
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Kannan, 2004, Ramakrishnan, 2001, Hawke et al., 2003). Not many studies attempt 
to identify the need for risk assessment and risk management technique to enhancing 
the performance and acceptance of banking and finance on the Internet, specifically 
in Nigeria. However, focus is on the use of the E-banking in general and findings 
from these studies are mostly descriptive, and thus do not reveal the implementation 
benefit of risk assessment and risk management for the success/ survival of the 
industries. 
Significantly missing in the literature is the use of soft computing tools, such as TAN 
and FIS, in assessing internally the operational risk exposure level inherent in E-
banking systems. Further, many organizations are still using the classical risk 
formula (i.e. severity x likelihood) of a similar risk event taking place in the future, to 
create a two dimensional matrix that guides their risk tolerability judgement 
(Summers 1977; Carroll, 1996; Pfleeger, 1997; Caralli et al., 2007). Such an 
approach is failing nowadays as we move towards a more dynamic environment of 
knowledge; dependent on human driven information society.  
Therefore, this study seeks to fill the void in research determinants of the E-banking 
system risk assessment and risk management among banking and finance industries. 
Secondly, it seeks to understand the determinants of E-banking risk assessment and 
management in Nigeria. The banking and financial industries are the focus of this 
study as they are seen as the potential vehicle to achieving the Nigeria dream of a 
fully developed IT based environment since  bank frauds, forgeries, money laundry, 
insider abuse and erosion of public confidence constitute a set of disturbing issues in 
the present-day Nigerian banking system. Therefore the banking and finance 
industries must play their role to help the nation to attain the objective of E-banking 
systems adoption. 
Aim and Objectives of Study 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the factors influencing the full 
adoption of Internet banking, and to identify and examine the importance of E-
banking system risk assessment and management in Nigeria banking contexts. 
Our objectives are to: 
 Explore approaches to determining Internet banking adoption rate across 
several continent of the world (from January 2007 – September 2009). 
 Explore approaches to identifying, analysing, and evaluating E-banking risks 
in general and specifically in the context of the Nigeria banking industry 
(from August 2008 – November 2009). 
 Examine ways soft computing tools and other risk assessment techniques can 
be instrumental in overcoming challenges in evaluating operational risks 
(from May 2009 – December 2010). 
 Understand the causal relationships among the indicators of the quality of the 
E-banking use, risk assessment and risk Management among banking and 
finance industries (June 2010 – December 2010). 
Research Questions 
1 How can the E-banking risk identified in the Nigeria banking industry be 
assessed, managed and to what extent? 
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2 How effective are the current tools and techniques for identifying, analysing and 
evaluating E-banking in general and specifically in the Nigeria contexts. 
3 What is the status of Internet banking adoption among individuals in Nigeria? 
4 What is the status of Internet banking adoption among Banking and Finance 
Industries in Nigeria? 
5 What are the risks involved in adopting E-banking systems for banking and 
finance services in Nigeria? 
Study Design 
The focus of this study is to understand the processes, through which operational 
risks occurs in Nigeria E-banking systems and the environmental constraints 
impacting successful adoption of E-banking systems in Nigeria. These elements are 
reflected in our research design. Both quantitative and qualitative research survey 
approaches will be adopted. Initial interviews will be held with senior banking 
officers categorized as CEOs, risk assessment officers, IT officers, and branch 
managers. The content of these interviews will be analysed to identify quantitatively 
the severity / frequency of operational risk occurrences and causal relationships 
between risk factors in the Nigeria banking industries. These causal relationships, 
severity / frequency of OR occurrences will be used to inform interviewees, which 
will explore their perceptions relative to the identified risk factors and their risk 
assessment and management strategies or techniques. Qualitative electronic 
questionnaires will be administered to the banking customers to identify operational 
risks / risk factors, severity and frequency of OR occurrences which will further 
reveal any undiscovered details (from the senior banking officers interviews) 
impacting upon the Nigeria E-banking systems adoption. This will allow the 
development of a new risk assessment framework, methodology, and measurement 
metrics to explain the inherent operational risk exposure level in the context of the 
Nigerian banking industry. 
Study Setting / Location 
The will be conducted in two commercial banks. These banks are situated in Warri 
and Abraka town of Delta state Nigeria.  
Study Population 
The study focuses on senior banking officers and their banking customers in the 
south-south region of Nigeria. Based on the population census conducted in 2006, 
Delta state is considered the second largest state in the south-south region, with a 
total population of about 4,000,000 million people, and which is about 20% of the 
south-south region (National Population Commission of Nigeria, 2011). The south-
south region consists of five major ethnic groups and they are: Urhobo, lgbo, lzon, 
Isoko and Itsekiri. These ethic groups also claim a common ancestry and similar 
culture as manifested in their religious worship, music, dance, festivals, art and 
crafts. Christianity, Islam, and traditional worship are the common religious practice 
in Delta state. 
Eligibility Criteria 
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This study focus on both banking executives which are responsible in influencing 
and implementing recommended changes to their current E-banking system and risk 
assessment process as well as banking customers (the end users) of the E-banking 
system. Therefore participants of these surveys and interviews must be eligible to 
independently conduct banking and finance activities.  
Measurement of the Variables  
Risk management encompasses three processes: risk assessment, risk mitigation, and 
evaluation and assessment. Risk assessment is the first process in the risk 
management methodology, it is used to determine the extent of the potential threat 
and the risk associated with an IT system. The output of this process helps to identify 
appropriate controls for reducing or eliminating risk during the risk mitigation 
process (Stoneburner, G., Goguen, A., and Feringa, A., 2002). A thorough and 
proactive risk assessment is the first step in establishing a sound information security 
program. Two types of risk analysis will be used, quantitative risk analysis and 
qualitative risk analysis (Miller, 2000). Hence, standard instruments will be used as 
much as possible. Basically, the study will adopt the existing standards for the 
management of information security for the banking and finance industry by ISO 
17799 (2005), ISO 27001 / BS 7799-2 (2005), and BS 7799-3 (2005) and few 
modifications if necessary (Mann, 2006).  
Several measurement scales will be considered during the questionnaire development 
and will include: ordinal, nominal, interval, and Likert scales (see Moser and Kalton, 
1971). Several of these scales will be used in the development of the questionnaire. 
However, the five-point Likert scales will mostly be used in the questions developed. 
A major reason for this approach is to enable smoothness, exploitation of 
approximation and imprecision in human-like reasoning, such that statistically and 
practically risks and risk exposure levels in the E-banking OR event data, can be 
identified. A five-point Likert scale, ranging from (1) ‘strongly disagree’ to (5) 
strongly agree will also be used to measure the reasons for E-banking system non-
adoption.  
Data Collection  
Data collection will be conducted in two phases: a pilot study phase and a 
questionnaire survey phase. A pilot study will be used to pre-test the questionnaire 
and will be followed up by interviews. Next, a structured electronic mail 
questionnaire will be sent to senior executives and customers of the commercial 
banks. Our initial interviews with the senior banking officers will aim to understand 
the quantitative impact of operational risks occurrences on their E-banking 
performance and risk assessment outcomes. The CEO will be chosen as a main 
respondent of this study since the CEO is typically the best person in the position of 
adopting the intensive risk assessment/ risk management process in the industry. The 
customer based questionnaire will be used to identify further the causal relationships 
between risk attributes. Analysis of data generated through this study will be used to 
develop a new risk assessment framework. 
Data Analysis 
Prior to in-depth analysis, an initial data pre-processing will be conducted to 
optimize and clean the data set collected.  Reliability of scale will then be carried out 
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on the pre-processed dataset, in order to test consistency of the scale and ensure that 
the scale is measuring the same construct. In addition, factor analysis will be used to 
reduce the dimensionality of the dataset. These processes are considered relevant to 
optimize performance and prediction accuracy of the proposed soft computing 
algorithms, as every prediction algorithm has its weaknesses and strength (Witten & 
Frank, 2005; Dunham, 2003) such as: capability to handle noise, missing data, 
various attribute coding and so on.  
Ethical Considerations 
Interviewees and questionnaire respondents will be provided with an explanation of 
the purpose of the interviews and surveys. Respondents will also be informed that 
their participation is confidential and voluntary. Participating banks will informed 
that they could withdraw from the research project at any time. A cover letter will be 
sent to each participant to explain the purpose of the study and the ethical rules. In 
addition, participants will be informed that cookies and personal data stored by the 
web browser will not be used in the surveys. Report findings will not be linked in 
any way to them as a participant or as a bank. Participating banks will also informed 
that data collected will be destroyed / deleted after data collected had been analysed. 
Participants will also be informed that, should they require an acknowledgement we 
will be much obliged to do so. 
Limitations 
There are several limitations that are inherent in both qualitative and quantitative 
study and are limitations of the current research protocol. In particular, the findings 
of qualitative study cannot be generalized beyond the context of the study. However, 
they are likely to provide knowledge of similar contexts. Quantitative data may be 
difficult to acquire from the banking industries due to data protection act and privacy 
policies governing the banking industries. 
Conclusion 
The key to determining how to approach operational risk exposures associated with 
E-banking systems lies with risk analysis. If the monetary or liability risk of an 
industry is small, it may not be necessary to invest in expensive countermeasures to 
additionally secure the systems. However, if the risk analysis proves that certain 
threats to the E-banking use can prove costly to the financial industry, it may 
therefore make sense to take action to limit the exposure. A thorough risk analysis 
holds the answers as to how to address the E-banking risk management needs. 
Funding 
This study is self-sponsored and based on voluntary response. 
 
